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Part I: Charter schools are publicly funded schools that, in exchange for ex-
panded accountability, receive more autonomy and experience fewer regulations than
traditional public schools. Previous work has found mixed evidence on the impacts
of charter schools on both charter and non-charter students. However, these studies
focus almost exclusively on test scores and may not fully account for endogenous
movements of students and location of schools. Using data from an anonymous large
urban school district, I investigate how charter schools affect both charter and non-
charter students. In the first chapter I look at the effects of charter schools on charter
students. I find that charter schools generate improvements in student behavior and
attendance but the effects on test scores differ by subject. These results change lit-
tle after correcting for selection based on changes in outcomes, endogenous attrition,
or persistence. In the second chapter I investigate whether charters affect students
who remain in non-charter schools. I find little evidence of charter school impacts
on non-charter students. However I also find evidence that regressions using school
fixed-effects may be biased. Changes in peer characteristics do not appear to play a
large role in the charter impacts.
Part II: Strains on the Federal budget have created worries that Federal fund-
ing of aid for higher education will fall in the future. If this happens, state govern-
ments will need to try to re-allocate their higher education spending more efficiently.
One possible way to do this would be to shift funding away from public provision
towards demand-side subsidies so that more students could attend private colleges.
However, this will only work if private colleges provide benefits to students over pub-
lic. In order to answer this question, I use highly detailed and rich data sets to assess
whether there are benefits to attending private colleges over public ones. For males
the wage return is small and statistically insignificant during their twenties but sta-
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exhibit increases in the likelihood of finishing a bachelor’s degree.
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INTRODUCTION TO THE DISSERTATION
In recent years the field of economics has expanded to study many topics not
traditionally considered be “economics.” Nowhere is that more apparent than in the
study of education. Historically, the interests of economists in education is how it
affects wages and the macroeconomy. Today, however, economic research has gone
beyond looking at what the effects of education are, to studying how to improve
education itself. Economists have been able to shed new light on our understanding
of the education process by highlighting the substantial role of incentives and the
importance of school governance.
This dissertation falls squarely into that line of research by studying two
aspects of school governance. The first is a relatively new type of school in the
United States called charter schools, one of the fastest growing reforms in education
today. Charter schools are publicly funded schools that operate under a contract,
called a charter, with a government agency, rather than being directly run by a local
school district. They are provided a degree of autonomy from local school boards and
freedom from some regulations in return for additional accountability requirements.
Despite often being managed by private organizations, charters are public schools and
receive almost all of their funding from government sources. Since 1997 the number
of charter schools in the US has increased almost six fold, and the number of charter
students has more than doubled since 1999, as is shown in Figure 1.1. Today, 1.15
million students nationwide attend charter schools.
Because of their incredible growth over the last ten years, charter schools
have gained a lot of attention from researchers and policy analysts alike. Most of the
research has focused on two major questions. The first is how charter schools affect
students who attend them. Theoretically it is unclear whether charters would be
beneficial or detrimental to students on average. On one hand, charters have fewer
regulatory burdens and are at higher risk of being shut down if they under-perform,
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thus providing incentives to increase effort. On the other hand, charters have high
levels of student turnover and eliminating some regulations may be detrimental to
students. I study this question in the first chapter using data from an anonymous
large urban school district (ALUSD). My findings on test scores are consistent with
the previous literature and suggest that charter schools have little impact. However,
unlike previous work, I am able to study the effects of charters on student behavior
and attendance. I find evidence that schools that begin as charters (startup charters)
improve discipline and attendance. In addition, I find these results to be robust to
corrections for selection based on changes in outcomes, endogenous attrition, and
persistence. In fact, it also appears that these impacts do not persist after students
return to non-charter schools and can be explained by differences in school size,
student-teacher ratios, and teacher experience. Thus, it seems that the benefits of
charter schools are unlikely to be a characteristic of their governance structure and
are more a characteristic of their small size and younger or less experienced teaching
staff.
The second major question regarding charter schools that researchers have
considered is how charters affect students who remain in regular public schools. Often
charter proponents will argue that charter schools generate incentives for non-charter
public schools to improve, since the non-charters lose money if one of their assigned
students choose to attend a charter. However charter schools may also affect the
characteristics of a non-charter student’s peers in a detrimental way. The loss of
funding from students attending charter schools could also make it difficult for non-
charter schools to improve. Once again using the data from ALUSD, I study this
question in chapter two. In addition to analyses with student and school-fixed effects,
which is the standard identification strategy in this literature, I also conduct analyses
that add school specific time-trends and use instrumental variable techniques. I find
little evidence that charter schools affect non-charter students. However, my results
3
suggest that previous work using only school fixed-effects may have biased estimates.
I also find that controlling for peer characteristics only slightly changes estimates
suggesting that changes in peer composition plays only a small role in charter impact
estimates on non-charter students.
In the third chapter, I move to governance of schools in higher education. Just
as in K-12 education, the governance of colleges and universities could have important
implications for their effectiveness in increasing human capital. In particular, I look
at the differences between colleges that are subsidized by state and local governments
(public colleges) and those that are privately owned and managed, usually by not-
for-profit organizations (private colleges). Thus, this is essentially an extension of
the literature on the effectiveness of public K-12 schools relative to private schools
(Altonji, Elder and Taber 2005a, Rouse 1998, Neal 1997, Evans and Schwab 1995).
I look at how wages, labor force participation, and educational attainment differ for
students from these two types of schools. I find statistically significant increases in
male wages and educational attainment. However for women, I find no impact on
wages, although there are improvements in educational attainment. Unfortunately,
because of selection, at best my estimates are upper bounds. Nonetheless, this means
that, while the effects on male wages may be inconclusive, women do no better by
attending a private college than a public. I do find lower divorce rates amongst
private women, suggesting there may be marriage market benefits.
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1. ACHIEVEMENT AND BEHAVIOR IN CHARTER SCHOOLS:
DRAWING A MORE COMPLETE PICTURE
1.1 Introduction
In this chapter I investigate how charter schools affect students who attend
them. In addition to this theoretical ambiguity discussed in the introduction to
this dissertation, the empirical evidence has been mixed. We might conclude from
these studies that the effect of charter schools on academic performance is, at best,
unclear. Why then does the number of charter students and schools continue to
rise while survey and anecdotal evidence suggest that parents are generally satisfied
with charters?1 One potential explanation for this puzzle is that charter schools
affect student outcomes in ways that researchers have not investigated. These al-
ternative outcomes may be particularly important in light of recent evidence of how
non-cognitive skills improve education and labor market outcomes (Heckman, Stixrud
and Urzua 2006, Jacob 2002, Heckman and Rubinstein 2001). In addition, work by
Weiher and Tedin (2002) and Jacob and Lefgren (2005) suggest that parents are more
concerned with discipline, safety, and student satisfaction than academic performance.
To my knowledge, no studies using individual panel data have looked at the
effects of charters on discipline and attendance. In order to study these outcomes,
along with retention rates, I use new data from an anonymous large urban school dis-
trict (ALUSD). This district has one of the largest and oldest district-level charter
1 See Bulkley and Fisher (2003) for a brief review of the survey literature and for anecdotal
evidence.
programs in the US. It has provided me with discipline and attendance records for
all charter and non-charter students from 1994-2004, along with test score records
from 1998-2004. This offers me an opportunity to investigate how charter schools
affect outcomes other than test scores and compare these results directly to test score
impacts.2 I find that charter schools are effective at improving student discipline and
attendance but effects on test scores vary by subject matter. Impacts on retention
rates and attendance rates are not statistically significant. Thus, the missing infor-
mation on these alternative outcomes could help explain the mixed results found in
the literature.
In addition to considering non-test outcomes, I investigate whether impacts
vary across different types of charter schools, since charters exhibit substantial amounts
of heterogeneity. Thus, in addition to estimating average charter impacts, I consider
the impacts of schools that begin as charters (startup charters) and those that con-
vert from regular schools into charter schools (conversion charters) separately. While
both types of schools are subject to additional accountability requirements and gain
freedom from some regulations, conversions often retain the same staff and facilities
after converting, while startups begin as completely new schools. Thus, the effects
of these two types of charters could differ substantially. In addition, identifying
whether these schools provide different impacts may have policy implications, since
states and districts could allow only one type when starting a charter program. My
findings show that discipline impacts are larger in startup charters than in conversion
charters while test-score and retention impacts are similar. I also find evidence that
suggests attendance improves in startup charters.
Nonetheless, there are some potential problems with individual fixed effects
analyses that could affect my estimates along with most of the recent work on charter
schools. Luckily, the large size of the district I study and the long time span of the
2 Note that from now on, I will refer to these outcomes collectively as “student performance.”
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data provide me with the ability to study some of these problems in-depth and to
account for them in ways that previous work has not been able to.
One potential problem is that the assumptions underlying fixed effects are
invalid if students choose to attend charter schools based on changes in outcomes.
If this occurs then the estimates of charter impacts may be contaminated by mean
reversion. This phenomenon has been widely noted in the job-training literature
(Heckman and Smith 1999, Ashenfelter 1978) while, in education, mean-reversion
has been shown to occur in standardized exams (Chay, McEwan and Urquiola 2005).
Previous research has not found evidence of this phenomenon in charter schools, but
this work only considers test scores. I find evidence that suggests there is selection due
to changes in discipline, attendance, and test scores in charters. I use interrupted
panel strategies (Hanushek, Kain, Rivkin and Branch 2005, Hanushek, Kain and
Rivkin 2002, Ashenfelter 1978) in order to mitigate the extent of this bias. When
I use this strategy, discipline and attendance estimates are not substantially affected
while the impacts on test scores remain mixed.
Another potential problem is non-random attrition. Many administrative
datasets have individuals entering and leaving the data. A particular concern with
respect to charter schools is that charter students may be more inclined to leave
for private schooling than non-charter students. This could create bias if the rea-
son charter students leave the district for these private schools is related to their
performance in the charter schools Although there is little evidence of this type of
student movement, since it is difficult to track students as they enter private schools,
Hanushek, Kain, Rivkin, and Branch (2005) find that charter students leave Texas
public schools at more than 2.5 times the rate of non-charter students. Thus, dif-
ferential attrition could be a substantial problem if the underlying causes of attrition
are correlated with outcomes. To address non-random attrition I use Kyriazidou’s
(1997) estimator for sample selection in panel data models. I find little to suggest
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that non-random attrition has a substantial effect on the charter impact estimates.
In addition, I also generate false data for attrited students under various assump-
tions to test the sensitivity of the discipline results to attrition. These suggest that
only under the most extreme assumptions could endogenous attrition eliminate the
discipline impacts.
A third complication arises if charter schools affect students after they return
to non-charter schools. In this case, fixed effects estimates may be biased since
these “persistent” outcomes will be applied to periods when the charter indicator
equals zero. In addition, whether or not charter school impacts are long-term is
relevant to policy. For the foreseeable future, the stock of charter schools in the
US will be small relative to non-charters. Thus most students who enter charters
in elementary and middle school will return to non-charter schools before leaving
the public school system. If charters provide short-term benefits but no long-term
benefits, the usefulness of these schools for generating human capital improvements
will be limited. The long time coverage of my data allows me to measure the extent of
this problem by conducting regressions with lagged measures of charter status. I find
little evidence of persistence in charter impacts after students return to non-charter
schools. Nonetheless, even if charter schools generate only temporary performance
improvements, they also tend to spend less money than non-charter schools. In 2002,
median per-student expenditures for charter districts were 13% lower than in non-
charter districts.3 Thus, if charters provide the same level of long-term performance
and cost less money, they still enhance the efficiency of the education system.
Overall, these results imply that charter schools in ALUSD provide improve-
ments in student discipline and attendance with mixed effects on test scores. How-
ever, these impacts are only temporary. While these results are not necessarily repre-
sentative of charter schools in other states and districts, they generate two important
3 National Center for Education Statistics, School District Finance Survey.
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implications for the charter literature. First, they provide evidence that individual
fixed effects strategies are robust to multiple bias reducing procedures, suggesting
that this econometric strategy is appropriate in the charter context. Second, they
highlight that the singular focus of the charter literature, and many other branches
of the economics of education, on test scores misses key pieces of information that
could lead to erroneous policy recommendations.
1.2 Background on Charter Schools
1.2.1 Previous Literature
Research on the effects of charter schools on charter students has been mixed
overall. Of the papers that use more advanced econometric techniques, some re-
searchers find statistically insignificant or statistically significant negative impacts of
attending a charter school (Hanushek, Kain, Rivkin and Branch 2007, Bifulco and
Ladd 2006, Sass 2006, Zimmer and Buddin 2003), while others find positive impacts
(Booker, Gilpatric, Gronberg and Jansen 2007, Hoxby and Rockoff 2004, Solmon and
Goldschmidt 2004, Solmon, Paark and Garcia 2001).
With the exception of Solmon and Goldschmidt (2004) who look at retention,
all of these papers only investigate the impacts on test scores. However, student
“performance” could encompass an array of outcome measures in addition to academic
achievement such as behavior, attendance, and social skills. These non-cognitive
outcomes have been shown to play important roles in educational attainment and job
market success (Heckman et al. 2006, Jacob 2002, Heckman and Rubinstein 2001).
Other research suggests that parents care about non-academic outcome measures
when they make decisions regarding their children’s schooling. Weiher and Tedin
(2002) survey charter parents in Texas and find that only 22% cite test scores as the
most important reason for sending their children to charter schools while 38% specify
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discipline or safety and 26% cite moral values. Jacob and Lefgren (2005) study
parents’ preferences when choosing teachers and find that for most parents their
children’s satisfaction is more important than academic performance. If charter
schools seek to improve these alternative outcomes then they may shift resources
away from improving test scores. Such a phenomenon could partially explain the
range of estimates of charter effectiveness that researchers have found.
All of the previously cited papers on charter schools use individual fixed effects
are similar analyses except for Hoxby and Rockoff (2004).4 Thus, another potential
reason that these estimates are inconclusive is that there could be aspects of charter
schools that generate violations of the assumptions that underlie fixed effects analyses,
and hence could lead to bias.
1.2.2 Charter Schools in the United States
Charter schools have become relatively commonplace across the US since the
first states enacted charter laws in the early 1990’s. Today approximately 2.2% of
public school students attend charter schools. Charters are more common in urban
areas than suburban or rural. In 2003, the most recent year detailed national charter
data is available, charter students were more than twice as likely to reside in urban
areas than non-charter students.5
Although it is common in charter research to classify charters homogeneously,
there is substantial heterogeneity across schools in how they are managed, their goals
and aims, the student populations they cater to, and their level of independence from
local school systems. Perhaps the most substantial difference between charters is
to whom they are accountable. Every charter school has a relationship with some
4 Hoxby and Rockoff (2004) use oversubscription lotteries to identify charter impacts. These are
admission lotteries conducted by schools that have more applicants than spaces available, While
this strategy is effective at eliminating bias, it usually limits studies to a small number of schools, in
this case three. In addition, these schools are likely of higher quality than the average charter since
having a lottery is an indicator of high demand for a school.
5 Common Core of Data, National Center for Education Statistics, US Department of Education.
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government institution. However, this can be a local school district, state or county
government, independent chartering board, or a university. As of 2003, 51% of all
charter students were in a school chartered by a local school district.6
A second important distinction to make between charter schools is whether
they are new schools (startup charters), or if the schools were previously non-charter
schools that switched to charter status (conversion charters). Understanding this
distinction may shed light on the mechanism through which charters affect student
outcomes since attending a conversion charter may be a less substantial change than
attending a startup charter. When a school converts to charter status it usually re-
mains in the same building and keeps the same teachers, administrators, and students.
In addition, most students continue to attend conversions because they are assigned
to the school based on the location of their residence. Thus, comparing conversion
charters to startups gives us insight into how reducing regulations and providing au-
tonomy alone, without an influx of new staff or facilities, affects student performance.
Different impacts between these two charter types may also have policy implications,
since some districts and states could permit only one type of charter school. This
distinction has been the subject of some previous research suggesting that the effects
on student achievement differ across these two types of schools (Sass 2006, Buddin
and Zimmer 2005b, Zimmer and Buddin 2003).
Despite these differences, there are a number of similarities that are present in
nearly every charter. First, charters are often exempt from many regulations. These
can range from the relaxation of minor regulations such as being able to adjust the
length of the school-day or provide classes on weekends, to relaxing more fundamental
regulations such as teacher certification and unionization rules. Second, in the case
of startup charters, parents have the option to enroll their child in a charter school
or in their assigned public school. This means that startup charters need to attract
6 Ibid.
11
students or risk being closed down. Third, charter schools gain autonomy from the
administration of the local school district. The extent of this can range from complete
autonomy to allowing school officials more flexibility to manage the school as they see
fit. Fourth, charters are more able to focus on certain student groups, such as at-risk
students, or on particular subjects, such as fine arts. Last, charters often receive less
money per-student from tax revenues than the local public schools do, though the
extent varies by state. For example, charter schools in Michigan get 100% of the state
and local per-student funding level while Pennsylvania charters get only 70%-82%.7
Although charter schools have a number of advantages that may generate
improvements in student performance, there are some disadvantages as well. Thus,
net impacts are theoretically ambiguous. While there are many ways that charters
may affect students, there are a few mechanisms that are particularly important. The
first is freedom from regulations. Charter proponents argue that reducing regulations
makes it easier for schools to innovate and experiment. However, this does not
necessarily improve student performance since the experiments could turn out poorly.
Charters also may be reluctant to abandon an ineffective experimental strategy if
there are high fixed costs to changing, such as for retraining teachers. In addition,
some regulations, such as teacher certification, may be helpful.8
Another argument made by charter proponents is that charter schools per-
form better because they are at some risk of losing their charters. This could be
a powerful incentive for charter administrators and teachers to put more effort into
improving student performance, since they need to show improvement to keep their
jobs. The involuntary loss of a charter usually occurs for one of three reasons - low
enrollment, revocation by the chartering authority, or financial problems. While the
first two reasons provide incentives to exert more effort, the third may force schools
7 Center for Education Reform.
8 The evidence on the effectiveness of teacher certification has been mixed (Glazerman, Mayer
and Decker 2006, Chatterji 2005, Darling-Hammond, Holtzman and Gatlin 2005, Hoxby 2002b,
Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin 1999, Berger and Toma 1994)
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to cut spending, potentially reducing performance. Unfortunately, it is difficult to
determine how common involuntary losses of charters are since national data on char-
ter schools is very limited. Nonetheless we can identify an upper bound by looking
at overall closure rates for charters, which between 2000 and 2004 averaged 5.0% per
year compared to a closure rate in non-charter public schools of 1.8% during this
period.9
While researchers have generally thought about how these characteristics of
charter schools may affect academic outcomes, they also could play a role in non-
academic outcomes. For example, many charters are permitted to require students
to wear uniforms. Most traditional public schools do not have this ability. These
uniforms may reduce misbehavior and violence in schools by, for example, prevent-
ing students from displaying gang colors. Charters may also provide innovative
techniques to improve student behavior such as by maintaining longer hours to keep
children occupied during late afternoons or providing monetary rewards for high at-
tendance.
1.2.3 Charter Schools in ALUSD
ALUSD was one of the first school districts in the US to institute a charter
program. Although the program has been in existence since 1996, it did not start in
earnest until 1997. Half of the charter schools created to date by ALUSD were started
in 1997 or 1998. Today there are more than twenty charter schools in ALUSD along
with over 200 non-charter schools.10 There is also a large number of non-district
charter schools in the ALUSD area. Figure 1.2 shows the evolution of the charter
program in ALUSD by examining the fraction of enrollment by school type. As of the
2004-2005 school year nearly five percent of students in the ALUSD area attended a
9 Author’s calculation from Common Core of Data, National Center for Education Statistics, US
Department of Education. A school is considered to have closed if it is classified as operational in
year t− 1 and is no longer classified as such in year t.
10 Due to risk of revealing the district, I cannot provide the exact number of schools in ALUSD.
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district charter school while 8.5% attended a non-district charter.11 Charter students
in ALUSD are also more likely to be in grades below high school. All of the
charter schools I study are chartered by the ALUSD district. Nonetheless, Table
1.1 provides some information aggregated to the school level about district startup,
district conversion, and non-district charters as well as non-charter ALUSD schools.
The schools that convert are poorer and have more minorities than non-charters while
district startups are on-par with non-charters and non-district charters are wealthier
with fewer minorities. Startups and non-district charters also have lower passing
rates for state exams and lower attendance rates than non-charters while conversion
charter outcomes are better than for non-charters. All three types of charters have
lower rates of limited English proficiency (LEP), have less experienced teachers, are
smaller, and spend less money per-student than non-charters. However, for outcome
measures it is unclear how much of the differences are due to composition effects or
charter impacts.
1.3 Data
In this chapter I utilize a new set of administrative records from an anony-
mous large urban school district (ALUSD). This dataset includes information on
disciplinary infractions warranting an in-school suspension or harsher punishment,
attendance, scores from a nationally norm-referenced examination and a criterion-
referenced state examination, grades, course work, and a number of student charac-
teristics. A full accounting of the variables used in this chapter with definitions can
be found in Appendix Table 1. The data cover the 1994-1995 to 2004-2005 academic
years and I am able to follow individual students for as long as they attend school in
11 Since I do not know how many students in the non-district charters would have attended ALUSD
otherwise, the enrollment totals may overestimate the actual student population of the ALUSD
boundaries. However, almost all of the non-district charters in the area are located within the
boundaries of ALUSD and thus it is reasonable to assume that most of the students in these schools
would have attended ALUSD otherwise.
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Startup Charters Non-District 
Charters
Student Demographics (% of All Students in School)
  Limited English Proficient 30.3 18.8 12.2 10.9
(1.4) (3.3) (6.3)
  Economically Disadvantaged 86.0 89.2 84.2 70.9
(0.5) (0.4) (5.1)
  At-Risk 63.5 49.2 49.0 60.0
(2.2) (3.0) (1.1)
  Special Education 10.8 8.2 5.9 12.5
(0.8) (2.1) (1.1)
  Gifted 9.3 11.9 4.2 1.8
(0.6) (1.6) (4.5)
  White, Non-Hispanic 7.2 5.6 6.8 14.1
(0.3) (0.1) (3.2)
School Demographics
  Teacher Experience (% of Teachers in School)
    0 - 5 Years 39.2 58.4 55.2 65.2
(3.8) (2.1) (11.6)
    6 or More Years 60.8 41.6 44.8 34.8
(3.8) (2.1) (11.6)
  Student-Teacher Ratio 16.2 16.5 17.1 17.2
(0.2) (0.5) (1.8)
  Per-Pupil Operating Expenditures $6,916 $5,773 $5,032 $6,394
(0.6) (1.4) (0.6)
  Enrollment 895 769 433 373
(0.6) (3.4) (7.5)
Student Outcomes
  Attendance Rate 95.0 97.0 93.3 91.0
(0.8) (0.9) (3.3)
  State Exam - Math
     % Passing at Low Level 61.9 71.6 54.6 42.0
(1.2) (1.2) (5.7)
     % Passing at High Level 14.7 18.2 10.9 7.4
(0.8) (1.1) (4.2)
  State Exam - Reading
     % Passing at Low Level 73.1 84.0 71.8 58.0
(1.8) (0.3) (5.0)
     % Passing at High Level 17.3 23.2 15.6 11.1
(1.3) (0.5) (3.4)
Table 1.1 - School Characteristics in 2004
Observations are school level aggregates.  Total number of non-charter schools is over 200.  Total number of district and 
state charter schools is over 40.  Exact sample sizes cannot be provided due to confidentiality restrictions.  Absolute t-
statistic of mean relative to non-charter mean in parentheses.
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ALUSD, providing a long time-series on many students. After dropping observations
for early education, pre-kindergarten, and kindergarten, 55% of students who are first
observed in the data prior to ninth grade have at least four observations. In addition,
65% of charter students have a pre-charter observation and only 20% have neither
pre nor post-charter observations. A drawback of this dataset, however, is that I do
not observe students in non-ALUSD charter schools within the district’s geographic
boundaries.
Since not all students take the norm-referenced examination and test data
are only available starting in 1998, I generate two samples.12 I call the first sample
the “base sample.” This sample is used when analyzing any outcome other than test
scores. It includes students in grades 1-12 who were enrolled as of the end of October
of each year, since this is when demographic information is collected by the district.
The demographic files identify the school a student attends and thus I use this as
the student’s school for the year. Some observations are excluded due to missing
attendance data (< 0.1%), leaving more than 1.2 million observations of which more
than 50,000 are students in charter schools.13
I call the second sample the “test sample,” which includes all students in the
base sample from 1998-2004 who have scores recorded for the mathematics, reading,
and language portions of the norm-referenced examination. If any one of these
exams are missing I drop the observation so that all three test scores are analyzed
based on the same sample. The test is a commonly-used nationally norm-referenced
examination and was given to all English-speaking students in grades 1-8 and all
students in grades 9-11. This provides wider coverage of grades than previous work
on charter schools, since most districts and states do not start testing until third grade
and often stop testing by eighth grade. Students who were not proficient enough in
12 Norm-referenced examinations are tests that are scaled to match a representative sample of
students in the same grade. Some papers use criterion-referenced examinations instead, which are
exams where the student’s grade is based on a set of standards.
13 Due to requirements regarding the anonymity of the district, I cannot reveal exact sample sizes.
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English in grades 1-8 took a separate Spanish language exam. While I have data on
these exam results, the scores are not directly comparable to those of students taking
the English exam so I do not include them in the analysis.14 The final test sample
includes over 900,000 student-year observations, approximately 40,000 of which are
students in charter schools.
Table 1.2 provides summary statistics for the base sample. There are a
number of differences between charter students and non-charter students in ALUSD.
Charter students tend to be less wealthy, are less likely to be at-risk or limited English
proficient, and perform better than non-charter students on every outcome measure
listed. Comparing conversion charters to startups, startup students are more likely
to be minorities, less likely to be limited English proficient, more likely to be at-risk,
less likely to be gifted, and perform worse than conversion students on every outcome
measure considered in the table except disciplinary infractions.15
1.4 Baseline Empirical Strategy
Since most charter schools are schools of choice, it is likely that parents send
their children to charters for reasons that are unobservable to the econometrician.
We may be particularly concerned that students who enter charters differ from non-
charter students in terms of unobserved ability, parental motivation, or tendency
to misbehave. The summary statistics in Table 1.2 suggest that in ALUSD lower
ability students enter startups and higher ability students attend conversions. If this
selection is not properly addressed then my estimates of the charter impacts may be
14 Twenty-four percent of elementary student-year observations in the base sample have no test
score because they take the Spanish language exam, but by the time students reach middle school,
almost all are taking the English language exam. In high school, 23% of student-years in the base
sample are missing test scores. This is mostly due to students dropping out of school or moving
out of the district between October and the testing period in late winter. Some students also are
missing test scores due to illness or suspension during the testing period. A complete accounting
of data exclusions by year and grade level is provided in the Appendix Tables 2 and 3.
15 Test scores are measured by national percentile ranking. This is the percent of students in a
nationally representative sample of test takers who scored lower than the observed student.
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Variable Non-Charter Charter Conversion Startup
% Female 49.2 48.5 49.3 46.0
(3.1) (6.6)
% White, Non-Hispanic 10.6 11.8 14.8 2.1
(8.5) (40.4)
Grade level 5.9 5.2 4.8 6.6
(46.5) (69.4)
Year 1999.0 2000.8 2000.4 2001.9
(134.6) (68.3)
% Eligible for Free Lunch 59.5 59.7 61.9 52.7
(1.2) (18.9)
% Eligible for Reduced Price Lunch 6.7 7.7 7.2 9.4
(9.7) (8.5)
% Other Economic Disadvantage 5.2 7.2 5.1 13.9
(21.5) (34.7)
% Limited English Proficient 25.1 21.0 22.0 17.9
(22.4) (10.1)
% At Risk 55.4 49.6 44.4 66.3
(26.9) (45.0)
% Special Education 11.2 8.1 8.9 5.3
(23.0) (13.4)
% Gifted and Talented 10.2 16.1 20.9 0.7
(44.9) (57.1)
% Recent Immigrant (within 3 years) 6.1 4.0 4.0 3.8
(21.1) (1.3)
% Parent is Migrant Worker 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.9
(1.4) (4.0)
# of Disciplinary Infractions 0.42 0.26 0.30 0.16
  (Suspension or More Severe) (27.4) (14.0)
Attendance Rate (%) 93.9 95.2 96.0 92.4
(29.8) (49.5)
% Retained 8.6 5.2 4.0 11.25
(23.7) (24.7)
Reading & English Grades 80.0 82.9 83.2 80.9
(57.4) (18.1)
Math Grade 79.7 82.7 83.2 79.7
(55.7) (25.1)
Average Grade 80.2 83.2 83.8 80.4
(65.9) (28.5)
Math Exam National Percentile Ranking 49.9 56.1 58.9 48.1
  (1998 and Later) (40.9) (30.7)
Reading Exam National Percentile Ranking 44.8 52.1 55.5 42.2
  (1998 and Later) (47.6) (38.1)
Language Exam National Percentile Ranking 49.7 56.5 59.7 46.9
  (1998 and Later) (44.5) (37.2)
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses.  Sample contains over 1.2 million non-charter student-year observations, 
approximately 40,000 observations of students in conversion charters and approximately 13,000 observations of 
students in startup charters.  Exact sample sizes cannot be revealed due to confidentiality restrictions.
Non-Charter vs. Charter Conversion vs. Startup
Table 1.2 - Summary Statistics of ALUSD Base Sample By Charter Status
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biased.
In the absence of a natural experiment or the ability to use an instrumental
variables approach, charter researchers have turned to panel data methods. Following
this line of research, I use individual fixed effects strategies to assess the effectiveness
of charter schools in ALUSD. However, this strategy has some limitations. Three
complications that may be important are selection based on changes in outcomes, non-
random attrition, and the persistence of charter effects. Hence, I separate the main
analysis into two sections. In this section I set up the baseline fixed effects strategy.
In the next section, I explain how each of the previously stated complications could
generate bias and I provide estimates that account for each of them.
If the effect of attending a charter on outcomes is constant across individuals
then my goal would be to estimate the effect of attending a charter school in ALUSD
on any student - the treatment effect (TE). However, treatment effects are likely to
vary across individuals and schools. Thus, I aim to estimate the average effect of
treatment on the treated (ATT) instead. The ATT is defined as
ATT = E(y1it|cit = 1)− E(y0it|cit = 1) (1.1)
where cit is an indicator of whether a student is a charter student, y
1
it is the outcome
while enrolled in a charter and y0it is the outcome while not enrolled in a charter for
student i in year t. It is not possible to calculate (1.1) since an individual cannot be
enrolled in a charter and enrolled in a non-charter at the same time. Thus, we need
to find a counterfactual group that will provide us with an accurate approximation of
E(y0it|cit = 1). The simplest solution would be to use the outcomes for students who do
not attend charters as the counterfactual, E(y0it|cit = 0). This is sufficient if students
are assigned to charter schools randomly. However, parents and students choose




6= E(y0it|cit = 1) and any attempt to estimate ATT using this counterfactual will be
biased.16
In order to address the bias in the comparison group one could condition on
a set of observables Xit to control for observable differences between treatment and
comparison groups, but this still leaves the possibility that the choice of cit will be
caused by y0it through some omitted factor. This is the general strategy used in much
of the early research on charter schools with some using school level data (Bettinger
2005, Hoxby 2004, Hoxby 2003, Hoxby 2002a) and others using student level data
(Buddin and Zimmer 2005b, Nelson, Rosenberg and Van Meter 2004, Goldstein 2004,
Eberts and Hollenbeck 2002).
The availability of panel data provides me with a strategy that may correct
this problem. If the decision to attend a charter is not correlated with unobserved
characteristics of students that vary over time then the ATT can be identified by
θ = E(y1it|cit = 1,Xit, φi)− E(y0it|cit = 0,Xit, φi). (1.2)
where φi is an time-invariant individual specific effect. Under the additional assump-
tion of strict exogeneity that states the outcome measure is uncorrelated with charter
status and exogenous characteristics in past or future periods, or
E(yit|ci1, ..., ciT ,Xi1...XiT , φi) = E(yit|cit,Xit, φi) (1.3)
we can estimate θ consistently using individual fixed effects. In addition, the estimate
16 One strategy to correct for this is to use data on oversubscription lotteries (Cullen, Jacob and
Levitt 2006, Hoxby and Rockoff 2004). However, the small number of such lotteries that are available
make such an analysis infeasible in most datasets. Not surprisingly then, ALUSD has not had any
lotteries. Another strategy that has been used for a similar school reform in Britain (Clark 2005)
is to see how schools that barely vote to switch to charter status compare to those that barely fall
short. However, in ALUSD schools choose to convert to charter status by petition rather than
election, and thus there is no information on those schools that do not get enough signatures to
convert.
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of θ, θ̂, has a causal interpretation. Thus, initially, I estimate θ using the following
regression equation:
yit = α+ θCit +DemogitΓ + SwitchitΦ +GradeyearitΨ + φi + εit (1.4)
where yit is some outcome measure for student i at time t such as discipline or
changes in test scores, cit is an indicator of charter status, Demogit is a vector of
time-varying observable demographic characteristics, Switchit is a set of variables
that define whether a student changes schools in year t, Gradeyearit is a set of grade-
by-year indicator variables that account for changes in outcomes over time and grade
level, φi is defined as above, and εit is i.i.d. error. This equation can also be modified
such that Cit contains indicators for multiple types of charters (Cit ≡ [Cconv, Cstart]′
and θ ≡ [θconv, θstart] ) so that the average effect of treatment on the treated can be
calculated for different types of charter schools.
Two recent papers (Ballou, Teasley and Zeidner 2006, Hoxby and Murarka
2006) have raised concerns regarding the validity of using the individual fixed effects
strategy to identify charter effects. Thus, I would like to briefly outline how I address
some of the problems they raise. The largest concern these papers have is that by
using fixed-effects, the charter impact is identified by using only those students who
switch between charter and non-charter schools and thus may not be representative
of all charter students. In the ALUSD data, this concern is mitigated by the fact
that 80% of charter students have at least one non-charter period and thus, most of
the charter students are identified in the regressions. In addition, the long time-span
and the fact that grades one through eleven are tested in ALUSD, ensures that the
identified sample is more representative of charter students in the district overall than
the samples used in previous research. A second concern they have is that endogenous
switching based off of temporary shocks could bias the estimates. The interrupted
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panel strategy I use in the next section addresses this problem. A third concern is
that the fixed effects analyses drastically reduces the size of the identified sample,
making estimates imprecise. However, the ALUSD data includes a large number
of identified charter students - 24,000 in the base sample. Thus, my estimates are
reasonably precise.
Hoxby and Murarka also argue that using oversubscription lotteries to identify
charter effects is a superior strategy to fixed-effects regressions. While they are correct
that a lottery based strategy has substantial advantages over fixed-effects, there are
two important aspects of lotteries that may be undesirable. The first is that, since
oversubscribed schools are likely to be of higher quality then schools with spaces
available, a comparison of lottery winners and losers will only identify the impacts
for the best charter schools. While this is useful information if we are trying to see
whether charters can, in ideal situations, be effective, it only generates as an upper
bound estimate of ATT . Second, lotteries may be subject to substantial attrition
bias, since parents who lose lotteries may be more likely to send their children to
private school than those who win. Since sending a child to private school is correlated
with the parent’s wealth, motivation, and interest in their children’s education, this
would leave students with less motivated and poorer parents in the comparison group,
generating an upwards bias in the charter impact estimates.
Another issue that has arisen in charter research is whether one should analyze
test score levels or annual changes. Most charter research uses the latter when panel
data are available. The reason is that, even after accounting for innate ability with
fixed effects, test scores reflect both knowledge stock and flow. For example, suppose
test scores are defined by
yit = γ0yi,t−1 + γ1xit + γ2zi + νit (1.5)
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where yi,t−1 is lagged test scores, xit represents time-varying characteristics of an
individual such as what school she attends in year t, zi represents time-invariant
characteristics, and νit is a random shock. The reason yi,t−1 is included in this
equation is that educational input from previous years also plays a role in current
test scores. For example, a student cannot pass an algebra test if he never learned
how do arithmetic. Thus, in order to ensure that the test scores reflect the added
value of the student’s current school, we need to account for this stock component
of achievement. One strategy would be to include lags of the outcome variable in
the regression, but lagged dependent variables are generally endogenous. Thus, a
common solution is to restrict γ0 = 1 so that
yit − yi,t−1 = ∆yit = γ1xit + γ2zi + νit. (1.6)
Therefore, using this value-added framework, we difference out the contribution of
previous schools to student test scores.
While this procedure seems reasonable for test scores, it does not necessarily
extend to other outcomes. Consider the case of discipline. One could make the
argument that discipline has a much stronger relationship with a student’s current
environment than past schooling environments (i.e. γ0 ≈ 0). However, one could
also reasonably argue the opposite. This same situation applies to attendance as
well. Thus, while I consider value-added models for test scores, I study both levels
and value-added models for discipline and attendance. For retention I only consider
levels.
Unless specified otherwise, all regressions in this chapter include the grade-
by-year indicators along with the time-varying demographic characteristics - whether
the student is eligible for free lunch, is eligible for reduced price lunch, has some other
economic disadvantage, has immigrated within three years, and whether one of the
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student’s parents is a migrant worker.
I also include a measure of student mobility in the model (Switchit). Pre-
vious research has shown that switching schools can have a detrimental effect on
performance (Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin 2004). To account for this, I follow pre-
vious work on charter schools by controlling for whether a student switches schools
in a given year (Booker et al. 2007, Hanushek et al. 2007, Bifulco and Ladd 2006).
In addition, I split school switches into “structural” and “non-structural” switches
where the latter is defined as switching into a school that less than ten percent of
a student’s previous class switches into in year t. Conversely, a student undergoes
a structural switch when more than ten percent of his or her previous class switch
into the same school in year t. This is the same definition used by Bifulco and Ladd
(2006). Since ALUSD has a liberal space-available transfer program, non-structural
switches could result from students changing addresses or transferring schools. I also
define students as non-structural switchers during the year when they enter the base
sample, except for those who enter during first grade.17 Thus, 21% of student-years
undergo non-structural switches (10% of student-years are non-structural switches
between two ALUSD schools) and 10% of student-years undergo structural switches.
The reason I make the distinction between structural and non-structural
switches is that a structural switch is likely to be exogenous while non-structural
switches are choices made by the students and parents. In this sense charter students
are similar to those who make non-structural switches between non-charter schools,
and it is possible that the two types of switches have different effects on charter im-
pacts. In addition, the fact that non-structural switching is a choice variable has
implications for the interrupted panel estimates I provide in the next section.
Table 1.3 provides regression estimates of the model in equation (1.4).18 The
17 I can identify whether students switch in 1994, the first year of data I use in the analysis, based
on information on the schools they attended in 1993.
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standard errors for each regression are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered by
school.19 In column one I group all charters together into one indicator variable.
There is a statistically significant reduction in both level and value-added measures
of disciplinary infractions, a statistically significant improvement in math test score
changes, and a statistically significant drop in reading. Impacts on attendance rates,
retention rates, and language test impacts are not statistically significant.
These results hide a substantial amount of heterogeneity. Column 2 shows
the same regression, but the charters are split into conversions and startups. The
two types of charters show similar patterns in the estimates but the magnitudes differ
substantially. For example, most of the discipline improvements from column one
occur in startup charters. The drop of 0.79 infractions per year when students enter a
startup charter is equal to 69% of the mean infraction rate in the year prior to startup
entry. For attendance, neither type of charter produces a statistically significant effect
on levels but students who attend startup charters show improvements in value-added
attendance of 2.5 percentage points relative to a baseline absentee rate of eleven per-
cent in the year prior to startup entry. This impact is statistically significant at the
ten percent level. Turning to other results, there is no statistically significant change
in retention rates in either type of charter. The only statistically significant effect on
test scores is for math scores in conversions.20 However, we must be cautious about
interpreting the results for the conversion charters. Since one of the conversion char-
ters includes a gifted and talented magnet program, and it also happens to be the
largest charter school, these results may not be representative of conversion charters
more generally. To address this, I reran these regressions while dropping any student
who ever attends that particular conversion charter. The results for this analysis
19 Some campuses are contained within a group of schools with the same administration. Thus,
for the purposes of standard error clustering I consider campuses within a school group to be one
cluster. For other purposes they are classified as separate schools.
20 I also found the baseline results to be similar for test score levels and to reweighing the sample
by number of days enrolled. These results are provided in Appendix Table 5.
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are provided in Appendix Table 6 and show that while the discipline estimates be-
come statistically insignificant for conversions, the math test score estimates remain
statistically significant at the 10% level and language estimates become statistically
significantly positive. Retention estimates become statistically significantly negative.
While the discipline results for startups are dramatic, since they are based
on a measure that can be manipulated by the charter schools there is a question as
to whether these are real behavioral changes or the result of charter schools being
more lenient with students. Nonetheless, there are a few reasons to believe that
these reflect real behavioral changes in the students. First, when I run regressions
that focus on severe infractions - substance abuse and criminal activity (shown in
Appendix Table 7)-, I find similar results. Since the margin I am considering is the
number of in-school suspensions or more severe punishments, then we should only
see reductions in these types of infractions if there are real behavioral improvements
since principals would be very unlikely to punish students for these infractions with
less severe punishments in a systematic manner. Second, I also find statistically
significant reductions in expulsions and the likelihood of having any infraction, so
the results are consistent across different margins. Third, I will show later that
there are statistically significant improvements in attendance when one accounts for
persistence. Since attendance is highly correlated with behavior and is much harder
to misrepresent we would expect there to be improvements in behavior based on
these results alone.21 Finally, at seven times the standard error, the results are very
large and would require a large amount of leniency in order to make the estimates
statistically insignificant.
Why are the results different for conversion charters and startup charters?
One potential explanation could be that there is little benefit to freeing schools from
21 The district’s auditing policy for attendance is to check the reported attendance against in-
dividual teachers’ log books. Thus, in order to falsify attendance rates a school would need the
participation of both administrators and a large number of teachers in the scheme.
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regulations without providing new staff and facilities. However, this does not explain
why math test scores improve in conversions but not startups while discipline and
attendance improve more in startups. Another potential explanation is that charters
tend to focus on particular aspects of student performance. That is, perhaps startups
try to specialize in helping children with behavioral problems while conversions focus
more on academic performance. Even if this is the case in ALUSD, it is not clear if
this is due to a random assignment of each focus across the two types of schools or if
there is some systematic reason that startups focus on behavior (i.e. perhaps parents
are more willing to change their children’s schools if they are misbehaving or are in
an unsafe environment then if they are simply not performing well academically but
are well-behaved). A third potential explanation is that there may be aspects of the
parents’ decision making processes when choosing to send their children to a charter,
or, for those whose children already attend charters, when choosing whether to exit
the charter, that could bias the estimates due to failures of strict exogeneity. The
next section addresses this issue in detail.
1.5 Correcting for Three Potential Sources of Bias
1.5.1 Selection Into Charters Based on Pre-Charter Outcomes
Researchers have been concerned about the possibility that selection of stu-
dents into charter schools is based on changes in the dependent variable, or changes
in unobserved factors that could affect the dependent variable, in which case fixed
effects estimates will be inconsistent (Booker et al. 2007, Hanushek et al. 2007, Bi-
fulco and Ladd 2006, Sass 2006). In particular, we may suspect that students select
into the charter school due to a change in test scores or discipline, or a change in
some strong correlate with these outcomes. Such a situation has been widely noted
in the job-training literature and is commonly called “Ashenfelter’s dip” (Heckman
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and Smith 1999, Ashenfelter 1978). Since a parent may see a drop in performance
as an indicator that the current school does not meet his or her child’s needs, it
is reasonable to believe that students change schooling environments in response to
poor performance. If this is true, then the strict exogeneity assumption is violated
since E(yit|cit, ..., ciT ,Xi1, ...XiT , φi) 6= E(yit|cit,Xit, φi); i.e. y is correlated with fu-
ture c. In addition, if the outcome measures exhibit mean reversion then fixed effects
would tend to overestimate the charter impacts, since this would generate spurious
improvements in outcomes at the time of charter entry.
Figures 1.3A and 1.3B investigate whether this phenomenon occurs in ALUSD
with respect to discipline and attendance. Figure 1.3A shows how these outcomes
change in the years prior to charter entry in grades four and five or grades six through
eight for both conversions and startups. An additional line shows students in these
grades who are not observed in charters at any time from 1994-2004 and do not make
non-structural switches during the grades listed at the top of each graph. Figure 1.3B
shows the same outcomes for students who undergo a non-structural switch between
traditional schools. All outcome measures in these graphs are demeaned within
individuals then regression adjusted for free lunch status, reduced-price lunch status,
other economic disadvantage, recent immigration status, parents’ migrant status, and
grade-by-year effects.
In Figure 1.3A, there is a noticeable drop in attendance rates and an increase
in disciplinary infractions in the year or two prior to entry into startup charters.
There are also similar “dips” for conversion charters, although the magnitude is far
lower. However, in Figure 1.3B we see the same patterns for non-structural switchers
between two traditional schools as for students entering startup charters. This sug-
gests that selection off of discipline and attendance is not a characteristic of entering a
charter school, but rather is a more general characteristic of non-structural switchers,
since 95% of students who enter startup charters from a non-charter ALUSD school
30
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are also non-structural switchers.
When we look for dips in annual test score changes, in Figures 1.4A and 1.4B
it is difficult to discern any pattern for charter schools or non-structural switches.
However, Figure 1.5A shows a noticeable dip in test score levels immediately prior to
startup charter entry, but as Figure 1.5B shows, there is no test score dip for non-
structural switchers. Thus, while there appears to be some selection into charters
based on test scores, non-structural switches, in general, appear from these graphs to
be associated more with worsening behavior.
Table 1.4 provides some regression estimates that identify the Ashenfelter
dips in the outcome variables shown in Figures 1.3A and 1.3B along with retention
and test scores. Each regression is run on the entire base sample for outcomes
other than test scores and the entire test sample for test score outcomes. They
contain indicators for being in a period that is three, two, and one year prior to entry
into a conversion or startup charter or prior to switching non-structurally between
traditional schools. They also include indicators for being in the year of the switch,
denoted by year g in the table, given the student is observed in the sample in the year
prior to the switch. The regressions confirm the graphical observations in Figures
1.3A and 1.3B. Students in conversions show no substantial drops in discipline and
attendance prior to entry while there is clear evidence of dips for students in startups
for the two years immediately prior to entry. All of the estimates for annual changes
in test scores except one drop in the year prior to entry for both types of charters
along with retention rates. In addition, the patterns for students who undergo non-
structural switches between non-charter schools are similar to students who enter
startup charters.22
In order to address the potential endogeneity generated by selection based on
22 The fact that non-structural switchers have similar pre-switch patterns to startup charter stu-
dents suggest that they could provide a good comparison group in a difference-in-differences analysis
focusing on these two groups. In Appendix Table 8 I provide the results of these regressions that
are remarkably similar to the estimates provided in Table 1.3.
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Table 1.4 - Fixed Effects R
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changes in outcomes I use a procedure called interrupted panel estimates (Hanushek
et al. 2007, Hanushek et al. 2002, Ashenfelter 1978). The idea is that by dropping the
periods prior to entry into a charter school, I can mitigate the effect of the selection
by comparing periods students are enrolled in charters to periods well before charter
entry. However, the results in Table 1.4 show that this selection also occurs in
students who undergo non-structural switches between traditional schools. Thus, I
also drop observations in the periods prior to non-structural switches between any
two schools.
Table 1.5 provides the results of these interrupted panel estimations. In the
first column, I show the results from Table 1.3 for comparison. In the second column,
I drop all observations in the year prior to when a student enters a charter school
from a non-charter school or when a student makes a non-structural switch between
non-charter schools. In the third column I drop the two years prior and in the fourth
I drop the year prior to a charter entry or non-structural switch and the year of the
entry or switch. Panel A conducts the analysis using a single charter indicator. In the
second column the estimates change little, except that reading score impacts become
more negative and retention rate impacts are statistically significantly positive now.
The results in the third and fourth columns are similar to the second. When I split
the charter impacts by conversion or startup charters in panel B the results are similar
to those in panel A. For conversions, the impact on discipline falls but not enough to
change the statistical significance of the level estimate, while reading impacts become
negative and statistically significant. For startups, there is little change in levels
of discipline and attendance impacts while retention impacts become statistically
significant and reading impacts become negative and statistically significant. One
particularly interesting result is that when both the year before and year of the switch
are dropped the added value measures of discipline and attendance improvements
for startups fall. This is in part due to increased precision, but it also suggests
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A.  General Charter Indicator (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# of Infractions -0.357** -0.336** -0.308** -0.289** -0.381** -0.372**
(0.085) (0.081) (0.073) (0.077) (0.086) (0.081)
Attendance Rate (%) 0.451 0.392 0.319 0.133 0.538 0.415
(0.383) (0.404) (0.375) (0.205) (0.497) (0.479)
Δ # of Infractions -0.223** -0.217** -0.214** -0.074* -0.249** -0.258**
(0.086) (0.076) (0.073) (0.036) (0.074) (0.077)
Δ Attendence Rate 0.646 0.571 0.559 0.064 0.775 0.820
(0.443) (0.441) (0.429) (0.147) (0.535) (0.567)
Likelihood of Being Retained 0.006 0.025* 0.032* 0.016# 0.022# 0.024#
(0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014)
Δ Mathematics NPR 1.379** 1.385* 1.528* 1.206* 2.013** 1.909**
(0.484) (0.583) (0.614) (0.593) (0.564) (0.569)
Δ Reading NPR -0.698* -1.710** -1.535** -1.955** -0.979** -1.382**
(0.319) (0.321) (0.335) (0.287) (0.339) (0.351)
Δ Language NPR 0.457 0.220 0.094 0.262 0.169 1.167**
(0.289) (0.276) (0.287) (0.274) (0.268) (0.348)
B.  Charters Split by Conversion and Startup
Conversion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# of Infractions -0.213* -0.185* -0.162* -0.196* -0.209* -0.205*
(0.090) (0.084) (0.072) (0.093) (0.088) (0.084)
Attendance Rate (%) 0.126 0.016 -0.040 -0.032 0.061 0.040
(0.163) (0.152) (0.156) (0.140) (0.162) (0.175)
Δ # of Infractions -0.097# -0.079 -0.069 -0.061 -0.122* -0.122*
(0.054) (0.050) (0.047) (0.043) (0.054) (0.055)
Δ Attendence Rate 0.078 0.016 -0.009 -0.045 0.066 0.070
(0.097) (0.106) (0.123) (0.095) (0.110) (0.121)
Likelihood of Being Retained -0.002 0.011 0.016 0.016 0.007 0.008
(0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009)
Δ Mathematics NPR 1.873** 1.514* 1.703** 1.250* 2.240** 2.153**
(0.483) (0.620) (0.640) (0.632) (0.556) (0.564)
Δ Reading NPR -0.543 -1.616** -1.356** -1.996** -0.945** -1.367**
(0.340) (0.357) (0.377) (0.291) (0.348) (0.361)
Δ Language NPR 0.498 0.236 0.133 0.160 0.152 1.142**
(0.330) (0.293) (0.295) (0.290) (0.288) (0.387)
Table 1.5 -  Interrupted Panel Fixed Effects Regressions of Charter Impact
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Startup (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# of Infractions -0.786** -0.786** -0.759** -0.748** -0.853** -0.797**
(0.107) (0.101) (0.085) (0.110) (0.104) (0.088)
Attendance Rate (%) 1.416 1.520 1.434 0.950 1.841 1.367
(1.191) (1.239) (1.128) (0.767) (1.427) (1.350)
 # of Infractions -0.634** -0.674** -0.722** -0.135* -0.629** -0.638**
(0.201) (0.168) (0.153) (0.054) (0.156) (0.156)
 Attendence Rate 2.487# 2.406# 2.542* 0.614 2.898* 2.918*
(1.300) (1.294) (1.224) (0.558) (1.396) (1.404)
Likelihood of Being Retained 0.044 0.092# 0.113* 0.021 0.096 0.097
(0.042) (0.048) (0.055) (0.028) (0.062) (0.062)
 Mathematics NPR -0.673 0.383 -0.230 0.839 0.057 0.414
(0.952) (0.854) (0.892) (0.927) (0.912) (1.006)
 Reading NPR -1.342 -2.437** -3.341** -1.605* -1.276 -1.474#
(0.874) (0.715) (0.791) (0.771) (0.832) (0.852)
 Language NPR 0.287 0.103 -0.303 1.122* 0.318 1.324#
(0.596) (0.557) (0.768) (0.528) (0.707) (0.753)
(1) No Dropped Years (from Table 3)
Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses.  Behavior and attendence regressions contain 
over 1,200,000 observations.  Retention regressions contain over 1,000,000 observations.  Test score 
regressions contain over 400,000 observations.    Exact sample sizes cannot be revealed due to 
confidentiality restrictions.  Regressions also include the following covariates: free or reduced price 
lunch status, other economic disadvantages, peer mobility rate, whether student undergoes a 
nonstructual switch, whether student undergoes a structural switch, and grade-by-year dummies. **, *, 
and # denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(3) Drop Two Years Prior to Charter Entry or Non-Structural Switch Between Non-Charters
(2) Drop Year Prior to Charter Entry or Non-structural Switch Between Non-Charters
(5) Drop Year Prior to Charter Exit or Non-Structural Switch Between Non-Charters
(6) Drop Year Prior to Charter Exit and Entry or Non-Structural Switch Between Non-Charters
(4) Drop Year Prior to and Year of Charter Entry or Non-structural Switch Between Non-Charters
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that these behavioral improvements occur once a student enters a charter with little
improvement afterwards. Results in section 5.3 will later confirm this. Nonetheless,
the discipline measure is still statistically significant. Thus, while the coefficients on
some outcomes change, the interrupted panel estimates are not substantially different
from the baseline estimates.
In addition to changes in outcomes affecting entry into charter schools, they
may also affect exit from charter schools. If a parent takes outcome measures as
indicators of match quality with the charter school then he may repeat the selection
process for charter entry and once again seek other educational options. A potential
consequence of this endogenous exit is that when the students return to ALUSD
non-charter schools after performing poorly in a charter, they may experience mean-
reversion back to higher performance levels. Since, in fixed effects analyses, students
who are in charters are essentially compared to periods when they are not in charters,
endogenous exit of this type could impose a downward bias the charter impacts.
To address this issue, in column four, I provide interrupted panel estimates
where the year prior to when a student exits a charter school and enters a non-charter
school is dropped. I also drop the year prior to non-structural switches between
non-charter schools. I caution, however, that using interrupted panel estimates for
endogenous exit is a more problematic strategy for removing bias than for endogenous
entry since these estimates identify the charter effects off of those who spend at least
two years in a charter. Nonetheless, this would tend to increase the change in the
estimates from the baseline result since students who benefit more from charters
are more likely to remain in them. Thus, as long as the changes in the estimates
are small, then there is little need for concern. This appears to be the case in
ALUSD. When we compare the results in column four to column one the impact
estimates change slightly, usually in the direction suggesting a better impact, but not
enough to have any bearing on the statistical significance of the outcomes except for
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reading impacts in conversion charters. Finally, in column five I drop both the year
prior to charter entry and before charter exit to see what effect adjusting for both
types of endogeneity has. This strategy seems to magnify the charter effects but
does not change the pattern of the estimates. Thus, overall, the results from the
interrupted panel analyses suggest that charters provide improvements in discipline
and attendance, but have mixed results for test scores, which is the conclusion drawn
from the baseline estimates. The only difference is that startup charters display an
increase in retention rates.
1.5.2 Attrition
While neither the endogenous entrance of students into charter schools nor
the endogenous exit of students out of charter schools into non-charter schools affect
the estimates considerably, some parents may choose to leave ALUSD altogether if
students perform poorly in charter schools. Although we may believe that parents of
students who perform poorly in non-charters would be as likely to leave the district as
charter students, the fact that they choose to send their children to charters suggests
they have preferences for alternative educational environments. In addition, charter
parents are more likely to be dissatisfied with the non-charter schools their children
previously attended or with the district in general. Thus, charter parents may be
more likely than non-charter parents to send their children to a private school or a
non-district charter school if their ALUSD schools are bad matches.
The evidence from the ALUSD data suggests that there is substantially more
attrition in charters than non-charters, particularly in startup charters. Figure 1.6
shows transitions between school types for ALUSD students in grades one through
eleven from 1998-2003. While about 16% of non-charter students exit ALUSD each
year, that number drops to 14% for conversion charters and jumps to nearly 32%
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for startup charter students.23 The differences are more dramatic over longer time
periods. For example, 38% of non-charter third graders are no longer in ALUSD
five years later while that number is 43% for conversion students and 58% for startup
students. Other research has shown differential attrition rates for charters as well,
even in statewide data. Hanushek, Kain, Rivkin, and Branch (2005) show that while
7% of non-charter students leave their population of 4th through 7th grade students
in Texas public schools each year, 18% of charter students leave.
The potential econometric problem when there is a substantial amount of
attrition is that if students select out of the sample in a non-random manner then the
results may be inaccurate representations of the effect of treatment on the treated.
While a fixed effects regression would ideally provide a consistent estimate of the
parameter θ in equation (1.2), if there is attrition from the population - defined here
as any student who attends ALUSD between 1994 and 2004 - then fixed effects will
estimate
θ′ = E(yit|cit = 1,Xit, φi, sit = 1)− E(yit|cit = 0,Xit, φi, sit = 1) (1.7)
where sit = 1 if the student is in the sample in year t, while sit = 0 if the student is
not observed in the sample and is not expected to have graduated by year t, assuming
normal grade progression. This is because I only observe those students who have
not attrited. If E(sit|yit, cit,X it, φi) = E(sit|X it, φi) so that s is mean independent
of y and c conditional on observables and the fixed-effect, then running regressions
on the attrited sample will lead to consistent estimates. However, this is a strong
assumption in most panels, especially in administrative datasets.
Table 1.6 provides a probit regression of whether a student attrits in the
following year on a range of observable characteristics. If attrition is random then
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we would expect very few of these characteristics to have statistically significant
correlations with attrition probability. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Attrition
is correlated with almost all of the observable characteristics and outcomes listed.
In addition, Table 1.7 shows that attriters from charter schools differ along multiple
dimensions from non-charter attriters. These differences become even more apparent
when charter students are separated by whether they attend a conversion or startup
charter. Thus the evidence in Figure 1.4 and Tables 6 and 7 suggests that attrition is
likely correlated with both y and c and therefore has the potential to generate bias.
To address this problem, I use an estimator proposed by Kyriazidou (1997).
Her insight is that if one can find those observations where attrition does not play
an independent role in the outcome equation (i.e., the error term in the outcome
equation is uncorrelated with attrition propensity), then by reweighing the sample to
focus on those observations, we can correct for endogenous attrition. In addition, her
estimator allows for the inclusion of individual specific intercepts in both the outcome
and the selection equation. This is essential to the identification of the model used
in this chapter.
To produce Kyriazidou’s (1997) estimator, one must first define the selection
equation,
sit = WitΩ + ζi + µit (A1)
where Wit is a set of variables that are observed whether or not the individual has
attrited, ζi is an individual specific fixed-effect, and µit is random i.i.d. error. Wit
need not contain all (or any) of the variables in the outcome equation, but it does
need to contain at least one variable that is not included in the outcome equation; an
exclusion restriction. The outcome equation in my model is equation (1.4). After
removing the fixed-effect in the outcome equation through first-differencing, Kyriazi-
dou argues that in observations where (Wit −Wis)Ω = 0 for s < t, the individual has
not had a change in circumstances that affects attrition. Since a student’s innate
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Table 1.7 - Comparison of Charter and Non-Charter Attriters (1997 - 2003)
Non-Charter vs. Charter Conversion vs. Startup
Variable Non-Charter Charter Conversion Startup
% Female 47.5 46.7 47.9 44.7
(1.6) (2.8)
% White, Non-Hispanic 11.2 8.7 11.8 3.6
(7.2) (13.0)
Grade level 6.0 567.1 4.5 7.5
(10.3) (50.9)
Year 2000.0 2000.5 2000.1 2001.2
(23.5) (26.9)
% Eligible for Free Lunch 58.2 55.1 64.7 39.4
(5.6) (23.3)
% Eligible for Reduced Price Lunch 6.6 7.5 7.9 6.9
(3.2) (1.6)
% Other Economic Disadvantage 9.0 11.2 5.7 20.2
(6.8) (21.0)
% Limited English Proficient 22.0 16.7 16.3 17.4
(11.3) (1.4)
% At Risk 60.9 54.2 42.7 73.1
(12.2) (28.3)
% Special Education 12.2 8.0 9.6 5.5
(11.5) (6.6)
% Gifted and Talented 5.9 7.8 12.5 0.0
(6.8) (21.3)
% Recent Immigrant (within 3 years) 7.7 5.7 4.8 7.1
(6.7) (4.5)
% Parent is Migrant Worker 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.9
(1.0) (2.6)
# of Disciplinary Infractions 0.61 0.29 0.39 14.6
  (Suspension or More Severe) (18.2) (10.1)
Attendance Rate (%) 89.5 91.6 94.0 87.6
(13.3) (25.8)
Reading & English Grades 76.9 80.8 81.8 77.2
(24.9) (14.0)
Math Grade 76.6 80.2 81.7 74.6
(21.4) (19.9)
Average Grade 76.9 80.7 82.2 75.5
(25.8) (22.5)
Math Exam National Percentile Ranking 44.8 48.6 53.1 38.4
  (1998 and Later) (8.2) (15.2)
Reading Exam National Percentile Ranking 40.2 45.3 50.1 34.8
  (1998 and Later) (11.4) (15.6)
Language Exam National Percentile Ranking 44.8 49.4 54.3 38.6
  (1998 and Later) (9.9) (16.3)
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. 
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tendency to switch schools is captured by fixed-effects we can generate consistent
estimates of θ , the charter effect, by using only those observations where this holds
true. The validity of this procedure requires a conditional exchangeability assump-
tion. That is, the error terms in both equations must be identically (though not




is, µit, µis|ζi) = F (ε∗is, ε∗it, µis, µit|ζi) for s 6= t (A2)
where ε∗it is the error term from outcome equation in the selected sample.
Of course Ω is unknown, but we can estimate it via a conditional “fixed-
effects” logit regression or some other maximum likelihood or maximum score method
to get Ω̂. A problem that arises is that there will almost always be very few observa-
tions where (Wit −Wis)Ω̂ = 0, and so limiting to only those observations will greatly
reduce power. Instead, Kyriazidou’s proposal is to use kernel weights to reweigh the
regressions towards observations where there is little change in attrition propensity
over time.
To apply Kyriazidou’s strategy, I run a first-differenced version of (1.4) weighted








where K is a kernel function with bandwidth hn and (Wit − Wis)Ω̂ is the first-
differenced linear prediction from a conditional “fixed effects” logit model of being
in the sample in year t.24 For consistent estimation Wit and Wis must contain an
exclusion restriction. The bandwidth hn falls with sample size n via the formula
24 This allows for unbalanced panels by differencing with respect to the last observation for indi-
vidual i prior to year t, which is s, rather than always differencing with respect to t− 1.
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hn = h ∗ n−1/(2(r+1)+1) where h is some constant and r is the order of differentiabil-
ity of the kernel at almost all points minus one. Thus, choosing the bandwidth is
equivalent to choosing the constant itself.
A difficulty with kernel weighted estimation methods is that the choices of the
kernel and bandwidth are often subjective. I use the normal density as the kernel in
this chapter which is the density used by Kyriazidou in her Monte-Carlo analysis.25
Generally, researchers have found that the choice of bandwidth is more important
than the choice of kernel, and thus the estimates may be very sensitive to the choice
of bandwidth. As the bandwidth increases, the variance of the weights falls and the
model converges to the unweighted model, increasing the bias. On the other hand, as
the bandwidth decreases more observations are given trivial weight in the regression,
which increases the variance of the estimates. Thus there is a trade-off between bias
and variance.
Researchers have proposed a number of strategies for choosing the band-
width, each with benefits and drawbacks.26 Kyriazidou provides a modification of
Horowitz’s (1992) “plug-in” strategy for bandwidth selection. This strategy identifies
a bandwidth that minimizes the mean-squared error (MSE) based on the asymptotic
properties of the estimator. A drawback of this method is that the MSE minimizing
bandwidth is sensitive to the choice of an initial bandwidth. One strategy that has
been used previously is to choose an initial bandwidth such that it equals the MSE
minimizing bandwidth (Dustman and Rochina-Barrachina 2000). The intuition be-
hind this strategy is that, since both the initial and MSE minimizing bandwidths
converge at the same rate, asymptotically they are equivalent.27 I use this method
to choose my initial bandwidth and I also test the sensitivity of the estimates to the
choice of bandwidth.
25 r = 1 in the case of the normal density.
26 See Pagan and Ullah (1999) and Blundell and Duncan (1998) for excellent discussions of band-
width selection in the context of non-parametric regression.
27 I am greatly appreciative to Jose Galdo for pointing this out to me.
50
Kyriazidou’s estimator also involves a correction for asymptotic inconsistency.
To make the correction, one needs to generate estimates with a “slow” convergence
bandwidth of hn = h ∗ n−ϕ/(2(r+1)+1) where 0 < ϕ < 1. Following the Monte-Carlo
simulation in Kyriazidou (1997) I choose ϕ = 0.1. Denoting the estimate using






The standard errors remain the same as in the “fast” bandwidth regression.
In order to estimate the selection equation, I expand the data so that any stu-
dent observed in ALUSD has observations until she is expected to graduate assuming
normal grade progression or until the year 2004, whichever comes first. For my exclu-
sion restriction, I use whether the student is not eligible to attend her previous school
due to exceeding the maximum grade of that school. The idea behind this exclusion
restriction is that a student would be more likely to leave the district if she has to
switch schools anyway; that is the relative costs of leaving the district falls if students
are forced to switch schools. Since the student will always be grade-eligible for her
last school if she is retained, I use the predicted grade based on the student’s grade
in t− 1 rather than the actual grade when determining eligibility. Thus if a student
is in grade six in a school that goes up to that grade, but is held back, he will still be
considered ineligible for that school since his predicted grade is seven. The model
includes as covariates indicators for whether the last school the student is observed
attending prior to year t is a conversion or a startup, as well as the last observed free
lunch, reduced-price lunch, other economic disadvantage, recent immigration status,
and parents’ migrant status. In addition the regression includes grade-by-year ef-
fects. If s = 0, the grade is predicted based on normal grade progression from the
student’s most recent observation.
Table 1.8 provides the results of the selection corrected estimates along with
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unweighted first-differences regressions for comparison.28 In addition to the MSE
minimizing bandwidths, I also provide results using bandwidths 50% smaller and
100% larger to test the sensitivity of the results to bandwidth selection. Comparing
the results for the MSE minimizing bandwidths to the unweighted estimates we see
that the charter effects are very similar regardless of whether they are split by type
of charter. The results also appear to be robust to the size of the bandwidth. Thus,
there is little evidence to suggest that endogenous attrition has a substantial effect
on the fixed effects estimates.
Another strategy one can use to test the sensitivity of results to endogenous
attrition is to impute the missing data under different assumptions about the out-
comes students would have achieved had they remained in ALUSD. In Table 1.9,
I show the results of these analyses. A detailed account of how data was imputed
can be found in the appendix. Under each scenario a group of attrited students are
assumed to have not attrited and have had disciplinary infractions equal to the max-
imum or a certain percentile of the distribution of disciplinary infractions for their
predicted grade-year or infractions are set to zero. In the first scenario, in panel
B, students who ever are observed in a charter attend non-charter schools instead of
attriting. In panel C, all students who attrit attend non-charter schools. In both
scenarios, even in the most extreme situations the discipline results for startups are
statistically significant, at least at the 10% level. For panels D and E, rather than
assign all attriters to non-charter schools they are assigned to schools in a probabilis-
tic fashion based on the transition probabilities imputed from a multinomial logit
regression on students who remain in the data. In these cases, all students who are
imputed to attend non charter schools have infractions set to 0 while those who are
imputed to attend charter schools have their infractions set to different levels relative
28 Since I cannot cluster standard errors for the fixed-effects logit model, I check the first stage of
the exclusion restriction using a linear probability model. This is statistically significant at the 1%
level. In order to avoid multicollinearity issues in the first stage due to the nature of the exclusion
restriction, I drop first graders from the regressions.
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(1) (3)
Charter Conversion Startup Charter Conversion Startup
# of Infractions -0.359** -0.161* -0.930** -0.323** -0.137# -0.916**
(0.100) (0.078) (0.187) (0.101) (0.076) (0.206)
Attendance Rate (%) 0.777 -0.025 3.090# 0.763 -0.083 3.450#
(0.665) (0.237) (1.823) (0.685) (0.247) (1.937)
Δ # of Infractions -0.333** -0.146* -0.971** -0.274** -0.116# -0.862**
(0.098) (0.061) (0.282) (0.104) (0.064) (0.333)
Δ Attendence Rate 0.794 0.009 3.468* 0.765 -0.052 3.804*
(0.580) (0.181) (1.735) (0.595) (0.196) (1.820)
Likelihood of Being Retained 0.013 0.012 0.018 0.023 0.018 0.037
(0.012) (0.014) (0.020) (0.016) (0.017) (0.032)
Δ Mathematics NPR 1.745** 2.203** -0.004 1.864** 2.070** 0.997
(0.619) (0.618) (1.294) (0.590) (0.634) (1.289)
Δ Reading NPR -0.675 -0.497 -1.355 -0.800 -0.813 -0.742
(0.703) (0.788) (1.319) (0.745) (0.857) (1.199)
Δ Language NPR 0.425 0.164 1.424# 0.570 0.245 1.940*
(0.618) (0.699) (0.828) (0.560) (0.614) (0.782)
(5) (7)
Charter Conversion Startup Charter Conversion Startup
# of Infractions -0.347** -0.154* -0.931** -0.355** -0.159* -0.931**
(0.100) (0.077) (0.194) (0.100) (0.078) (0.189)
Attendance Rate (%) 0.765 -0.039 3.204# 0.773 -0.028 3.121#
(0.662) (0.241) (1.852) (0.663) (0.238) (1.830)
Δ # of Infractions -0.312** -0.139* -0.935** -0.327** -0.144* -0.961**
(0.099) (0.061) (0.300) (0.098) (0.061) (0.287)
Δ Attendence Rate 0.781 -0.008 3.615* 0.789 0.004 3.510*
(0.579) (0.185) (1.770) (0.579) (0.182) (1.746)
Likelihood of Being Retained 0.016 0.013 0.024 0.014 0.012 0.019
(0.014) (0.016) (0.025) (0.013) (0.015) (0.021)
Δ Mathematics NPR 1.810** 2.170** 0.377 1.764** 2.192** 0.106
(0.605) (0.621) (1.294) (0.615) (0.619) (1.294)
Δ Reading NPR -0.701 -0.577 -1.195 -0.684 -0.519 -1.321
(0.718) (0.815) (1.281) (0.708) (0.796) (1.309)
Δ Language NPR 0.460 0.185 1.554# 0.432 0.169 1.449#
(0.605) (0.679) (0.794) (0.614) (0.694) (0.814)
Table 1.8 - Kyriazidou (1997) Selection Corrected Estimates
Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses.  Students in first grade are dropped to avoid multicollinearity in 
the first stage.  First-stage regressions contain over 1.2 million observations and also includes grade-by-year dummies along 
with the student's last known status of the following once-lagged covariates: free or reduced price lunch status, other 
economic disadvantages.  Each Behavior and attendence regressions contain over 800,000 observations.  Retention 
regressions contain over 800,000 observations.  Test score regressions contain over 300,000 observations.    Exact sample 
sizes cannot be revealed due to confidentiality restrictions.  Regressions also include the following covariates: free or 
reduced price lunch status, other economic disadvantages, whether student undergoes a nonstructual switch, whether 
student undergoes a structural switch,  and grade-by-year dummies. **, *, and # denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively.
(8)
2 * MSE Minimizing Bandwidth
(4)




1/2 * MSE Minimizing Bandwidth
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Table 1.9 -  Sensitivity of Discipline Results to Assumptions About Attrition
A. Infraction Statistics by Grade Level
Percentile Within Grade Grouping
Grade Maximum 99th 95th 90th 80th 70th Mean
1st - 5th 23 2 0 0 0 0 0.08
6th - 8th 45 9 5 3 1 1 0.87
9th - 12th 36 7 3 2 1 0 0.57
B.  Imputations for Charter Students Only - Attend Non-Charter With Infractions Imputed to be X
Percentile Within Grade-Year
X: Maximum for 
Grade-Year
99th 95th 90th 80th 70th 0
Conversion -4.894* -1.726* -0.867** -0.518** -0.248** -0.130 0.001
(2.120) (0.687) (0.299) (0.153) (0.087) (0.102) (0.144)
Startup -6.152* -2.406** -1.411** -1.026** -0.754** -0.587** -0.491**
(2.534) (0.773) (0.311) (0.151) (0.112) (0.141) (0.183)
C.  Imputations for All Students - Attend Non-Charter With Infractions Imputed to be X
Percentile Within Grade-Year
X: Maximum for 
Grade-Year
99th 95th 90th 80th 70th 0
Conversion -4.611** -1.903** -0.985** -0.585** -0.283* -0.172# -0.008
(1.604) (0.710) (0.352) (0.208) (0.111) (0.098) (0.122)
Startup -8.718** -3.289** -1.795** -1.225** -0.755** -0.502** -0.335#
(2.810) (0.930) (0.397) (0.205) (0.094) (0.119) (0.193)
D.  Imputations for Charter Students Only - Type of School Attended Random Function of Observed Characteristics 
When Attrited Student is in a Non-Charter Infractions = 0;  When Attrited Student is in Charter Infractions = X
Percentile Within Grade-Year
X: Maximum for 
Grade-Year
99th 95th 90th 80th 70th 0
Conversion 1.708 0.168 -0.042 -0.130 -0.193* -0.219* -0.252**
(1.811) (0.353) (0.184) (0.123) (0.092) (0.087) (0.089)
Startup 2.893 0.228 -0.333 -0.551* -0.716** -0.824** -0.882**
(3.038) (0.862) (0.425) (0.260) (0.149) (0.103) (0.103)
E.  Imputations for All Students - Type of School Attended Random Function of Observed Characteristics
When Attrited Student is in a Non-Charter Infractions = 0;  When Attrited Student is in Charter Infractions = X
Percentile Within Grade-Year
X: Maximum for 
Grade-Year
99th 95th 90th 80th 70th 0
Conversion 5.266 1.391 0.525 0.170 -0.102 -0.211** -0.334**
(3.835) (0.989) (0.467) (0.256) (0.107) (0.073) (0.096)
Startup 7.550 1.723 0.407 -0.111 -0.518** -0.752** -0.886**
(4.679) (1.316) (0.645) (0.383) (0.185) (0.090) (0.082)
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to their predicted grade-year. As in panels B and C, panel D only imputes data for
students who ever attended a charter and E imputes data for all attrited students.
While the evidence in these panels are not as strong as B and C, they still suggest that
we need to make very extreme assumptions about the attrited students for attrition
to make the discipline results statistically insignificant.
1.5.3 Persistence of Charter Effects
Bias can also arise if the treatment affects outcomes in multiple periods.
Thus, we may be concerned that charter attendance in year t could affect outcomes
in t + 1, t + 2, and so on. This “persistence” causes fixed effects regressions to
attribute charter impacts to periods after students return to non-charter schools,
biasing the estimates. This is particularly important in the ALUSD data since 69%
of charter students return to non-charter schools at some point. More technically,
the existence of persistence violates strict exogeneity since yit becomes a function of
ci,t−k, i.e. E(yit|ci1, ..., cit,X i1, ...,X iT , φi) 6= E(yit|cit,X it, φi).
In addition to the econometric issues it raises, persistence in charter impacts
has policy implications as well. As of 2003 only 3.5% of public schools were charter
schools and most students attend charters in elementary grades. Thus, until the
number of charter schools in secondary grades becomes much larger, the vast majority
of students who attend charters will return to regular public schools at some point.
If charter impacts have little effect on students after they return to regular schools,
then charters will not provide long-term benefits for most students.
I aim to identify the persistence effect by using two models. The first model
includes lagged measures of charter status in the fixed-effects regressions. This
strategy will reduce the bias generated by persistence, although if persistence lasts
beyond the number of periods lagged some bias will remain (Wooldridge, 2002, pp.
301). In order to prevent the loss of too many observations, I use two lags in this
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analysis. Separate regressions using three lags provide similar results. Thus, I
estimate the following model
yit = α+ θ0cit + θ1cit−1 + θ2cit−2 + XitΓ + GitΨ + φi + εit (1.9)
where cit−1 and cit−2 are first and second lags of cit, which is defined as in equation
(1.4). It should be noted, however, that including the lags limits the regressions to
include only those observations where the student has been in the sample for at least
three consecutive years.
Table 1.10 provides the results from these regressions. These include the
same covariates as in the baseline regressions in section four. The first three columns
show the effects of charter status in periods t, t− 1, and t− 2 on outcomes in period
t. The second and third sets of three columns show the same results broken down by
conversion and startup charter status. When I add the lagged charter status, only the
attendance impacts for startups and the language test scores for conversions change
substantially. In addition, both of these impact estimates increase, suggesting that
if persistence is generating bias, it is generating an underestimation of the charter
effects.
Nonetheless, while this strategy is useful for establishing the extent of the
bias from persistence it is an impractical way to measure the extent of persistence,
since the lagged charter indicators do not distinguish between individuals who are
still in charters and those who have left. To address this, I consider a second model
where an indicator is added for whether a student has previously attended a charter
and is not currently enrolled in one. In addition, in order to see if charter impacts
vary with the length of time spent in a charter, I also separate the indicators for
charter enrollment into indicators for being in the first year of a charter spell and
being past the first year of a charter spell. Thus, I estimate the model
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it + θ2Postit + XitΓ + GitΨ + φi + εit (1.10)
where c1it = 1 if the student is in the first year of a charter spell, c
2+
it = 1 if
a student is in another year of a charter spell, and Postit = 1 if the student was
previously in a charter but is not currently enrolled. As in the previous analysis, I
also estimate a model that separates each of these indicators by conversion or startup
status, so that, for example, Postit splits into two indicators. The first equals one
whether the student was previously in a conversion charter and is not currently in a
conversion and the second is defined similarly for startups. One potential concern
with this model is that endogenous exit could be a more substantial problem here than
in other models, since our outcome of interest is the effect of a charter after leaving.
To address this, I use whether a student is grade ineligible for the last charter he
or she attended as an instrument for being in a post charter period. As in section
5.2, in order to avoid the potential endogeneity of the instrument through retention,
I use the student’s predicted grade rather than actual grade. Table 1.11 shows that
this instrument is a strong predictor of being in a post-charter period. Table 1.12
shows the second-stage results. Note that these are similar to the results from a
regular fixed-effects estimation, supporting the results in section 5.1 that suggested
endogenous exit is not a major concern. These results are available from the author
upon request. The most remarkable result here is the sharp increase in disciplinary
actions after a student leaves a charter. While the increase is larger for startups, it
is clearly observed for both types of charters. As for other outcomes, in startups all
of the point estimates suggest worsening outcomes after students leave the startups
and attend other schools, although only retention is statistically significant. For
conversions, there are persistent improvements in attendance and retention, but a
drop off in test scores after students leave. Thus, there is essentially no persistence
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obust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses.  B
ehavior and attendence regressions contain over 1,000,000 
observations.  R
etention regressions contain over 1,000,000 observations.  Test score regressions contain over 500,000 
observations.    
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for the value added measures of discipline and attendance also confirm the suggestion
from the interrupted panel estimates in section 5.1 that behavioral improvements
occur at the time of entry into the startup charters.
1.6 Additional Outcomes, Heterogenous Impacts, And Controlling
for School Characteristics
Table 1.13 provides some results on additional outcome measures of interest
and looks at whether charter effects vary by student type and school characteristics.
All regressions are linear fixed effects models and include the same covariates as in the
baseline regressions in section four. Panel A looks at the additional outcomes. These
include whether a student has any disciplinary actions in a year, whether a student
is expelled, limited English proficiency, and at-risk status. Startup charters provide
statistically significant improvements in all of these, except LEP for the Hispanic
sub-sample. Conversion charters provide improvements in having any disciplinary
actions and expulsions, but exhibit increases in LEP rates. There are two potential
explanations for this result. One is that the conversion charters may be more effective
at identifying whether a student is LEP. Another is that, since LEP status is partially
based on reading and language test scores it is possible that schools are reclassifying
students as LEP if their test scores fall.
Panels B and C look at how the charter impacts vary by type of student. In
order to limit the number of estimates displayed, I only show regressions using the
general charter indicator. Panel B considers variation by race. Charters provide
Hispanics with more discipline and attendance improvements than blacks and other
races, while blacks get larger improvements in test score changes. Panel C shows
that males have higher test score impacts than females but there is no statistically
significant difference for other outcomes.
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(1)
Any Charter  Conversion  Startup
Any Infractions -0.108** -0.051* -0.277**
(0.027) (0.023) (0.037)
Expelled -0.003** -0.002** -0.006**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)










# of Infractions -0.458** 0.023 0.292*
(0.073) (0.103) (0.135)
Attendance Rate (%) 0.075 1.206* -0.046
(0.261) (0.574) (0.373)
Likelihood of Being Retained 0.023 -0.013 -0.036*
(0.017) (0.021) (0.017)
Math NPR Gain 2.022** -0.967 -0.333
(0.482) (0.598) (0.810)
Reading NPR Gain -2.004** 1.547** 2.239**
(0.257) (0.487) (0.654)
Language NPR Gain -0.032 0.468 1.073#
(0.267) (0.307) (0.566)
21,672 observations are dropped due to multiple races being listed for an individual.
Charter Charter*Female
# of Infractions -0.390** 0.080
(0.098) (0.067)
Attendance Rate (%) 0.656 -0.024
(0.440) (0.106)
Likelihood of Being Retained 0.002 0.007
(0.011) (0.005)
Math NPR Gain 1.788** -0.532
(0.545) (0.354)
Reading NPR Gain -0.176 -0.940**
(0.364) (0.259)
Language NPR Gain 0.966* -0.968*
(0.404) (0.385)
31,566 observations are dropped due to multiple genders being listed for an individual.
Table 1.13 - Additional Outcomes and Variation by Race and Gender
A.  Additional Outcomes
(2)
Limited English Proficient 
  (Hispanic Only)
Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses.  Behavior and attendence regressions contain over 
1,200,000 observations.  Retention regressions contain over 1,000,000 observations.  Test score regressions 
contain over 500,000 observations.    Exact sample sizes cannot be revealed due to confidentiality restrictions.  
Regressions also include the following covariates: free or reduced price lunch status, other economic 
disadvantages,  whether student undergoes a nonstructual switch, whether student undergoes a structural switch, 
and grade-by-year dummies. **, *, and # denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
B. Charter Impacts by Race
C. Charter Impacts by Gender
Regressions contain over 1.2 million obsrvations except the LEP-Hispanic regressions which contain over 
800,000.
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Table 1.14 runs the baseline fixed effects regressions while including some
observed characteristics of the charter schools. The purpose of this analysis is to
see if we can get a bit inside the “black box” and determine what characteristics of
charter schools drive the results found in the previous sections. Each panel provides
results from regressions for a single outcome including various combinations of controls
for per-student expenditures, student-teacher ratios, total enrollment, and teacher
experience. Panel A looks at disciplinary actions and shows an interesting result.
When I control for student-teacher ratios, enrollment, and teacher experience the
entire impact estimate for startup charters drops to statistical insignificance and
becomes very close to 0. In fact, controlling for student-teacher ratios and enrollment
alone makes the estimate fall in absolute value to a statistically insignificant -0.142
compared to a statistically significant -0.786 without the controls. More disciplinary
actions are associated with more students per teacher, higher enrollment, and more
experienced teachers, but the driving force seems to be the student-teacher ratio and
enrollment. This suggests that the effectiveness of startup charters in improving
discipline is almost entirely due to keeping the school small and maintaining a large
staff.
On the other hand, controlling for these school characteristics, seems to in-
crease the startup charter impact on attendance as is shown in panel B. Most of
this change in the estimates seems to be driven by teacher experience in that hav-
ing less experienced teachers is associated with higher attendance rates. While the
correlation between teacher experience and student discipline and attendance may
seem counter-intuitive, one potential explanation is that younger teachers may be
more energetic and are more able to thrive in a charter school that wants to try
new pedagogical techniques. These characteristics may allow the younger teachers
to keep tighter control over their classes and make the classes more interesting, thus
encouraging students to attend.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Convert -0.213* -0.226* -0.224* -0.231* -0.235* -0.221* -0.213# -0.214#
(0.090) (0.093) (0.092) (0.110) (0.106) (0.098) (0.115) (0.115)
Startup -0.786** -0.855** -0.446** -0.552** -0.142 -0.595** -0.073 -0.072
(0.107) (0.127) (0.086) (0.135) (0.092) (0.116) (0.097) (0.103)
Per-Student Expenditure ($1000's) -0.028** -0.009
(0.006) (0.010)
Per-Student Expenditure^2 ($1000's) 0.0001* 0.000
(0.0000) (0.000)
Student-Teacher Ratio 0.094** 0.054* 0.058** 0.038#
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020)
Student-Teacher Ratio^2 -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Enrollment (1000's) 0.494** 0.374** 0.375** 0.352**
(0.085) (0.085) (0.087) (0.088)
Enrollment^2 (1000's) -0.092** -0.071** -0.070* -0.066*
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
Teacher Experience: 0 Years -0.002 -0.005** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Teacher Experience: 1-5 Years 0.001 -0.003# -0.003#
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Teacher Experience: 6-10 Years 0.003 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Teacher Experience: 11-20 Years 0.004# -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Convert -0.097# 0.017 0.066 0.117 0.082 -0.072 -0.050 -0.095
(0.054) (0.159) (0.153) (0.160) (0.154) (0.170) (0.171) (0.177)
Startup 1.416 1.437 2.805** 2.087 2.957** 1.841** 2.543** 2.218**
(1.191) (1.218) (0.314) (1.350) (0.639) (0.443) (0.615) (0.566)
Per-Student Expenditure ($1000's) -0.178** -0.184
(0.057) (0.113)
Per-Student Expenditure^2 ($1000's) 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.002)
Student-Teacher Ratio 0.118 0.103 0.096 -0.278
(0.201) (0.189) (0.193) (0.222)
Student-Teacher Ratio^2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.008
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Enrollment (1000's) 0.461 -0.177 -0.212 -0.661
(0.671) (0.644) (0.648) (0.537)
Enrollment^2 (1000's) -0.028 0.112 0.116 0.210#
(0.154) (0.145) (0.148) (0.126)
Teacher Experience: 0 Years 0.020* 0.015* 0.013*
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
Teacher Experience: 1-5 Years 0.023** 0.019** 0.017**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Teacher Experience: 6-10 Years 0.019* 0.014* 0.013*
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Teacher Experience: 11-20 Years 0.016# 0.011 0.014#
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
Table 1.14 - Fixed Effects Regressions with Controls for School Characteristics
A: # of Dsciplinary Infractions
B: Attendence Rate (%)
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Panels C, D, and E show how controlling for school characteristics affects the
estimates for test scores. The only test score estimate that substantially changes
is math test scores. While the math estimates for conversion charters improve a
bit, there is a large drop in test score estimates for startup charters. These results
suggest that, if enrollment were higher and student-teacher ratios were lower, then
test scores would be lower in startup charters.
1.7 Conclusion
Charter schools have become an important and increasingly popular school
reform over the last decade. Despite this, we know surprisingly little about the
effectiveness of charter schools on charter students beyond their impact on test scores.
Previous research has not considered how charters affect other outcomes such as
discipline and attendance. In addition most previous research has treated charter
schools as homogenous institutions and has not distinguished between the different
types of charters, nor has previous work examined whether students gain any long
term improvements in performance from attending charters. In this chapter, I have
tried to address these gaps in the literature using new data from an anonymous large
urban school district (ALUSD) with an extensive charter program. Through the use
of individual fixed effects, I am able to account for potential bias resulting from time-
invariant unobserved characteristics of students. There are some potential pitfalls
from using this strategy. Fixed effects estimates can be biased if there is selection
into and out of charter schools based on changes in outcomes, non-random attrition,
or persistence in charter effects. I adjust my estimates for these complications using
a variety of econometric techniques.
My estimates suggest that charters are effective at improving student behav-
ior, on average, while their impact on test scores is mixed. There is no statistically
significant effect on retention or attendance.. However, startup charters, schools that
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open as charters, provide larger improvements in discipline than conversion charters,
traditional public schools that convert to charter status. In addition, when I control
for lagged charter attendance, the attendance results become positive and statisti-
cally significant for startups. While there are a number of potential reasons for there
being such large discipline impacts in startup charters, there are two that may play
particularly large roles. The first is that startup charters are much smaller than non-
charters and conversions, providing administrators with the ability to closely oversee
their schools and students. For example, one principal of a startup charter in ALUSD
is able to meet with each of her students at least once a semester due to the small
size of the school. This seems to play a large role in the results. Controlling for
enrollment and student-teacher makes the impact estimate for disciplinary infractions
change from a statistically significant -0.79 per year to a statistically insignificant -
0.14. Controlling for teacher experience cuts that estimate further to -0.07. Another
possibility is that charter schools are able to more easily remove students who have
particularly bad behavior problems, making the administrators and teachers more
able to aid students with mild problems. This could also increase the likelihood
of well behaved students influencing the behavior of misbehaving students through
peer-effects mechanisms.
In addition to the impact estimates, I also find substantial evidence of se-
lection based on changes in outcome measures, particularly for students in startup
charters. I correct for this using interrupted panel estimates (Hanushek et al. 2005,
Hanushek et al. 2002, Ashenfelter 1978) and find little to suggest that the selection
has a substantial effect on the fixed effects estimates. In addition, I account for
the potential endogeneity of attrition by using a semi-parametric estimator proposed
by Kyriazidou (1997). These estimates suggest that my fixed effects estimates are
not substantially affected by non-random attrition. Finally, I find some evidence of
persistence in charter impacts for conversion charters, but no evidence of persistence
66
for startup charters. There is a particularly large increase in disciplinary actions
after students leave startup charters.
Taken together, these results paint a mixed picture of charter schools. On
the one hand, charters seem to be effective at improving student discipline and at-
tendance while students are enrolled. On the other hand, the evidence suggests
that these effects do not last after students return to non-charter schools. Thus, as
long as students return to non-charter schools after attending a charter, the evidence
presented here suggests that they will not garner any long-term benefits. Hence, if
charters are to be an effective strategy for improving student performance, there would
need to be a large enough supply so that students could attend charters throughout
their entire academic careers.
I should note that the results presented in this chapter are only for one school
district. Therefore, they do not necessarily extend to charter schools in other loca-
tions. Nonetheless, this chapter has two important implications for the charter
literature. First, my individual fixed effects results have been shown to be robust
to multiple bias reducing procedures. These results suggest that this econometric
strategy is appropriate in the context of charter schools, though more research is
needed to ensure that this holds for other locations. Second, while the literature on
charter schools has done an excellent job of analyzing how charters affect test scores
while students are enrolled in them, this chapter shows that there are other aspects
of charter schools that need to be investigated. The fact that I find large impacts
of charters on discipline and evidence that startup charters improve attendance rates
suggests that studies that only look at test scores may not have all of the information
needed to accurately assess the effectiveness of these schools.
This chapter looks at one aspect of charter schools - how they affect students
who enroll in them. While more research is needed on this issue, there are other
aspects of charter schools that also require further study before we can have a complete
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picture of how these schools work, such as how charter schools affect non-charter
students. I address this question in the next chapter. We also need to get inside
the “black box” of charter schools and establish why charter schools work or do not
work. In particular, the role of spending in charter schools can be very important.
If charters are no more effective at instruction than non-charters, they may still be
efficiency enhancing if expenditures are lower.
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2. HOW DO CHARTER SCHOOLS AFFECT NON-CHARTER
PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS?
2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I investigate how charter schools in ALUSD affect
those students who choose to attend them. In this chapter, I look at what happens to
those students who remain in regular public school. Compared to the large amount of
literature on how charter schools affect students who attend them, there is surprisingly
little evidence of how charter schools affect students in traditional public schools
using individual data (Bifulco and Ladd 2006, Sass 2006, Buddin and Zimmer 2005a,
Booker, Gilpatric, Gronberg and Jansen 2004).
There are a few mechanisms through which charter schools may affect tra-
ditional public schools. The most commonly cited is a competition effect. When
a charter school enrolls a student usually they get a set amount of money from the
chartering authority, be it the state government, a university, or a local school district.
Almost always, some portion of this funding would have gone to the public school
the student would have attended otherwise and thus there is a financial incentive for
public schools to prevent students from attending charter schools. In addition, public
schools may wish to prevent students from leaving if they can be closed down for low
enrollment. If these two incentives spur public school teachers and administrators to
increase effort and efficiency, then charters would exert a positive competition effect
on public schools. On the other hand, the loss of funding from students switching
to charters may make it more difficult for schools to improve, causing outcomes to
worsen. In addition, some theoretical work by Cardon (2003) suggests that if there
are capacity constraints on charters then public schools may not respond to charter
competition. Indeed, if public schools are overcrowded, they may welcome the charter
schools.
Another mechanism is through changes in peer composition. In most cases,
though there are some exceptions, previous research, including that presented in chap-
ter 1 of this dissertation, has found that charter students tend to have lower income
and are more likely to be racial minorities than non-charter students (Hanushek et
al. 2007, Bifulco and Ladd 2006, Sass 2006). In addition, Christensen (2007) finds
charter schools report fewer behavioral problems with students then traditional pub-
lic schools and in the previous chapter I show that charter students in the school
district studied here tend to select into charters based on worsening discipline and
falling test scores. Thus, it is possible that by attracting lower (or in some cases
better) performing students, charter schools may change how peer-effects mechanisms
operate in non-charter schools.
Even if we are to abstract away from the mechanism of charter impacts, iden-
tifying the effects of charter schools on non-charter students is problematic because
both a student’s choice of what school to attend and a charter school’s choice of where
to locate are not random. Thus, any study of charter school impacts on non-charter
students must account for these two potential types of selection bias. Previous work
has used student fixed-effects to account for endogenous movements of students and
school fixed-effects to account for charter location. While some researchers consider
the former to be a sufficient correction for student movements, concerns have been
raised that school fixed-effects are insufficient for addressing endogenous charter loca-
tion since they only account for selection based on time variant characteristics. Fixed
effects also insufficiently account for sample selection derived from specific types of
students leaving regular public schools to attend charter schools.
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In this chapter, I look at how charter schools in ALUSD affect students who
remain in traditional public schools. These include both the charters that are spon-
sored by ALUSD and those that are sponsored by other entities, mostly the state
government. I add to the current literature in four ways. First, I provide estimates
that use school specific time trends and instrumental variable techniques to account
for the potential that charter schools endogenously locate near particular types of
non-charter schools. Second, I assess the effects of charter schools on discipline and
attendance of non-charter students in addition to test scores. Third, I account for
the contamination of competition impacts with changes in peer composition by con-
trolling for twice lagged average peer discipline and grades. Fourth, I look at whether
there are different impacts of charter schools based on whether they are conversions,
schools that were originally traditional public schools but convert to charter status,
or startups, schools that begin as charters and by whether the charter is granted by
the local school district or some other government entity.
I find that when school specific trends are added to regressions, which correct
for charter location based on permanent trends of non-charter schools, there is little
impact of charter schools on non-charter students. In addition, some of the estimates
change considerably when trends are added. This highlights the possibility that school
fixed-effects are insufficient corrections for endogenous charter locations. Instrumen-
tal variable estimates using the number of bus routes nearby as an instrument for
charter penetration provide further evidence that school fixed-effects estimates are
insufficient. While these estimates are not conclusive due to large standard errors,
they suggest that using school fixed effects or school fixed effects combined with trends
underestimate the charter schools’ effects on discipline and overestimate the charter
schools’ effects on test scores. I also find that controlling for lagged peer effects has
little effect on the estimates using school fixed-effects or school fixed-effects combined
with school specific trends.
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2.2 Literature, Mechanisms, and Selection
2.2.1 Previous Literature
While there is a large literature on how charter schools affect students who
attend them,1 only a handful of papers have considered how charter schools affect
non-charter students. Some early work on the topic has used school level data to
answer this question. Bettinger (2005) finds little effect of charter schools on public
schools while Hoxby (2004) and Holmes, Desimone and Rupp (2003) find positive
effects of charter schools on public schools. While these papers were instrumental in
starting this line of literature, since all outcome measures are aggregated to the school
level it is impossible to tell whether these results are due to charter competition or
changes in the student body composition.
Recent work on whether charter schools affect non-charter students has turned
to individual panel data in order address concerns regarding changes in composition.
In addition, panel data can be used to account for unobserved heterogeneity of stu-
dents across different levels of charter penetration, as long as the selection of students
into schools near or far from charters is based on time-invariant characteristics. Sass
(2006) and Booker, et al. (2004) find that charter schools have positive effects on
non-charter public schools while Bifulco and Ladd (2006) and Buddin and Zimmer
(2005) find statistically insignificant impact estimates.
Thus, in general, researchers have found that charter schools have, at worst,
no statistically significant effect on non-charter public schools and, at best, a large
positive effect. However, despite the systematic results, there are still a number of
unanswered questions that remain. First, all of the papers listed above only con-
sider how charter schools affect test scores. Charter schools may have impacts along
other dimensions as well. For example, if parents choose to send their children to
1 Please see chapter 1 for a discussion of this literature
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charters because of discipline and safety problems, evidence supported by the first
chapter of this dissertation and Weiher and Tedin (2002), then regular public schools
may respond by trying to improve their students’ discipline. Second, although most
of the work in this literature refers to charter impacts as “charter competition,” as
mentioned above, there are multiple mechanisms through which charters may affect
non-charter students. In addition to competition, one potentially important mech-
anism is changing peer group composition. This, in turn, can affect the peer effects
mechanism. Indeed, work by Booker, Buddin and Zimmer (2005) find consider-
able changes in peer characteristics when charter schools open near California public
schools. Third, although researchers have used school fixed-effects to account for the
endogenous location decision of charter schools, estimates will be inconsistent if char-
ter schools select their locations based on time-varying characteristics. For example,
charters may prefer to locate in areas where schools are on downwards achievement
trends so that demand will likely increase in the future.
2.2.2 How Charter Schools May Affect Non-Charter Students
Charter schools may affect non-charter students in public schools in a number
of ways. The most commonly cited mechanism is through a competition effect.
Since charter schools draw enrollment and, as a result, funding away from regular
public schools, charter proponents have argued that administrators and teachers in
traditional public schools will increase effort and innovation so that they may prevent
their students from leaving. However, there are a number of reasons why traditional
public schools may not respond to charter competition. First, schools are not profit
maximizing firms. They are more like not-for-profit firms, and thus may depart from
profit-maximizing behavior (Duggan 2002, Glaeser 2002, Glaeser and Shleifer 2001,
Duggan 2000, Lakdawalla and Philipson 1998, Shleifer 1998). Thus, it is not clear
that loss of funding provides a large incentive to improve. Indeed, if schools are
73
overcrowded principals may welcome the charters, as that would make instruction
easier. Second, work by Cardon (2003) shows that, in theory, even if the utility
functions of school administrators and teachers do desire higher enrollment, schools
may not respond to charter competition if there are capacity constraints placed on
charters. Many states impose these constraints by limiting the size of individual
charter schools or limiting the number of charters that may be opened. Third, it
is also possible that the loss of funds that traditional schools incur when charters
draw students away would hamper the flexibility that administrators would have to
make adjustments. Fourth, if districts are able and willing to divert funds easily
from schools faced with little charter competition to schools facing a large amount of
competition, the incentive to improve may be small.
In addition to the competition effect, charter schools may impact non-charter
students through changes in peer effects. Previous work, along with the first chapter
of this dissertation, has shown that there is substantial selection into charter schools
(Hanushek et al. 2007, Bifulco and Ladd 2006, Sass 2006). Thus, we would expect the
composition of students left in schools with charters nearby would change. This was
found in schools in California (Booker, Zimmer and Buddin 2005). The changing
composition could impact students through peer effects (Cooley 2006, Hoxby and
Weingarth 2005, Angrist and Lang 2004, Hanushek, Kain, Markman and Rivkin 2003,
Zimmerman 2003, Sacerdote 2001). A priori it would seem that, since charters
generally attract lower ability students, non-charter students would likely improve
due to peer-effects.2 Thus estimates of charter impacts may overestimate the actual
“competition” effect.
2 The standard model of peer effects is the linear-in-means model where the effect is linear in
average peer ability. In this model we’d expect non-charter students to improve as described. How-
ever, recent evidence by Hoxby and Weingarth (2005) suggests that the linear-in-means model is
wrong. They finds evidence suggesting that a more appropriate model is one where outcomes improve
when there are concentrations of students of similar ability. In this case charters would also tend
to improve outcomes since they would tighten the distribution of students in non-charter schools.
Other evidence provided by Foster(2006) suggests that peer effects may not work through social
interactions. It is unclear what implication this may have for charter schools.
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2.2.3 Endogenous Student Movements and Charter Location
One of the largest problems researchers on this topic have faced is how to
deal with multiple layers of selection. The first problem is that a parent’s choice
of school is not random. Thus we may be concerned that parents would select
into or out of schools near charters for unobservable reasons that are correlated with
student ability and behavior. Perhaps more importantly, it is likely that some parents
respond to observed changes in traditional public schools that result from charter
competition. For example, suppose that charters do generate positive competition
effects in non-charter schools. A number of parents with high achieving students
who planned to send their children to magnet schools may now decide to keep their
children in their newly improved neighborhood school, thus increasing the estimated
charter impact. In order to address this problem researchers have used student level
fixed-effects in panel datasets. This will sufficiently correct for student selection if
the selection is based on time-invariant characteristics of the students, such as their
parents’ motivation.
The second problem is that the location of charter schools themselves is not
random. There are a number of factors that go into the decision of where to locate
a charter school including space availability and transportation options, since most
charters do not have access to district provided bussing.3 To the extent that these
factors are not associated with student characteristics this is not a problem. However,
an additional factor that likely plays a large role in the decision of where to locate is
the demand for an alternative schooling environment. This would likely be higher
in areas with low-performing schools. Indeed, many charters are created through
grass roots organizing in a community, often in response to the poor quality of the
local schools. In some cases charters convert from regular public schools rather than
3 In ALUSD, charters that convert from regular public schools have busing available, but district
startups and non-district charters do not. Nonetheless, in some cases charter schools provide their
own busing.
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choose their location. For these schools we would expect endogenous location to
be less of a problem. Nonetheless, the choice of whether or not to convert may be
correlated with neighborhood characteristics.
Depending on the nature of this selection, the bias in the charter impact
estimates could be positive or negative. If charters locate near low-performing schools
based on time-invariant characteristics of the public schools (i.e. the charters locate
near schools that have been low performing for many years and have shown little
improvement or worsening), then simple OLS regressions would underestimate the
effects of charters. Researchers have addressed this type of selection by including
school fixed-effects in OLS regressions. However, if location is, at least partially,
based on time-varying characteristics of non-charter schools then this strategy will
not eliminate, and in fact may exacerbate, the bias. One possible way this can
occur is if charters locate in areas where performance is worsening on the belief
that this will generate higher demand in the future. Since many charters face high
startup costs and thus open with few students and expand later, having an anticipated
increase in demand could be desirable. Another mechanism for this selection would
be if parents and community leaders are not spurred to start charter schools until
they see performance in the public schools worsening. The direction of this type of
bias depends on whether the trends are permanent or temporary. To illustrate this,
Figure 2.1 shows the difference between estimated and actual charter impacts under
the two types of trends. If the trends are permanent, then OLS regressions would
underestimate the charter impacts. If the trends are temporary and schools exhibit
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2.3 Charter Schools in ALUSD
ALUSD is an ideal location to study the effects of charters on non-charter
students because there are both charters authorized directly by the district (district
charters) and charters authorized by other authorities (non-district charters).4 In
addition to separating charters by whether they are district or non-district, I also sep-
arate the district charter schools further by whether they are conversions or startups.
Please refer to section 1.2.3 for a detailed description of charter schools in ALUSD.
2.4 Data
In this chapter I make use of the same data as in chapter 1. For a description
of how I create my two samples, the “base” sample and the “test” sample, please see
section 1.3. Unlike in the first chapter, however, I limit the base sample to 1996 and
later, since charter schools only began appearing in 1996. In addition, school location
data for 2004 had not been made available until recently, thus I exclude data from
that year. The final base sample has over 1.2 million student-year observations for
students in non-charter public schools. The final test sample includes over 900,000
observations, although this falls to approximately 500,000 observations when using
value-added specifications of test-score regressions.5
School addresses were derived from the US Department of Education’s Com-
mon Core of Data. Any missing addresses were filled in using school directories
acquired directly from ALUSD. These addresses were then converted to latitude
and longitude using the geocoder.us website. If an address could not be matched
using geocoder.us then I used Google EarthTMto find the latitude and longitude.
Afterwards, distances between schools were derived using the sphdist command in
4 The vast majority of these charters are authorized by the state government, but a few are
authorized by local universities
5 Test scores are measured by national percentile ranking, which is the percent of students in a
nationally representative sample of test takers who scored lower than the observed student.
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StataTM. In order to use bus routes as an instrument for charter penetration I ob-
tained geographic information system (GIS) files for the 2006 bus route maps from
ALUSD’s local transportation authority. Schools were matched to routes within var-
ious distances using ArcGISTM. Economic characteristics and population density of
census tracts were obtained from the 2000 Census Summary Files.
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for school-years that are between the
0th and 49th, 50th and 74th, 75th and 89th, and 90th and 99th percentiles of charter
penetration within two miles from 1998 - 2003. I define charter penetration here as
the fraction of students within a specified radius who are in grades covered by the non-
charter school but attend a charter school. The first four columns show characteristics
based on penetration by any charter type. As charter penetration increases students
are more likely to be at-risk of dropping out, have limited English proficiency, and
be recent immigrants. In addition, test scores and attendance are lower in schools
with more charter penetration. The last four columns show penetration by startup
charters (both district and non-district) only. Since these charters choose their
location while the locations of conversions is pre-determined, there may be different
characteristics of the schools with high penetration by this measure. This does not
appear to be the case, as the descriptive statistics cut by this measure of penetration
are similar to those cut by the other measure.
2.5 Empirical Strategy
I begin my outline of the empirical strategy used in this chapter by establish-
ing a simple equation of the form
yigjt = α+ βCjt + XigjtΩ + GradeYeargtΠ + εigjt (2.1)
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where yigjt is an outcome measure for student i in grade g in school j during academic
year t, C is some measure of charter school penetration into the school’s education
market, X is a set of observable student characteristics, GradeYeargt is a set of
grade-by-year indicators and ε is an error term. Epsilon can further be broken down
into student and school error components
εigjt = γijgt + ηjt (2.2)
The concern is that both γijgt and ηjt will be correlated with Cgjt through some
unobserved factors.
To deal with the potential that cov(γijgt, Cgjt) 6= 0 I assume that
γijgt = λi + νigjt (2.3)
where cov(λi, Cgjt) 6= 0 but cov(νigjt, Cgjt) = 0. Under this assumption we can
remove λ from (2.1) by demeaning the model with respect to the individual as such
ȳigjt = βC̄jt + X̄igjtΩ + GradeYeargtΠ + ν̄igjt + η̄jt. (2.4)
Note that while all students contributed to the identification of equation (2.1), now
only those students who are in the sample for multiple years and have changes in
charter penetration contribute to the identification of β.
Although this procedure corrects for student selection under the assumption
stated above, if charter location is endogenous then cov(η̄jt, Cjt) 6= 0. To address
this type of selection, researchers have made the assumption that
η̄jt = ζ̄j + θ̄jt (2.5)
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where cov(ζ̄j, Cgjt) 6= 0 and cov(θ̄jt, Cgjt) = 0. Under this assumption we can add
school indicator dummies to the regression that will move ζ̄ into the observable part
of the equation. Thus, our regression equation becomes
ȳigjt = βC̄jt + X̄igjtΩ + GradeYeargtΠ + S̄igjtΓ + ν̄igjt + θ̄jt. (2.6)
where S is the vector of school indicators. In this case, β is identified off of students
who are in ALUSD for multiple years and attend schools that experience a change
in charter penetration. However, if charters select locations based on trends in local
school performance, or, similarly, if grass root efforts to create charters are spurred
by trends in local schooling conditions, then equation (2.5) will be incorrect and
including school indicators will not correct for selection. One way we can address
this issue is to add school specific time-trends to the regression.
ȳigjt = βC̄gjt + X̄igjtΩ + GradeYeargtΠ + S̄igjtΓ + ¯S ∗ tigjtΛ + ν̄igjt. (2.7)
Identification in this case is based on the same students as in equation (2.4).
As long as charter location is correlated with linear permanent trends but uncorrelated
with non-linear or temporary trends, then this will eliminate the bias. If this is not
the case, however, then this strategy will not solve the problem. Thus, we may want
to use an instrumental variables strategy defined by the equations
ȳigjt = β
ˆ̄Cjt + X̄igjtΩ + GradeYeargtΠ + ν̄igjt (2.8)
ˆ̄Cjt = φZ̄igjt + X̄igjtΘ + GradeYeargtΥ + ρ̄igjt (2.9)
I propose using the availability of bus routes near a regular public school as an
instrument for whether a district startup or non-district charter school opens nearby.
This is similar to the strategy used by Lavy (2006) in his analysis of school choice in Tel
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Aviv. Since these types of charters do not have access to bussing provided by ALUSD,
parents usually need to rely on their own vehicles, public transportation, or walking to
send their children to these schools. Because of these transportation restrictions and
the high poverty rates of charter students, it is reasonable to believe that charters
attempt to locate in areas where there is substantial public transportation. Thus,
identification of β in this case is based on students who are in ALUSD for multiple
years, experience a change in charter penetration, and attend schools where charter
schools are induced to locate nearby due to the availability of bus transportation.
Nonetheless, even if one is able to surmount these identification concerns, the
estimates may still be misrepresentative. Generally, the estimates of charter impacts
on non-charter students have been interpreted as charter competition effects. How-
ever, other mechanisms, such as changes in peer composition generating adjustments
in peer effects, may also play a role. How much is due to peer composition changes
is particularly important, since compositional changes could conceivably be achieved
through the regular public school system. For example, districts could increase the
availability of “alternative” schools for students with behavioral or academic prob-
lems. Thus, from a policy perspective it is important to remove the impact of peer
composition changes from the overall charter school impacts. Table 2.2 shows how
charter students differ from non-charter students. I focus on district startups and
non-district charters since there is much more movement in and out of these schools
then there is in conversion charters. In addition, since I cannot observe directly
whether a student enters a non-district charter, I use students who leave the dataset
in schools within two miles of an overlapping non-district charter as a proxy for char-
ter students. I also limit this group to those in first through eighth grade so as to
minimize the number of dropouts in the group. In both cases there are substantial
differences between charter students and those who do not attend charters. Gener-
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considerably worse academic and behavioral outcomes. Thus, to address the poten-
tial contamination of charter competition effects with changes in peer composition
I run variations of the models described above that also include measures of lagged
peer characteristics.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Defining Charter Penetration
Before conducting this analysis, one needs a definition of “charter penetra-
tion.” The first measure of charter penetration, by Hoxby (2001), is whether a school
district has over 6% of enrollment in charter schools. But this does not inform us
about school level penetration, nor does it necessarily apply to locations other than
Michigan, which is the state she studies.
There are two issues to consider when measuring charter penetration at the
school level. The first is what is the proper measure of charter penetration in a given
geographic area. Previous work has used the number of charters near a traditional
public school and the share of total enrollment in charter schools (Bifulco and Ladd
2006, Sass 2006, Booker et al. 2004, Holmes, DeSimone and Rupp 2003). I use
the second of these measures, as I believe this more accurately reflects the pressures
that non-charter schools would face from charter schools. Thus, I define charter
penetration as follows. Define a set of schools within a distance (d) of school j,
including j as J = 1, 2, ..., Ndc , N
d
c + 1, N
d






c is the total
number of charter schools and Ndnc is the total number of non-charter schools. Charter











where Gmin and Gmax are the lowest and highest grades, respectively for school j
and Enrollgnt is enrollment in grade g, school n and year t. For example, suppose I
am measuring charter penetration within one mile of a school, j, that serves grades
kindergarten through five. In this case I calculate the total number of students in
those grades attending charter schools within one mile and divide by the total number
of students attending any school within one mile (including those in j) in those grades.
Thus, my charter penetration measure is the fraction of all public school and charter
school students in overlapping grades who attend a particular type of charter school
within a geographic radius around the public school
The other determinant of charter penetration is the distance radius around a
school in which charters would be considered competitors. Since I am only looking
at one school district, I cannot use the district itself as the market. Indeed, it is
not clear whether competitive incentives are stronger at the school or district level.
Thus, previous research that looks at school-level competition has generally defined
some linear distance from a school as the competitive market. However, the correct
distance probably varies considerably with the urbanization of the locations being
considered. Because of this, previous papers include estimates along a range of
distances, although these ranges also vary widely. Bifulco and Ladd (2006) and
Sass (2006) use 2.5, 5, and 10 miles, while Holmes, Desimone, and Rupp (2003) use
distances ranging from 5 to 20 kilometers (3.1 to 12.4 miles) and also use the county as
the local education market. Booker, et al. (2004) use the school district as the local
education market. All of these papers use state level data and so their distances may
not work well in an urban environment such as ALUSD. To figure out the optimal
distance measure, I run regressions of the form
yjt = α+ βChartDistjt + XjtΩ + SchooljΘ + YeartΛ + εjt (2.11)
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where yjt is the fraction of students who leave school j and enter a district startup
charter in year t+ 1, ChartDistjt is the number of startup charters with overlapping
grades within a certain radius, Xjt is a set of observable school characteristics, and
Schoolj and Yeart are school and year dummies, respectively. The results of this
regression are shown in panel A of Table 2.3. In panel B, I show similar regressions for
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# of Startups within 1 Mile 0.173* 0.173*
(0.068) (0.071)
# of Startups within 2 Miles 0.069
(0.049)
# of Startups within 3 Miles 0.053#
(0.030)
# of Startups within 4 Miles 0.031
(0.025)
# of Startups within 5 Miles 0.022
(0.020)
# of Startups between 1 and 2 Miles 0.018
(0.077)
# of Startups between 2 and 3 Miles 0.045
(0.031)
# of Startups between 3 and 4 Miles -0.001
(0.028)
# of Startups between 4 and 5 Miles 0.000
(0.022)
B. Percent of Students in Non-Charters in Year t Who Leave ALUSD in Year t + 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# of Non-District Charters within 1 Mile 0.423* 0.467*
(0.179) (0.187)
# of Non-District Charters within 2 Miles 0.267*
(0.115)
# of Non-District Charters within 3 Miles 0.017
(0.084)
# of Non-District Charters within 4 Miles 0.026
(0.059)
# of Non-District Charters within 5 Miles 0.012
(0.054)
# of Non-District Charters between 1 and 2 Miles 0.170
(0.123)
# of Non-District Charters between 2 and 3 Miles -0.162
(0.110)
# of Non-District Charters between 3 and 4 Miles 0.030
(0.089)
# of Non-District Charters between 4 and 5 Miles -0.083
(0.096)
Table 2.3 - Relationship Between Student Movements and the Distance Between Non-Charter 
Schools and Charter Schools with Overlapping Grades 
A. Percent of Students in a Non-Charters in Year t Who Switch to a Startup District Charter in Year t + 1
Unit of observation is the school-year.  Each regression includes over 1500 school-year observations.  Exact sample sizes cannot be revealed due to 
confidentiality restrictions.  Analysis covers years t = 1993 to 2002.  Panel titles denote the dependent variables.  One school is dropped due to 
missing data.  Each regression also includes the percent of students who are black, hispanic, native american, asian or pacific islander, economically 
disadvantaged, limited English proficient, in vocational programs, in special education programs, in bilingual programs, and in gifted programs.  The 
regressions also include the percent of teachers who have 1-5, 6-10, 11-20, and more than 20 years of experience as well as the student-faculty ratio, 
and year and campus fixed effects.  Robust standard errors clustered by school are in parentheses.  **, *, and # denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.
the number of non-district charter schools with overlapping grades nearby. However,
since I cannot observe when students enter non-district charters, I proxy using the
87
percent of students who leave ALUSD the following year. The regressions consider
how student movements change with the distance of the charter schools from the
non-charter schools. The results show that only schools with charters very close
by - less than one mile - lose a statistically significant fraction of their students to
charter schools. Each district charter within one mile is associated with a loss of
0.2% of students while each non-district charter within one mile is associated with
0.4% more students leaving ALUSD. Both of these are statistically significant at the
five percent level. Unfortunately there is not enough variation in charter location to
look at distances less than one mile, thus, in light of these results, I use the distances
of 1, 1.5, and 2 miles in my measures of charter penetration.
2.6.2 Estimates Using School Fixed Effects and School Time Trends
Table 2.4 shows the baseline results for this chapter. Each dependent and
independent variable used in the regressions is de-meaned to remove the student
fixed-effect. In addition to the variables listed in the table, the regressions also
includes some time-varying student characteristics: free lunch eligibility, reduced price
lunch eligibility, whether the student has another economic disadvantage, whether the
student is a recent immigrant, whether the student’s parents are migrant workers, and
grade-by-year indicator variables. The first column for each distance radius shows
regressions with no corrections for endogenous location. The second column includes
a set of school indicator variables. The third column shows results from regressions
that include both school indicator variables and school-specific linear time trends.
All standard errors are clustered by schools to allow for correlation of the error terms
across students who attend the same school. I consider five outcome measures - the
number of disciplinary infractions warranting an in-school suspension or more severe
punishment, the attendance rate, and annual changes in math, reading, and language
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ranking (NPR) for a commonly used national norm-referenced examination. NPR is
the percent of students in a nationally representative sample of test-takers who score
lower than the observed student. Charter penetration is broken into three types:
conversion, district startup, and non-district. Each of these measures are used in
separate regressions.
Let us begin by considering the effects of charters on student discipline. With-
out school fixed-effects or school specific trends (columns 1, 4 and 7), conversions and
non-district charters appear to improve discipline while district startups increase dis-
ciplinary infractions. When school fixed effects are added (columns 2, 5 and 8), the
effect of conversions on discipline becomes stronger while the estimates for startups
increase and non-district estimates decrease, to the point where non-district impacts
are statistically insignificant. Finally, the specification using both school fixed-effects
and school specific trends (columns 3, 6 and 9) appears to do little to the estimates
for conversions, except within one mile, but move the estimates for startups and
non-district charters further in the direction they moved when school fixed effects
were added. Using this as the preferred specification, it appears that charters have
little effect on discipline - for each school type two out of three of the estimates are
statistically insignificant.
For attendance, results with no school fixed-effects or trends suggest that
conversions improve attendance, while startups have no statistically significant im-
pact, and non-district schools have worsened attendance. However, when school
fixed-effects are added the attendance impacts increase, in some cases quite substan-
tially. Adding school specific time-trends to these regressions increase the attendance
impacts further. In this case, the attendance impacts are positive and statistically
significant for conversion charters, but there is no statistically significant impact for
startups and non-district charters.
Unfortunately, the effect of adding school fixed-effects and school specific
90
time-trends on the test score estimates are less clear. Without school FE or trends,
all three types of charters seem to have statistically insignificant to negative impacts
on test scores. When school fixed-effects are added, although the point estimates
change dramatically in some cases, this general pattern holds for conversions and
startups, but non-district charters appear to generate negative impacts within one
mile and positive impacts within two miles. Nonetheless, when school specific trends
are added on top of school fixed effects, these results become statistically insignificant
in almost all cases.
Thus, my preferred results using school specific time trends suggest there is
little evidence for charters affecting non-charter schools, although conversions appear
to generate improvements in attendance. Despite the lack of statistically signifi-
cant results, these regressions do show that adding school specific trends generates
substantial changes in the estimates. This suggests that school fixed-effects do not
sufficiently account for endogenous locations of charter schools.
2.6.3 Instrumental Variables Estimates
Even after controlling for school fixed-effects and school specific time-trends
we may still be concerned if there is some residual endogeneity of charter penetration.
As mentioned before, one possible source would be if charters locate near non-charter
schools that are temporarily on downward trends in outcomes or are anticipated to
worsen in the future. To address this issue, I use the availability of public trans-
portation, specifically busses, near a non-charter school as an instrument for charter
penetration. Since most charter schools need to provide their own transportation,
all else equal, we would expect them to locate where public transportation options
are plentiful. Since this reasoning does not apply to conversion charters, I will not
include them in this analysis.
More specifically, the exclusion restriction I use is the number of bus routes
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within a specified radius around a charter school. A bus route is defined as being
within the established radius if the bus passes through the radius during its travels.
Thus if I’m using one mile as my competition radius, then I’ll use bus routes within
one mile, competition within 1.5 miles will correspond to bus routes within 1.5 miles,
and so on. Table 2.5 shows how the number of bus routes near a school correlates with
student and school characteristics. This table highlights the main problem with this
instrument, which is that public transportation tends to be more common in areas
where people are low-income since wealthier people tend to use private transport.
Indeed, the number of bus-routes correlates strongly with economic conditions of
the census tract the school is in. Nonetheless, when zip-code indicators for each
school are added to the regression most of the economic measures become statistically
insignificant. While the estimates once again become statistically significant when
student fixed-effects are added, this is due to increased precision rather than a change
in the point estimates.
Whether these correlations are a substantial problem depends on whether
they are indicative of unobserved characteristics that have independent effects on
outcomes that are correlated with bus routes. Unfortunately, there is no way to
test this directly. However, we can look at reduced form regressions of bus routes
on outcomes to get a sense of the exogeneity of the exclusion restriction. If bus-
routes have no predictive effect on outcomes, especially in years prior to charter
schools opening, then it is unlikely that unobserved correlates with bus routes affect
outcomes, and thus the instrument is exogenous. Table 2.6 shows the results of
these regressions. In panel A, I look at how the number of bus routes correlates
with discipline and attendance in three periods. The first period, 1993 - 1995, is
prior to any charters opening. The second period, 1996 - 1998, is early in the
charter period, while the third period, 1999 - 2004 is after charters have become
well established. Without student fixed-effects there is no statistically significant
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Table 2.5 - Regressions of Number of Bus Routes on Observable Characteristics
Dependent Variable: # Busroutes within 1 Mile # Busroutes within 1.5 Miles # Busroutes within 2 Miles
Student Characteristics (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
  Female 0.040 0.031 - 0.011 -0.011 - 0.018 0.000 -
(0.073) (0.030) - (0.098) (0.043) - (0.111) (0.048) -
  Black 0.993* 0.156 - 1.496* 0.204 - 0.816 -0.279 -
(0.436) (0.214) - (0.735) (0.285) - (0.883) (0.282) -
  Hispanic 0.880# 0.132 - 1.448* 0.247 - 0.827 -0.169 -
(0.523) (0.182) - (0.714) (0.250) - (0.818) (0.230) -
  Asian 0.195 0.278 - 0.369 0.593# - -0.273 0.506 -
(0.595) (0.212) - (0.975) (0.359) - (1.141) (0.470) -
  Native American 0.378 0.151 - 0.432 0.120 - 0.286 0.082 -
(0.610) (0.262) - (0.913) (0.352) - (1.317) (0.528) -
  Recent Immigrant 0.400 0.104 0.046 0.420 0.110 0.010 0.249 0.146 0.144*
(0.305) (0.102) (0.045) (0.476) (0.133) (0.061) (0.512) (0.135) (0.067)
  Parents are Migrant Workers -0.111 0.180 0.199* -0.238 0.124 0.079 -0.370 0.008 0.178#
(0.267) (0.121) (0.096) (0.376) (0.164) (0.103) (0.396) (0.195) (0.106)
  Limited English Proficient -0.134 0.016 0.002 -0.537 -0.025 0.016 -0.415 -0.010 0.085
(0.604) (0.125) (0.085) (0.815) (0.201) (0.120) (0.886) (0.219) (0.139)
  At Risk 0.196 -0.015 0.000 0.595 -0.005 -0.028 0.456 0.042 0.035
(0.320) (0.097) (0.025) (0.542) (0.195) (0.037) (0.621) (0.221) (0.045)
 Gifted 0.356 -0.357 -0.174 1.233 -0.235 0.089 1.459 -0.217 0.134
(0.564) (0.357) (0.120) (1.375) (0.436) (0.152) (1.527) (0.415) (0.159)
  Special Education 0.072 0.001 0.087 -0.053 -0.034 0.044 0.071 0.025 -0.009
(0.243) (0.091) (0.058) (0.390) (0.155) (0.082) (0.459) (0.178) (0.072)
  Free Lunch Eligible 1.107* 0.201# 0.084** 1.444* 0.411* 0.142** 1.753* 0.057 0.047
(0.468) (0.122) (0.031) (0.673) (0.198) (0.047) (0.810) (0.214) (0.055)
  Reduced Price Lunch Eligible 0.429 0.112 0.082** 0.397 0.174 0.124** 0.628 -0.208 -0.004
(0.459) (0.129) (0.028) (0.668) (0.190) (0.045) (0.769) (0.198) (0.053)
  Other Economic Disadvantage 0.479* 0.010 0.033 0.875* 0.171 0.082* 0.955* -0.045 0.081#
(0.239) (0.094) (0.022) (0.393) (0.163) (0.034) (0.455) (0.185) (0.043)
Neighborhoold Characteristics of School
  Population Density 0.072 -0.051 -0.039 0.015 -0.234 -0.221* -0.042 -0.414** -0.403**
(0.214) (0.123) (0.072) (0.299) (0.166) (0.106) (0.298) (0.153) (0.090)
  Fraction Black 0.916 0.334 -1.224 -5.686 -4.982 -8.614# -5.488 0.613 -1.516
(4.174) (4.072) (2.689) (6.846) (6.953) (4.752) (8.379) (7.092) (4.330)
  Fraction Hispanic 6.848 -9.259 -10.294# -0.181 -25.363# -31.948** 20.743 -3.079 -5.502
(9.893) (8.577) (5.482) (15.155) (13.176) (10.102) (17.834) (13.677) (8.359)
  Fraction Non-Native -30.855** 18.356 13.155* -52.425** 5.262 4.334 -78.237** -15.197 -13.544
(10.428) (11.583) (6.624) (13.658) (13.518) (7.583) (15.590) (13.934) (8.662)
  Fraction w/ HS or Some College -49.674** -13.425 -18.453* -84.264** -52.648** -59.410** -79.063** -36.927** -34.902**
(12.334) (11.804) (7.351) (18.034) (17.095) (12.411) (20.408) (14.207) (9.941)
  Fraction w/ College or Advanced Degree 1.295 -15.654 -19.494* -7.380 -47.388* -59.026** 30.058 -5.927 -10.617
(11.580) (11.660) (7.714) (18.424) (20.965) (16.945) (21.355) (18.941) (12.657)
  Labor Force Participation (Male 16+) 24.480* 9.453 10.204* 38.242** 21.344 23.807* 31.322* 18.223 19.795*
(10.100) (7.031) (4.334) (12.947) (13.401) (9.315) (14.319) (12.661) (8.085)
  Ln (Household Income) -9.614** 0.641 1.642 -20.085** -0.687 1.836 -30.742** -7.749# -6.150*
(2.842) (2.065) (1.386) (3.904) (4.437) (2.877) (4.352) (4.121) (2.869)
  Fraction receiving Public Assistance -17.966 27.527# 29.575** -73.668* -0.219 0.393 -79.255* 10.415 -0.412
(24.559) (15.361) (9.907) (31.542) (17.378) (12.865) (38.581) (17.368) (11.700)
Grade-Year Indicators N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Zip-Code of School Indicators N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Student Fixed-Effects N N Y N N Y N N Y
Huber/White standard errors clustered by school in parentheses.  Behavior and attendence regressions contain over 1,200,000 observations.  Test score 
regressions contain over 400,000 observations.  Exact sample sizes cannot be revealed due to confidentiality restrictions.  **, *, and # denote significance at 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































relationship between discipline or attendance and bus routes in the pre-charter or
early post-charter periods, while only discipline is statistically significant in the late-
charter period. With student fixed-effects the relationship is stronger, but once again
this is mostly due to increased precision rather than changes in the point estimates.
In addition, the relationship appears rather weak in the pre-charter period relative to
the late charter period, though this could also be due to the fact that the bus route
data is for 2006.
Unfortunately I cannot do the same exercise with test scores since schools did
not start giving the exam until Fall, 1997. Instead, I am able to use data on whether
or not a student passed a state criterion referenced exam that was given from 1993
- 2001. The examination was given in reading and math to all students in grades
3-8 and 10. The results from this analysis is provided in panel B. In no case does
the number of bus routes have a statistically significant relationship with whether
a student passes the exam. Thus, the evidence in Table 2.6 does suggest that bus
routes are a valid instrument for charter penetration, provided that one accounts fully
for economic conditions.
In light of this requirement, I control for a number of economic characteristics
of each school’s local neighborhood using census tract level data from the 2000 census.
In addition to the covariates used in the regressions in Table 2.4, I also include a
quartic in population density, along with the fractions of the population that are black,
Hispanic, not native born, high school graduates without a college degree, college
graduates, or receiving public assistance. I also include labor force participation for
males aged sixteen and over, the log of household income, and indicator variables for
the zip-code of the school. Descriptions of these variables can be found in Appendix
Table 9. Thus the first stage is identified off of differences in the number of bus
routes within zip codes.
Another problem with this choice of exclusion restriction is that, while the
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first stage coefficients on bus routes are statistically significant in most cases, they
are not very strong. Thus, in order to improve the strength of the instrument, I
use only the combined measure of charter penetration for both district startups and
non-district charters - i.e. non-conversion charters. For purposes of comparison, I
also provide estimates from the non 2SLS regressions using this measure of charter
competition.
Table 2.7 provides the results for this analysis. For discipline, the estimates
with school fixed effects and school trends are positive, but generally statistically in-
significant. On the other hand, the 2SLS results find a negative impact on discipline
that is statistically significant at the 10% level for distances of one and two miles, and
at the 5% level for distances of 1.5 miles. For attendance, regressions with school
fixed effects are negative and statistically significant at the 5% level for distances of
two miles, but when school specific trends are added, the attendance effect becomes
statistically insignificant at all distances. The 2SLS results are also statistically in-
significant, but positive. Thus, for discipline and attendance, the 2SLS results are
suggestive, though by no means conclusive, of a bias towards estimating charters hav-
ing undesirable impacts on non-charter schools in regressions with school fixed-effects.
Adding school specific trends gets us closer, but does not seem to remove the bias
entirely.
On the other hand, test score results tell a different story. Regressions
using school fixed effects or school specific trends show the impacts to be statistically
insignificant at the 10% level in most cases, and statistically insignificant at the
5% level in all cases. In addition, the point estimates are sometimes positive and
sometimes negative. The 2SLS estimates, however, are consistently negative. While
most of the estimates are not statistically significant, three out of nine measures are
statistically significant at the 10% level and one is statistically significant at the 5%
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conclusive, of a upwards bias in impact estimates of charter schools on test scores
in non-charter schools. Hence, while I cannot conclude from this evidence that
analyses that rely on school fixed-effects or school specific trends are incorrect, these
results raise substantial questions about their validity and suggest that, in a worst
case scenario, previous research has over-estimated the charter impact on test scores.
2.7 Accounting for Changes in Peer Composition
The strategies used in the previous section do not account for changes in peer
composition. If charters change the characteristics of a student’s peers, then this
in turn could affect a student’s own outcomes through the peer-effects mechanism.
In order to address this issue, I account for peer composition by adding controls for
quartics in the average of twice-lagged peer course grades and disciplinary actions
along with a quartic in their interaction.6 If I use current peer grades and discipline,
charter competition effects will also improve outcomes for peers. Thus, accounting
for peer composition will bias the charter competition effects towards zero. Thus, in
order to reduce the extent of this “contamination” the peer variables are calculated
from other students twice lagged characteristics, when they were likely to be in other
schools and at a time when fewer charter schools existed in ALUSD.
Table 2.8 provides the results for these regressions. Since I include lagged
peer characteristics, the sample changes to drop the years 1993 and 1994 and grades
one and two. Thus, in order to make a reasonable comparison, the first panel repeats
the regressions from table 5 and 6 with the new sample. In each case there is very
little change in the estimates from adding the controls for peer characteristics. Thus,
I find little evidence that changes in peer composition affects the estimates of charter
school impacts on non-charter students. However, this is, admittedly, a low power
6 I use course grades instead of test scores since grades are available for all years back to 1993.
However, course grades in 1994 are only available for grades 1 - 5
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Table 2.8 -  Accounting for Changes in Peer Characteristics in Estimates of Charter Impacts on Non-Charter Students
A. Explanatory Variable: Enrollment Share in Non-Conversion (%)
School Fixed Effects School Fixed-Effects & School Specific Time Trends
No Peer Characteristics Controls Controls for Quartics in Peers' 
Mean Twice-Lagged Discipline, 
Grades, and Interaction
No Peer Characteristics Controls Controls for Quartics in Peers' 
Mean Twice-Lagged Discipline, 
Grades, and Interaction
i.  Measure of Charter Penetration: Share Within 1 Miles
Dependent Variable:
  # Disciplinary Infractions -0.003 -0.008 0.055 0.050
(0.020) (0.019) (0.036) (0.036)
  Attendence Rate (%) -0.299** -0.300** -0.243 -0.236
(0.095) (0.093) (0.171) (0.167)
  Δ  Math NPR -0.652 -0.681 -0.393 -0.414
(0.976) (0.975) (1.168) (1.162)
  Δ  Reading NPR -0.142 -0.106 -0.256 -0.303
(0.770) (0.769) (1.009) (1.036)
  Δ  Language NPR -0.243 -0.259 -0.788 -0.784
(0.684) (0.686) (0.849) (0.859)
ii. Measure of Charter Penetration: Share Within 1.5 Miles
Dependent Variable:
  # Disciplinary Infractions -0.004 -0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
  Attendence Rate (%) -0.224* -0.217* -0.048 -0.043
(0.095) (0.096) (0.118) (0.122)
  Δ  Math NPR 0.315 0.259 0.133 0.094
(0.363) (0.373) (0.373) (0.382)
  Δ  Reading NPR 0.303 0.281 0.146 0.149
(0.251) (0.257) (0.266) (0.272)
  Δ  Language NPR 0.173 0.160 0.188 0.187
(0.325) (0.329) (0.349) (0.353)
iii. Measure of Charter Penetration: Share Within 2 Miles
Dependent Variable:
  # Disciplinary Infractions -0.001 0.000 0.008 0.007
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021)
  Attendence Rate (%) -0.176** -0.172** -0.054 -0.052
(0.058) (0.057) (0.082) (0.085)
  Δ  Math NPR 0.484# 0.464# 0.085 0.073
(0.270) (0.273) (0.304) (0.311)
  Δ  Reading NPR 0.181 0.168 -0.100 -0.105
(0.155) (0.159) (0.225) (0.228)
  Δ  Language NPR 0.154 0.133 0.172 0.165
(0.214) (0.211) (0.244) (0.246)
B. Explanatory Variable: Enrollment Share in District Startup (%)
School Fixed Effects School Fixed-Effects & School Specific Time Trends
No Peer Characteristics Controls Controls for Quartics in Peers' 
Mean Twice-Lagged Discipline, 
Grades, and Interaction
No Peer Characteristics Controls Controls for Quartics in Peers' 
Mean Twice-Lagged Discipline, 
Grades, and Interaction
i.  Measure of Charter Penetration: Share Within 1 Miles
Dependent Variable:
  # Disciplinary Infractions 0.099# 0.077 -0.061 -0.090
(0.058) (0.057) (0.095) (0.097)
  Attendence Rate (%) -0.162 -0.194 0.505 0.495
(0.439) (0.447) (0.587) (0.582)
  Δ  Math NPR 1.380 1.349 0.902 0.861
(1.703) (1.776) (1.585) (1.627)
  Δ  Reading NPR 0.920 0.961 0.597 0.724
(0.904) (0.939) (0.829) (0.846)
  Δ  Language NPR -0.221 -0.206 -0.339 -0.194
(0.937) (0.921) (0.736) (0.727)
ii. Measure of Charter Penetration: Share Within 1.5 Miles
Dependent Variable:
  # Disciplinary Infractions 0.077# 0.069 -0.020 -0.034
(0.044) (0.042) (0.060) (0.064)
  Attendence Rate (%) -0.080 -0.070 0.529# 0.536#
(0.196) (0.190) (0.315) (0.315)
  Δ  Math NPR 0.299 0.229 0.098 -0.029
(1.614) (1.680) (1.631) (1.688)
  Δ  Reading NPR 0.146 0.068 -0.174 -0.170
(0.873) (0.938) (0.870) (0.936)
  Δ  Language NPR -0.107 -0.242 -0.420 -0.397
(1.050) (1.034) (0.951) (0.927)
iii. Measure of Charter Penetration: Share Within 2 Miles
Dependent Variable:
  # Disciplinary Infractions 0.190** 0.185** 0.091# 0.077
(0.072) (0.071) (0.050) (0.047)
  Attendence Rate (%) -0.356** -0.360** 0.197 0.196
(0.133) (0.136) (0.361) (0.361)
  Δ  Math NPR -1.539 -1.539 -4.018** -4.074**
(1.246) (1.269) (1.053) (1.050)
  Δ  Reading NPR -0.434 -0.517 -1.862** -1.848*
(0.667) (0.686) (0.711) (0.719)
  Δ  Language NPR -0.662 -0.811 -0.455 -0.482
(0.805) (0.800) (0.907) (0.895)
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C. Explanatory Variable: Enrollment Share in Non-District Charter (%)
School Fixed Effects School Fixed-Effects & School Specific Time Trends
No Peer Characteristics Controls Controls for Quartics in Peers' 
Mean Twice-Lagged Discipline, 
Grades, and Interaction
No Peer Characteristics Controls Controls for Quartics in Peers' 
Mean Twice-Lagged Discipline, 
Grades, and Interaction
i.  Measure of Charter Penetration: Share Within 1 Miles
Dependent Variable:
  # Disciplinary Infractions -0.024 -0.026 0.068 0.067
(0.028) (0.029) (0.046) (0.046)
  Attendence Rate (%) -0.325* -0.318* -0.324# -0.315#
(0.156) (0.156) (0.165) (0.166)
  Math NPR -2.648# -2.693# -1.766 -1.853
(1.599) (1.561) (1.953) (2.020)
  Reading NPR -1.486 -1.450 -2.567 -3.022
(1.268) (1.234) (1.874) (1.927)
  Language NPR -1.005 -1.064 -2.558 -2.835
(1.267) (1.263) (1.929) (1.951)
ii. Measure of Charter Penetration: Share Within 1.5 Miles
Dependent Variable:
  # Disciplinary Infractions -0.074 -0.073 -0.004 -0.004
(0.050) (0.049) (0.054) (0.051)
  Attendence Rate (%) -0.321# -0.311# -0.171 -0.165
(0.170) (0.173) (0.197) (0.201)
  Math NPR 0.983 0.917 0.516 0.544
(0.613) (0.606) (0.721) (0.726)
  Reading NPR 0.913# 0.908* 0.536 0.542
(0.473) (0.454) (0.561) (0.561)
  Language NPR 0.626 0.656 0.789 0.797
(0.560) (0.544) (0.540) (0.531)
iii. Measure of Charter Penetration: Share Within 2 Miles
Dependent Variable:
  # Disciplinary Infractions -0.043# -0.040# 0.000 0.001
(0.022) (0.023) (0.038) (0.038)
  Attendence Rate (%) -0.158 -0.152 -0.071 -0.070
(0.099) (0.098) (0.116) (0.117)
  Math NPR 0.873** 0.867** 0.449 0.478
(0.313) (0.308) (0.427) (0.420)
  Reading NPR 0.290 0.280 -0.095 -0.106
(0.201) (0.204) (0.343) (0.351)
  Language NPR 0.406 0.401 0.350 0.346
(0.323) (0.309) (0.350) (0.341)
All regressions include quartics in population density of school's Census tract, controls for Census tract economic conditions, student fixed effects, zip-code of school indicators, free or reduced price 
lunch status, other economic disadvantages, recent immigration status, parents' migrant status, and grade*year dummies  For a complete list of controls see the appendix. Huber/White standard errors 
clustered by school in parentheses.  Behavior and attendence regressions contain over 1,200,000 observations.  Test score regressions contain over 400,000 observations.  Exact sample sizes cannot be 
revealed due to confidentiality restrictions.  **, *, and # denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
test, so we must interpret these results cautiously.
2.8 Conclusion
Charter schools have the potential to generate strong incentives for public
school administrations and teachers to increase effort and improve student perfor-
mance. However, they also have the potential to make increasing performance in
traditional public schools more difficult through reducing funds and changing stu-
dent’s peer groups. In this chapter, using data from an anonymous large urban
school district, I add to the current literature in four ways. First, I provide estimates
that use school specific time trends and instrumental variable techniques to account
for the potential that charter schools endogenously locate near particular types of
non-charter schools. Second, I assess the effects of charter schools on discipline and
attendance of non-charter students in addition to test scores. Third, I account for
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the contamination of competition impacts with changes in peer composition by con-
trolling for twice lagged average peer discipline and grades. Fourth, I look at whether
there are different impacts of charter schools based on whether they are conversions,
schools that were originally traditional public schools but convert to charter status,
or startups, schools that begin as charters and by whether the charter is granted by
the local school district or some other government entity.
Estimates using school-fixed effects to correct for endogenous location of char-
ter schools show a mixed picture. While most estimates are statistically insignifi-
cant, discipline seems to improve in startup charters while for non-district charters
test score impacts of charter penetration within one mile are statistically significantly
negative, but within two miles they are statistically significantly positive. However,
these results become statistically insignificant when school specific trends are added
with only one exception. Indeed, when school specific trends are added, overall the
results suggest there is little impact of charter schools on non-charter students. In
addition, some of the estimates change considerably when trends are added. This
highlights the possibility that school fixed-effects are insufficient corrections for en-
dogenous charter location.
Instrumental variable estimates using the number of bus routes nearby as an
instrument for charter penetration provide further evidence that school fixed-effects
estimates are insufficient. While these estimates are not conclusive due to large
standard errors, they suggest that using school fixed effects or school fixed effects
combined with trends underestimate the charter schools effects on discipline and
overestimate the charter schools’ effects on test scores.
Finally, I find that controlling for lagged peer effects has little effect on the es-
timates using school fixed-effects or school fixed-effects combined with school specific
trends. However, these tests are low power, and thus, at best, they are suggestive of
there being only a small role for peer composition changes.
101
3. ARE THERE RETURNS TO ATTENDING A PRIVATE
COLLEGE?
3.1 Introduction
The average net cost (tuition, fees, room, and board minus grants) of attend-
ing an in-state public four-year college or university was $5,695 in 1999 (in $2004).
By comparison, attending a private four-year college or university cost an average of
$15,020. Over a 4-year college career from 1999 – 2003 the average private college
student paid $38,817 more than his or her public counterpart.1 In addition, this gap
has widened over the past 40 years. Figure 3.1 shows that gross tuition and fees
have increased by nearly $16,844 on average for private universities since 1964. In
contrast, in-state tuition and fees at public universities only increased by $3,695 on
average. With these substantial cost differences one would expect there to be signif-
icant benefits to attending a private college rather than a public college. However,
previous research has been unclear as what effect attending a private college has on
wage and education outcomes.
Understanding whether there are benefits to attending a private college has
substantial policy implications. Large deficits are putting pressure on the Federal
government to cut funding for financial aid. In fact, the 2007 President’s Budget
proposed cutting Pell Grants by 27%. In the expectation that less Federal spending
for higher education will be forthcoming, state governments will need to distribute
1 National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS), 2000 Digest of Education Statistics, 2003
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their education funding more efficiently. One potential avenue to improve efficiency
would be to divert funds from public colleges to financial aid programs. If this occurs,
then more students would likely attend private colleges (Long 2004). This can be
efficiency enhancing if attending a private college provides a higher return, in terms
of the student’s labor market outcomes, per dollar of government funds spent.
On the surface, there is considerable evidence that a substantial private pre-
mium exists. First of all, private colleges are generally ranked higher than their public
counterparts in commonly used lists. For example, of national universities ranked 50
or higher by US News and World Report’s 2006 rankings, only 13 are public, despite
public universities in this group outnumbering private by 2 to 1. In addition, most
easily observable statistics, such as average SAT scores and faculty-student ratios,
consistently show private schools performing better than public schools. Using data
from US News & World Report Directory of Colleges, 1991, Table 3.1 shows how
public & private colleges compare on a set of 9 common college quality measures.
Table 3.1 - Average College Quality for Public & Private Four-Year Schools
Measure Public Private
Avg SAT Score 975 1027
% of Students in Top 10% of High School Class 26% 33%
% of Students in Top 25% of High School Class 53% 58%
% of Faculty with PhD 78% 72%
Graduation Rate (%) 42% 59%
Freshman Retention Rate (%) 74% 80%
Rejection Rate (%) 27% 29%
Per-Student Expenditures $11,213 $15,435
Faculty-Student Ratio 0.060 0.080
Source: US News and World Report Directory of Colleges and 
Universities, 1991.   Weighted by full-time enrollment + 2/3*part-time 
enrollment.
Public colleges are higher in only 1 of the categories, percent of faculty with PhD’s.
These measures and rankings are misleading, however, when investigating
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the quality of a private college education. The problem is that they depend on the
quality of schools and the quality of the students in those schools. For example,
consider graduation rates. Table 3.1 shows that only 42% of public school students
eventually graduate while 59% of private students do. At the same time, however,
the average SAT score of public school students is 52 points lower than for private
school students. Thus, while the lower graduation rate suggests poorer performance
on the part of the public college, most or all of that difference could be due to lower
ability students enrolling in public schools.
Thus, the positive selection of higher ability and/or more motivated stu-
dents into private schools makes finding an accurate measure of relative quality dif-
ficult. Research into this topic at the primary and secondary level has used an
instrumental variables approach to correct for selection utilizing religion as an in-
strument for attending a Catholic school (Grogger and Neal 2000, Neal 1997, Evans
and Schwab 1995). The concept of comparing public to private non-profit firms has
also been extensively researched in the health care sector where the private for-profit,
private non-profit, and public sector all play substantial roles in hospital ownership
(Shen, Eggleston, Lau and Schmid 2005) with some use of natural experiments to
identify the differences (Duggan 2000).
Unfortunately, a lack of natural experiments or feasible instruments means
that neither of these strategies will work well for higher education. In this chapter, I
take a different approach to addressing selection. Rather than modeling the selection
process, I assume that the selection is positive in the sense that higher ability and more
motivated students will select into private colleges. This is essentially a “selection
on observables” analysis, but rather than assuming that selection is based solely on
observables, I assume that the selection on unobservables (primarily selection based
on unobserved ability and motivation) is positive. Later in this chapter, I provide
some evidence that suggests this is a reasonable assumption. Thus, I try to “knock
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out” the observed return premium using a rich set of covariates. Any return left over
can be considered an upper bound estimate. This procedure is similar to that used
by Fryer and Levitt (2004) when they look at the black-white test-score gap in early
elementary education.
Therefore, my contribution is to use very rich data from two different datasets,
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY) and the High School and
Beyond Survey (HSB), In so doing, I estimate an upper bound on the average returns
to attending a private college making use of some unique variables that can help
proxy for motivation and other additional controls not previously used in this context.
In addition, I focus on differences by gender. Previous research on this topic has
not done despite evidence suggesting that the returns to education for women are
substantially different than those for men (Dougherty, 2005).
I find that for males, the upper bound on the wage returns is small and
statistically insignificant between ages 24-29 but statistically significant at around
11% by the time the student reaches ages 36-41. On the other hand, for females I do
not find any statistically significant wage returns. In both cases, however, I cannot
eliminate the possibility that attending a private school enhances future education
outcomes, particularly the likelihood of obtaining a bachelor degree. These estimates
are quite large, particularly for men where a private student is 13.5 percentage points
more likely to obtain a bachelor degree than his public counterpart, off of a baseline
of 56%. For females the estimate is 9 percentage points off of a 54% baseline. Even
though this is an upper bound, the size of the estimate suggests that there could very
well be substantial non-pecuniary benefits to attending private colleges. I also show




3.2.1 Using Prices as a Measure of Quality
Theoretically, it is unclear whether a private or a public college would provide
a higher quality education. In a standard market we would expect the large price
difference to reflect the provision of a higher quality good. However, the higher edu-
cation market is far from a standard market. One major complication is that both
supply-side and demand-side subsidies play a large role in this market. In FY2002
state and local governments spent $157 billion on higher education with the federal
government providing another $17 billion, though some of the federal funding is al-
ready included in the state and local figure through intergovernmental grants.2 These
subsidies could drive a wedge between the marginal cost of providing a higher quality
education and the price paid by students and their families. The subsidies take a
number of forms including direct aid from state governments to public institutions,
financial aid for low-income students, and tax-preferences for non-profit public and
private institutions (which enroll 96% of students in four-year institutions.3) Thus
the prices may be as much a reflection of how much government support institutions
receive as they are indicators of quality.
Another major complication in the higher education market that makes it
difficult to use prices as a measure of quality is that as a student selects the school
he or she wants to purchase the education from, the school also selects the student
it wants to provide education to. Thus, not only do students need to agree to the
price and quality of the education the school is providing before they purchase, but
the school also has to approve of the quality of the students purchasing it. Part of
the reason for this is that students are both consumers of education and inputs in
2 US Census Bureau - Census of Governments, 2002; Statistical Abstract of the United States,
2004-2005.
3 Digest of Education Statistics, 2004
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the educational process through mechanisms like peer effects (Rothschild and White
1995). The schools thus have an incentive to reduce prices overall to attract high
quality students or they may charge lower prices to high quality students specifically
through adjustment of institutional financial aid packages and through provision of
scholarships (Singell 2002).
3.2.2 Prior Literature
Researchers have spent considerable effort trying to assess whether private
primary and secondary schools provide better education than public schools. A few
papers have tried to use religion as an instrument for attending a private school, par-
ticularly Catholic schools (Neal 1997, Evans and Schwab 1995). In both cases, the
authors find improvements in educational outcomes from attending Catholic schools.
Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005a) also find positive returns to attending Catholic
schools using a strategy that utilizes the amount of selection on observable character-
istics as a guide for approximating the amount of selection on unobservables. Another
strategy used in primary & secondary education is the natural experiment approach.
Using this method, Rouse (1998) finds that students in Milwaukee, Wisconsin who
were provided vouchers to attend selected private schools performed better on math
exams, though no different on reading exams, than students randomly denied the
vouchers.
Unfortunately, in the higher education literature, natural experiments and
instruments are hard to come by. It is for this reason that, most of the college quality
literature has relied on selection on observables techniques to study whether attending
a college of higher observable quality increases earnings. Loury and Garman (1995)
and Black, Daniel and Smith (2005) control for large sets of observable characteristics
and run OLS analyses of the relationship between college quality and wages. Both of
these papers find that higher quality colleges increase wages. While making important
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contributions to the literature, their results may overestimate the returns to attending
a higher quality college since residual unobserved ability and motivation bias would
likely bias the results upwards.
Another more potentially problematic issue is the lack of common support
across students who attend high and low quality colleges. The concern is that
students who attend high quality schools may be so fundamentally different from
those who attend low quality schools that any analysis that does not directly focus
on similar students will be biased. Dale and Krueger (2002) notice this problem and
attempt to correct for it by grouping students based on the types of schools they
apply to and are accepted into and then including group fixed-effects. This ensures
that each student is only compared to students who apply to similar sets of schools.
This strategy has the additional benefit that, under the assumption that students
who apply to and are accepted into similar schools are similar along unobservable
dimensions, then it will also correct for selection on unobservables. They find that
students who attend higher quality colleges measured by average SAT scores garner
little to no wage benefit. However, Black and Smith (2004) use propensity score
matching as an alternative correction for common support problems. They find that
students who attend high quality colleges garner higher wages than those who attend
low quality colleges.
Only a handful of papers have addressed the returns to attending a private
college specifically. The most important paper in this line of research is Brewer,
Eide, and Ehrenberg (1999; hereafter BEE). They separate colleges into 6 groups
based on ratings in Barron’s Profiles of American Colleges : Private top, middle,
and bottom and public top, middle, and bottom. Using data from the National
Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 (NLS72) and the High School
and Beyond (HSB) study they find that attending a top private college increases
wages and earnings over a bottom public college. While they provide a significant
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contribution to the college quality literature, the paper potentially suffers from the
common support problem, since Black and Smith (2004) show that few high ability
students attend low quality schools and even fewer low ability students attend elite
schools. This lack of common support means that papers like BEE which rely on
parametric functional forms with only a few covariates may still suffer from bias even
if they do sufficiently correct for selection on unobservables. In light of this problem,
Dale and Krueger (2002) use the same data as BEE and find that by simply controlling
for the SAT scores of schools the students applied to and the number of schools the
students apply to, then OLS estimates of a return to attending an elite private college
are essentially reduced to zero. While this is not directly comparable to BEE since
they use a Heckman selection model, it does highlight potential problems with BEE’s
analysis.
Other papers that have studied the returns to attending a private college
include Bowman and Mehay (2002) who use a similar method to BEE to look at job
performance and promotions of naval officers, Eide, Brewer, and Ehrenberg (1998)
who look at the impact of college quality on graduate school attendance, and Brewer
and Ehrenberg (1996) who use the same strategy as BEE but only looking at the
1986 followup of the HSB Seniors cohort. All three papers find positive impacts of
attending an elite private college. Behrman, Rosenzweig, and Taubman (1996) also
consider an indicator for attending a private college when looking at the returns to
different college qualities between female twins. Their estimate is strongly positive.
3.2.3 Selection
As was discussed in the literature review, there is a concern in the college
quality literature that there is substantial selection of students into schools of differing
quality based on ability and motivation. These concerns remain when considering the
choice of whether to attend a public or private college. For example, it is possible that
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students (and parents) who take a more active interest in their (children’s) education
may be willing to pay more for college, thus they would be more likely to attend
private schools. The ideal way to solve the ability selection problem would be to find
an instrument that is correlated with attending a private college but uncorrelated
with other factors that are related to the outcome variables of interest.
Unfortunately, it is very difficult to find a feasible instrument for individuals’
educational decisions. Researchers who have studied the returns to education have
made some attempts to address ability and motivation bias with instrumental vari-
ables regression and the related bivariate probit model, which relies on some stricter
assumptions. Evans and Schwab (1995) is one of the most influential papers to
use this approach in education economics. They estimate the returns to attending
Catholic school using a students’ religion as an instrument. Neal (1997) conducts a
similar analysis with bivariate probit models where the main instruments (exclusion
restrictions) are based on the supply of Catholic schools near the students’ residences.
However, Grogger and Neal (2000) later find this instrument to be invalid and Altonji,
Elder, and Taber (2005a, b) show that both of these instruments are likely correlated
with unobservables.
In the returns to higher education literature BEE try to correct for selection
while estimating the returns to attending an elite private college by predicting the
type of college a student is likely to attend through a multinomial logit model based
on exogenous characteristics and then including a selection correction term in the
reduced form equations. However, as stated before, Dale and Krueger (2002) find
results using an alternative selection correction strategy that contradict BEE’s. This
raises the possibility that there may be problems with BEE’s choices of exclusion
restrictions.
In the context of this chapter, one potential exclusion restriction is to use
relative supply of public and private colleges near student residences. This is similar
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to the strategy used by Card (1995) and Kling (2001) to estimate the returns to a
college education. For the students in one of my datasets, I calculated multiple mea-
sures of relative supply and prices of private and public colleges at various distances
from the county of the students’ high schools.4 In all cases, these supply conditions
were highly correlated with local labor market conditions both near the student’s
high school and eventual college. Since most students tend to reside post-college
near their pre-college residences, these supply and price variables are likely invalid as
instruments.
Thus, in this chapter, I am unable to fully account for unobserved ability
bias. However, this does not mean that we cannot garner some accurate information
from the estimates. First of all, I make use of very detailed data with unique
variables. No work has been done on this question previously that takes into account
as many potentially important control variables. One particularly useful variable is
the number of extracurricular activities or clubs the students in which the students
participated during high school. Arguably more motivated students would participate
in more clubs, thus I use this variable as a proxy for motivation. I also include a
number of high school quality variables and measures of the quality of the student’s
family life as a child.
Of course, even with all of these additional covariates we may still be left with
residual bias. However, there is a prior belief that unobserved ability and motivation
would be positively correlated with attending a private college if such a correlation
exists. Thus, if my estimates suggest that there are no returns to attending a private
college then those results would likely remain even if I fully correct for ability bias.
Therefore, we could view the estimates provided in this chapter as upper bound
4 I used the High School and Beyond Sophomore Cohort restricted access dataset to conduct this
analysis. While the counties are not identified in the dataset, it does provide some information for
each county from the US Census Bureau’s County Statistics File 1. With the permission of the
Department of Education, I was able to identify each of the students’ counties by matching to the
Census bureau data with at 100% match rate.
112
estimates on the returns to attending a private college.
As with the other research, common support is also a problem in this analysis.
To deal with this, I use a highly flexible functional form for my OLS analyses. This
would allow parametric modeling to better account for differences between students
who attend public and private schools. In addition, since my focus here is on whether
or not a student attends any private college rather than comparing high quality
private colleges to low quality public colleges, there is much more overlap of student
characteristics in the treated and untreated groups. Thus, common support problems
are likely to be less of an issue in this analysis than in previous papers.
3.3 Model and Data
The basic model I will use for wages and earnings in this chapter is as follows:
Yi = α+ βPrivatei + ΓXi + εi (3.1)
Y is an outcome variable, either log of hourly wage, log of annual earnings, or years
of school completed, Private is an indicator for whether or not a student’s main
school is a private school, and X is a vector of individual, high school, and family
characteristics. In the NLSY I define a student’s “main school” as the undergraduate
four-year school where the student received the most credit hours before completing
grade 16, regardless of from where he or she received any degrees. For HSB, because
the transcript data is very poor, I define the “main school” as the four-year school
where the student spent the most months working towards a bachelor degree. Rather
than assume that εi is i.i.d. with mean 0, I assume that it is a composite term as
such:
εi = γZi + νi (3.2)
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where Z is unobserved ability and motivation and ν is i.i.d. error with mean 0. In
this case, my estimate of β, β̂, will have the following relationship with β:




In this situation, β̂ will be inconsistent and biased, but the direction of the
bias will be positive provided that cov(Private, Z) > 0 and γ > 0. While it seems
reasonable to assume that ability and motivation are positively related with wages
and academic success, it is not as clear that high ability and more motivated people
will sort into private schools, giving us a positive covariance, even after controlling
for a rich set of covariates. Later on, I will provide evidence using observed variables
that suggests this is an accurate assumption. For other outcomes that are binary
– labor force participation, schooling outcomes, and employment – I use the probit
equivalent of the above, rather than a linear probability model.
The data for this chapter comes from two sources. The primary source is the
Geocoded National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979. This is a restricted access,
nationally representative survey of all persons aged 14-22 in 1979. After an initial
interview in 1979, the survey follows people every year until 1994 and every 2 years
thereafter through 2002. This survey is very useful because it has different types of
post-treatment outcomes over many years, has a large set of pre-treatment observable
characteristics, and it has college identifiers that allow me to match students to the
colleges they attend.
The initial survey contains 12,686 observations. However, since I am looking
at a specific subset of the NLSY population, that number falls considerably to 4,595
when I restrict to people who ever attended a four-year college. Unfortunately, the
NLSY suffers from a large amount of missing data. For most variables, rather
than reduce the sample further, I include a “missing” dummy in my regressions.
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Nonetheless, for some variables there was no other choice than to reduce the sample
if they were missing. These sample restrictions are described in Appendix Table 10.
The final sample includes 3,819 observations, with 1,792 males and 2,027 females.
A description of all variables used in the NLSY main regressions can also be
found in the appendix. Nevertheless, there are several variables that warrant extra
attention, especially those that serve as measures of student ability and motivation.
The key motivation variable is the number of clubs the student participated in during
high school. Arguably, a student who participates in more clubs in high school cares
more about his or her education. The main student ability variable is his or her
performance on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery. This is a test
given by the US Armed Forces to new recruits. As part of a renorming process,
the military gave the test to NLSY participants. The battery includes questions
on 10 subjects. Rather than include each score and interactions in the regressions,
I follow Cawley, Conneely, Heckman and Vytlacyl (1996); Cawley, Heckman and
Vytlacil (2001); Black and Smith (2004); and Black, Daniel and Smith (2005) in
using principal component analysis to collapse the age-adjusted ASVAB scores into
two linearly independent measures, called principal components. In addition to the
ASVAB, the NLSY also has some information on the quality of the student’s high
school. This can provide additional measures of student ability and/or motivation.
The second dataset I utilize is the High School and Beyond Sophomore Co-
hort. This is a nationally representative study of 14,825 students who were sopho-
mores in high school in 1980 and then re-interviews them in 1982, 1984, 1986, and
1992. As with the NLSY, I first cut the sample to students who attend a four year
college or university. In this case, however, to ensure that there is a post-college
outcome in 1992, I limit to only those students who had attended by 1986. This
leaves a base sample of 4,237. Also, like the NLSY, the HSB suffers from a substan-
tial amount of missing data and thus I use the same procedures as described above.
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The final sample contains 3,526 people, including 1,669 males and 1,857 females. A
detailed description of the sample cut is provided in Appendix Table 10.
While this dataset does not provide me with as much post-treatment infor-
mation as the NLSY (it does not provide any information on outcomes later than 10
years after high school) it has some different covariates that could potentially reduce
selection further. First of all, not only does it have the number of clubs the student
participates in, but it also has the number of clubs a student had a leadership posi-
tion in. It also has data on how often the student reads for pleasure and how often
the student completed his or her homework in high school. For ability measures,
the HSB survey also has a test battery specifically created for the survey. Students
were given the exam in 1980 and again in 1982. In this case, the measure I use is
the student’s average percentile on the exam over those two years. The HSB also
provides the students’ self reported average grades in high school.
I should also note that in analyses based on both of these datasets, I make
use of many more observable variables than BEE, despite their use of the HSB as one
of their sources. They include only race, gender, family size, family income, parents’
education, test scores, and indicators for whether the individual holds a part-time job
and whether he or she is still enrolled in school. Amongst other items, I also include
the motivation measures described above, region of residence, family structure, high
school quality measures, whether the student attends a public or private high school,
and the student’s intended major in college in the HSB analysis. Except for the
public/private high school and intended major variables (these are not available) I
include the variables just described in the NLSY analysis along with variables on
whether someone in the student’s family had a library card, magazine subscription,
or a newspaper subscription when the student was 14, whether the student ever knew
his or her mother or father, and the parents’ ages. These additional variables will
help control for other factors that influence future earnings and college completion.
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3.4 Main Results
Tables 3.2A and 3.2B provide summary statistics for various outcome mea-
sures by gender from the NLSY and the HSB, respectively. Both the log wage
and log earnings measures are averages over all years when wages or earnings were
reported and the person’s age falls in the limits provided in the table. They are
also adjusted for inflation to $2002. Also note that the means are weighted using
customized weights that take into account the construction of these samples. A de-
scription of the weighting procedures used in this chapter is provided in the appendix.
For males, there are substantial differences in many outcomes between public
and private school attendees. Private males have higher wages in all age groups,
higher earnings in all age groups, are more likely to complete their bachelor degree,
attain graduate degrees, and attend post-bachelor classes. In addition, they complete
more years of schooling. However, there is very little difference for labor force par-
ticipation, unemployment, and enrollment. For women, the differences are generally
in the same direction but the wage, earnings, and schooling differences are smaller
than for men. Women also seem more likely to differ in LFP at young ages and in
school enrollment at age 27 and 36/37.
Unlike the NLSY, the HSB only provides outcomes up to 11 years after the
sophomore year of high school. Students who are age 16 at the end of their sophomore
year, will thus be age 27 when earnings are observed. This would roughly correspond
to the 24 – 29 age group in the NLSY. With this in mind, the means for the HSB data
differ somewhat from the NLSY data. Earnings differences for men are essentially
0 while private men in the HSB are less likely to be employed or in the labor force.
However, the differences for schooling outcomes and earnings for women are broadly
consistent with the NLSY data. For both genders there are positive differentials in
the amount of education completed, but men have larger differences. The women’s













































































































































































































































































































































































































































† Earnings are adjusted for m
onthly labor force participation.  See paper text for details.
M
eans based on w
eighted sam


















ages 24 – 27. Thus, the basic conclusion we can draw from these summary statistics
is that private students have better labor market and education outcomes than public
students, and the differences are somewhat greater for men.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 provide summary statistics on the covariates that are
used in the regressions. Almost all of the means split across public and private
students as we would generally expect. In both datasets, private students have higher
test scores and/or grades, come from higher quality high schools, have mothers with
higher education, participate in more clubs in high school, are more likely to have
college prep curricula in high school, are more likely to have 2-parent families, and
have higher incomes or live in wealthier counties. Table 3.4 also shows some of the
advantages the HSB has over the NLSY in terms of available covariates. In addition
to the results just described, the HSB also shows that private students read more and
are more likely to have attended a private high school.
Tables 3.5 through 3.8 provide the main results of this analysis. In tables 3.5
and 3.6 I show the changes in the private estimate when I add covariates for selected
outcome measures. The important thing to note here is that for most of the
outcomes shown, the coefficients move substantially closer to 0. This is particularly
true for the wage measures. The coefficients on wages in the NLSY & earnings in
the HSB fall between 60% and over 100%. Similar drops, not shown, are found
for NLSY earnings as well. At the same time, the standard errors either remain
relatively constant or even fall. This suggests that the declining degrees of freedom
do not pose a problem to efficient estimation. For educational outcomes, the drops
in the coefficients are less substantial, particularly for bachelor degree attainment.
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 provide the final regression estimates after all covariates are
added for the NLSY and HSB samples, respectively. One key aspect of these results
is that if we were to just consider the gender pooled sample, we would mistakenly
find that the returns are always statistically insignificant. In Table 3.7, we see that
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Covariate Public Private T-Stat N 5% Sig
Demographics
Female 0.50 0.54 1.84 3819
Age in 1979 17.70 17.65 -0.45 3819
Race/Ethnicity
   Asian-Pacific Islander 0.01 0.01 0.40 3819
   Black 0.11 0.11 -0.07 3819
   Hispanic 0.04 0.02 -2.19 3819 *
   Native American 0.04 0.03 -1.90 3819
   Other 0.12 0.11 -0.49 3819
Born outside US 0.80 0.84 2.06 3798 *
Childhood
Parental structure at 14
  Both parents 0.80 0.84 2.06 3798 *
  Father only 0.01 0.01 0.04 3798
  Mother only 0.12 0.10 -1.31 3798
  Other 0.02 0.01 -0.80 3798
Never knew mother 0.00 0.00 -0.59 3231
Never knew father 0.01 0.01 -1.15 3,106
Library card at 14 0.85 0.88 1.78 3807
Magazine subscription at 14 0.79 0.83 1.97 3798 *
Newspaper subscription at 14 0.90 0.92 1.62 3808
Education
ASVAB - principal component 1 0.77 0.90 2.84 3819 *
ASVAB - principal component 2 0.15 0.28 3.02 3819 *
High school curriculum type
  Vocational 0.08 0.06 -1.31 3775
  Commercial 0.02 0.01 -0.74 3775
  College Prep 0.51 0.64 4.75 3775 *
  General 0.39 0.28 -4.61 3775 *
High school statistics
  % teachers w/ advanced degree 50.24 53.40 1.83 2649
  Dropout rate (%) 12.62 10.95 -1.24 2630
  Enrollment 1,330 1,420 1.61 2659
  Library volumes (thousands) 16.04 19.26 3.65 2428 *
  Base teacher salary (thousands) 10.78 10.84 0.82 2638
# clubs in high school 2.09 2.39 2.56 3778 *
Year started college 1979.8 1979.5 -1.97 3818 *
Table 3.3 -  NLSY Summary Statistics for Selected Covariates - Both Genders
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Parents
Mother's highest grade 12.60 13.25 3.53 3668 *
Father's highest grade 13.21 13.95 2.43 3479 *
Geographic
Per-capita inc of county at age 14 (thousands) 8,368 8,986 3.74 3586 *
Region
  New England 0.03 0.14 1.71 3586
  Mid-Atlantic 0.15 0.29 3.15 3586 *
  Great Lakes 0.25 0.21 -1.09 3586
  Plains 0.09 0.08 -0.25 3586
  Southeast 0.23 0.17 -1.89 3586
  Southwest 0.10 0.04 -2.91 3586 *
  Mountain 0.05 0.02 -1.35 3586
  Pacific 0.10 0.05 -2.37 3586 *
Statistics are weighted by customized weights.  See paper text for details.  Standard errors & T-
statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity & clustered by primary sampling unit.
in pooled sample none of the wage and earnings measures for any of the age groups
are statistically significant. However, when we split the sample we start to see
some interesting differences. First, for women we see that there are no statistically
significant wage or earnings returns to attending a private college. If anything, the
point estimates suggest the returns for women may, in fact, be negative, though they
are well within a 95% confidence interval, and thus the negative sign could be due to
imprecision.
For men, the story is considerably different. At ages 24 – 29, both wage
and earnings returns are very small and statistically insignificant, though the point
estimate is indeed positive at about 1%. Then we start to see a gradual increase
in the returns. The wage return estimates for males increase to a still statistically
insignificant 4% at ages 30 – 35, and then increases to a statistically significant 11%
for ages 36 – 41. For the earnings measures, the estimated returns are roughly
similar for 30-35 year old males & 36-41 year old males at 15% and 12%, respectively.
However, these estimates are less precise than the wage estimates, and thus are not
necessarily inconsistent with the wage results. The earnings measures for the HSB,
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Public Private Difference T-Stat N 5% Sig
Demographics
    Female 0.512 0.561 0.049 2.10 3526 *
    Race/Ethnicity
        Hispanic or Spanish 0.063 0.063 0.001 0.07 3526
        Native American 0.006 0.002 -0.004 -2.64 3526 *
        Asian or Pacific Islander 0.020 0.010 -0.010 -2.70 3526 *
        Black 0.085 0.076 -0.009 -0.70 3526
        White 0.826 0.848 0.022 1.35 3526
Family Income in 1982
    $0 - $7,999 0.029 0.034 0.005 0.49 3526
    $8,000 - $14,999 0.096 0.062 -0.034 -2.91 3526 *
    $15,000 - $19,999 0.103 0.102 -0.001 -0.10 3526
    $20,000 - $24,999 0.129 0.122 -0.008 -0.49 3526
    $25,000 - $29,999 0.145 0.138 -0.008 -0.48 3526
    $30,000 - $39,999 0.188 0.177 -0.011 -0.59 3526
    $40,000 - $49,999 0.104 0.085 -0.019 -1.36 3526
    > $50,000 0.137 0.192 0.055 3.00 3526 *
Academic Performance
     Average Test Percentile† 0.694 0.724 0.030 2.58 3526 *
     Average Grades
         Mostly A's 0.205 0.288 0.083 3.73 3526 *
         Mostly A's & B's 0.317 0.292 -0.025 -1.20 3526
         Mostly B's 0.241 0.211 -0.030 -1.49 3526
         Mostly B's & C's 0.171 0.143 -0.027 -1.54 3526
         Mostly C's 0.056 0.046 -0.010 -0.93 3526
         Mostly C's & D's or Lower 0.010 0.020 0.010 0.92 3526
Motivation
     # of Extracurricular Activities in HS 3.902 4.273 0.371 2.80 3526 *
     # of Extracurricular Activities in 
HS
     Where Student Was a Leader 1.232 1.369 0.137 1.90 3526
     How Often Reads For Pleasure
         Rarely or Never 0.225 0.193 -0.032 -1.55 3526
         Less Than Once Per Week 0.202 0.162 -0.040 -2.14 3526 *
         1 or 2 Times A Week 0.304 0.350 0.046 2.05 3526 *
         Every Day 0.246 0.272 0.025 1.17 3526
Table 3.4 -  HSB Summary Statistics For Selected Covariates  - Both Genders 
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Parents
    Mother's Education
        High School or Lower 0.528 0.481 -0.047 -1.89 3526
        Some College 0.196 0.172 -0.024 -1.24 3526
        Bachelor Degree 0.148 0.167 0.019 1.16 3526
        Advanced Degree 0.081 0.131 0.050 3.29 3526 *
    Father's Education
        High School or Lower 0.423 0.380 -0.043 -1.71 3526
        Some College 0.145 0.134 -0.011 -0.61 3526
        Bachelor Degree 0.169 0.197 0.028 1.58 3526
        Advanced Degree 0.198 0.220 0.022 1.14 3526
Family Structure
     Both Parents 0.751 0.782 0.031 1.44 3526
     Father Only 0.035 0.030 -0.005 -0.55 3526
     Mother Only 0.181 0.168 -0.013 -0.65 3526
     Other 0.034 0.018 -0.016 -2.33 3526 *
High School Type/Quality
    Type of High School
        Regular Public 0.861 0.707 -0.154 -5.73 3526 *
        Alternative 0.005 0.007 0.002 0.53 3526
        Catholic 0.102 0.184 0.082 3.86 3526 *
        Other Private 0.032 0.102 0.070 3.14 3526 *
    High School Program
        General 0.221 0.161 -0.061 -3.17 3526 *
        College Prep 0.695 0.766 0.071 3.14 3526 *
        Vocational 0.078 0.068 -0.010 -0.72 3526
    High School Quality Measures
         College Attendence Rate 0.500 0.597 0.096 6.59 3439 *
         Dropout Rate 0.075 0.058 -0.018 -4.35 3422 *
         Enrollment (in hundreds) 12.5 12.0 -0.5 -1.02 3324
         Disadvantaged Student Rate 0.119 0.084 -0.035 -4.58 3306 *
         Tearcher Adv. Degree Rate 0.475 0.512 0.037 2.80 3424 *
Geographics of High School in 1982
    Per Capita Income of County 10.359 11.266 0.906 7.04 3526 *
    Region 
        New England 0.069 0.133 0.064 3.35 3526 *
        Mid Atlantic 0.126 0.277 0.151 5.86 3526 *
        South Atlantic 0.136 0.136 0.000 0.01 3526
        East South Central 0.059 0.024 -0.035 -3.52 3526 *
        West South Central 0.128 0.069 -0.059 -3.07 3526 *
        East North Central 0.217 0.205 -0.012 -0.54 3526
        West North Central 0.107 0.073 -0.034 -2.19 3526 *
        Mountain 0.056 0.014 -0.042 -4.04 3526 *
        Pacific 0.102 0.070 -0.033 -2.25 3526 *
† Mean of percentile score on test batteries given in 1980 & 1982.
Means based on weighted sample.  T-statistics are adjusted for clustering at the high-school level.  Note that 
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shown in Table 3.8, are consistent with the wage earnings measures in the NLSY,
with statistically insignificant earnings returns for both males and females 11 years
after finishing their sophomore year of high school (i.e. around age 27).
One concern about these results is that, since they are only based off of people
who are employed, they may be hiding some substantial differences in labor force
participation and employment. To alleviate these concerns I show the relationship
between private and both unemployment and labor force participation. For the NLSY
sample, I test this at multiple ages and do not find any statistically significant impact
of the private variable on these outcomes except for men at age 36 or 37. However,
this result is suspect since only a small portion of the original sample remains in the
data up to this age level and a large number of observations are dropped from the
probit analysis due to perfect prediction. A linear probability model of the same
specification generates a slightly negative and statistically insignificant estimate of
the employment effect. LPM models for male unemployment at other ages provide
estimates nearly identical to the marginal effects of the probits, suggesting that the
probit estimate for age 36/37 males is inaccurate.
Nonetheless, in the HSB sample, I do find a statistically significant drop in
employment for private males of 3.6 percentage points. How this may affect the HSB
earnings estimate is unclear. However, since that estimate is consistent with the
NLSY estimates, the effect of the employment differential is likely small. Another
concern is that if one type of student is more likely to be enrolled in classes while
working then their wages and earnings may be artificially low, i.e. they may be
working part-time. To address this, table 3.5 shows that there is no statistically
significant effect of private on whether or not a person is enrolled in school at a given
age. This holds for the HSB results as well.
For educational outcomes, the results differ much less across genders, though
once again the men seem to garner higher returns. Attending a private school is
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associated with statistically significant increases in the likelihood of finishing bachelor
degrees for both males and females. These results hold in both datasets. For the
NLSY data, the average marginal effect of private on completing a bachelor’s degree
is 13.5 percentage points for males and an 8.9 percentage points for females . In
light of this, it is also not surprising that private students are also found to complete
more years of education. Also, in the HSB data, private males appear more likely to
attempt post-bachelor degrees, but the NLSY results suggest there is no statistically
significant difference for post-bachelor schooling or graduate school completion.
3.5 Modeling Selection and Alternative Specifications
3.5.1 Evidence for Positive Selection
In the previous section, I showed that there are substantial drops in the private
coefficients when covariates are added, providing some evidence that the selection into
private schools is positively related to unobservables that co-vary positively with wage
and educational outcomes, such as ability and motivation. Table 3.9 provides some
additional evidence that the selection works in this way. Here, I run a probit model of
whether or not a student’s main school is a private school on the covariates used in the
outcome regressions. In all cases, the coefficients are either statistically insignificant
or are statistically significant in the direction that we would expect if there is positive
selection. Students who attend private colleges have higher test scores (particularly
females), higher incomes, participate in more clubs in high school (males only), are
more likely to be in a college preparatory curriculum in high school, attend high
schools with more library books, have mothers with more education (females), and
are more likely to come from the northeast section of the country. Women are also
more likely to come from a two-parent household. One concern about these results
is that, since the region dummies are so highly statistically significant, they may be
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Variable
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
Female 0.055 (0.066) - - - -
ASVAB
    1st Principla Comp 0.093* (0.054) 0.023 (0.076) 0.167** (0.076)
    2nd Principal Comp 0.074* (0.040) 0.002 (0.059) 0.149*** (0.055)
Age 14 - County Income † 0.770*** (0.224) 0.726** (0.289) 0.867** (0.352)
# of High School Clubs 0.030 (0.022) 0.101*** (0.033) -0.026 (0.026)
HS Curric (College Prep omitted)
    Vocational -0.052 (0.106) -0.055 (0.147) -0.031 (0.141)
    Commercial -0.178 (0.172) -0.320 (0.424) -0.181 (0.188)
    General -0.189*** (0.072) -0.245** (0.106) -0.146 (0.091)
# of Books in HS Library † 0.154*** (0.038) 0.150*** (0.051) 0.141** (0.058)
Mother's Highest Grade Completed 0.045*** (0.011) 0.030 (0.019) 0.057*** (0.020)
Father's Highest Grade Completed 0.002 (0.013) 0.020 (0.017) -0.013 (0.016)
Parents/Guardians (Both omitted)
   One Natural, One Stepparent -0.034 (0.133) -0.034 (0.200) -0.111 (0.178)
   Father Only 0.092 (0.242) 0.444 (0.339) -1.039*** (0.398)
   Mother Only -0.071 (0.080) -0.034 (0.118) -0.118 (0.120)
   Other -0.069 (0.192) -0.137 (0.278) -0.097 (0.235)
Region (New-England omitted)
    Mid-Atlantic -0.480** (0.216) -0.473** (0.230) -0.412* (0.225)
    Great Lakes -0.877*** (0.208) -0.824*** (0.217) -0.865*** (0.222)
    Plains -0.835*** (0.212) -0.788*** (0.233) -0.822*** (0.214)
    Southeast -0.864*** (0.218) -0.893*** (0.233) -0.783*** (0.266)
    Southwest -1.239*** (0.210) -1.288*** (0.234) -1.250*** (0.244)
    Mountain -1.175*** (0.348) -1.053*** (0.351) -1.274*** (0.396)
    Pacific -1.196*** (0.204) -1.284*** (0.260) -1.139*** (0.235)
†  denotes coefficient & standard errors are multiplied by 10,000.  ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, & 10% levels, respectively.  Robust standard errors clustered by primary sampling unit in parentheses. 
Regressions also include religion, fraction of high school teachers with advanced degrees, high school dropout 
rate, base salary of high school teacher, high scholl enrollment, age, whether someone in the person's family at 
age 14 had a library card, magazine subscription, or newspaper subscription, and race dummies.  All 
coeficients for these variables were insiginficant except for "Native American" in the female regression.  
Weighted by 1979 NLSY weights.
Table 3.9 - Probits of Covariates on Private, NLSY
Both Genders Males Females
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absorbing a lot of variation. Nonetheless, regressions without the region dummies
provided similar results.
3.5.2 Specification Checks
Table 3.10 shows that the main NLSY results are robust to a number of
different specification checks. Column 1 provides the main results found in Table
3.5. In column 2, I restrict the sample to only those who complete college. Since there
is such a large correlation between attending a private school and completing college,
we may think that any wage returns would come from that extra education. Column
2 shows little change in the estimates when making this restriction. This suggests
that any positive returns are not being completely driven by degree completion. I
will explore this issue in depth in the next section.
Column 3 restricts the sample to students who are 14 – 17 in 1979. The
concern here is that, since the ASVAB test is given to individuals at different ages,
this could create a measurement error bias. While I age adjust the ASVAB scores
before doing the factor analysis, the larger concern is that some students may take
the test after attending college. Thus the scores will reflect both pre-college and
during-college human capital accumulation. By restricting to people who are 14 –
17 at the start of the survey, when the test is administered, we can see if this is a
problem. Once again, the wage and earnings estimates do not appear to change
much with this restriction. While log wages at ages 36 – 41 becomes statistically
insignificant, this is only due to the reduced precision since the coefficient actually
increases. While the coefficients of the other estimates jump around a bit, these
are in line with the increased standard errors and thus, significance does not change.
Educational outcomes are another matter. For males there is a substantial increase
in the bachelor degree coefficient and increases in post-bachelor schooling for both
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different, it does not change the overall pattern of the results.
Columns 4 and 5 add controls for state of college and replace region of res-
idence with state of residence controls, respectively. In both cases the results are
very similar to the main results in column 1. Columns 6 – 8 provide estimates under
alternative weights, using the NLSY provided weights based on the 2002, 1996, and
1990 samples. The results are robust across all three weighting schemes with respect
to the main results.
3.6 Extensions
3.6.1 Role of Additional Education in Wage/Earnings Estimates
As the results in Table 3.7 show, there is a large relationship between at-
tending a private school and additional schooling for both genders. Thus, it seems
plausible that the positive wage returns found for males could be solely due to in-
creased education stock and not necessarily due to a higher quality education. Table
3.11 investigates this by accounting for multiple combinations of different educational
outcome variables for males.5 Arguably, the private estimates here reflect the wage
and earnings returns to attending a private college net of the improved educational
outcomes. Column 2 simply controls for whether or not the student completes his
bachelor degree. Two interesting results come out of these regressions. First, the
private coefficients at younger ages (24-29 and 30-35) barely change. On the other
hand, the private coefficient for both wages and earnings at ages 36 – 41 both fall
by 33%. This is a rather surprising result considering that 75% of degree recipients
in the sample finish before age 24 and 93% finish before age 30 . Nonetheless, the
estimates for the returns to obtaining a bachelor’s degree appear to increase with
age, suggesting that much of the increase with age in the wage returns to attending a
5 Running these estimates for females generates no changes in the estimated wage effects. These
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private school may be related to educational attainment. Column 3 interacts degree
completion with attending a private school to see if the returns to degree completion
differ across college types. While, not surprisingly, the private coefficient falls in some
cases, the interaction is never statistically significantly different from 0. Columns 4-6
add in highest grade completed and advanced degree completion, neither of which
demonstrably changes the results from column 2.
In columns 7 and 8, I address another concern with how colleges affect educa-
tional decisions by controlling for choice of major. One can make the argument that
private colleges may encourage students to participate in majors that lead to lower
paying careers or, alternatively, students who are interested in these careers may be
attracted to private colleges. This brings up one potential flaw in my argument for
positive selection. If the latter argument is true, then there may be elements of unob-
served selection bias that reduce, rather than increase, the estimates. It does indeed
appear that when controlling for major the private estimates increase. However, the
increase is small and does not change the pattern or significance of results. Thus,
if the choice of major is being driven by selection, its impacts on the estimates are
likely to be small.
3.6.2 Spousal Earnings and the Marriage Market
Since we can only take these estimates to be upper bounds on the returns to
attending a private college, it is not necessarily clear for men if there are any wage
or earnings returns. However, for women it seems clear that there are little to no
pecuniary returns to attending a private college. If anything, the returns may be
negative. This begs the question of what did women from the time period covered
in the data gain from attending a private college. Just like males, they do appear
more likely to graduate and to complete more years of schooling. However, it seems
unlikely that this is the entire story, particularly since the estimated returns for males
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are higher for both wages and educational attainment. One possibility is that women
get improved marriage market outcomes, such as higher spousal income and higher
quality marriages.
Table 3.12 investigates these possibilities. For spousal earnings, when one
just looks at differences in means, it does appear that both men and women who
attend private colleges marry wealthier people than their public counterparts. This
is particularly true at younger ages. However, once the covariates are added the
spousal earnings returns from ages 24 - 29 fall to insignificance. It is also unlikely
that this result is due to differences in the probability of entering into marriage, since
the likelihood of ever getting married does not seem to be related to attending a
private school. What is striking is that women who attend private schools are statis-
tically significantly less likely to get divorced than their public counterparts. When
covariates are added the magnitude of the effect falls, but remains statistically signif-
icant at about 5.7 percentage points. This suggests that there could be substantial
quality of life benefits to women from attending a private college. Interestingly, I
find nearly the exact opposite effect for men, though due to larger standard errors it
is not statistically significant.
3.6.3 Accounting for Heterogeneity in College Quality
Other questions one may ask about these results is how much of the estimates
can be explained by differences in observable college quality, and whether there is
heterogeneity with respect to observable quality. In Table 3.13 I consider this issue by
looking at how robust the estimates are to controls for and interactions with observed
quality. I use the school’s average SAT score or, if SAT score is not available, the SAT
equivalent of their average ACT score as a proxy for college quality. The data for the
SAT/ACT measure comes from Barron’s Profiles of American Colleges 1982. While
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of all, I could arguably take multiple quality measures and use principal component
analysis to generate a composite quality index as is done in Black and Smith (2004)
and Black, Daniel, and Smith (2005). However, there are two drawbacks to this
method - it would make interpretation of the quality estimate difficult and since many
schools do not report some measures, I would have to drop a substantial number of
schools. Secondly, Black and Smith (2005) show that SAT scores are a relatively
accurate measure of overall college quality.
Since many of the students studied in the main sample do not attend colleges
that report average SAT or ACT scores, the sample for this analysis is different from
previous ones. Thus, in column 2, I run the regression without any college quality
measures but only on the quality sub-sample. The wage and earnings measures
stay relatively consistent; however the educational outcome coefficients drop for both
males and females. This in and of itself is an interesting result. In order to be
included in the sample, your school not only needs to be included in the Barron’s
book, but it also needs to have reported test scores. It is plausible to believe that
higher quality schools are more likely to be included in the book and are more likely to
report scores. Thus, these results suggest that much of the impact of private schools
on completion derives from the lower portion of the college quality distribution. As
I will discuss a bit, the results from column 4 support this argument.
Column 3 shows the private coefficient after controlling for a quartic in
SAT/ACT scores. For both males and females, most of the estimates change very
little from those in column 2. This suggests that much of the returns to attend-
ing private colleges for males are due to unobserved quality differences between the
schools, and observed quality gives us little information in this regard. For women,
since the estimates in column 2 were all statistically insignificant to begin with, it is
not surprising that controlling for SAT/ACT score generates no substantial changes
with respect to column 2. I should note though that the graduate degree completion
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and post-baccalaureate schooling estimates in both columns 2 and 3 fall considerably
with respect to the main results in column 1. This is also true, albeit to a lesser
extent, for males. For women, the graduate degree estimate becomes statistically
significantly negative.
The most important results in this table from a policy perspective are those
provided in column 4. In this column the regressions include the full set of covariates
along with a quartic in SAT/ACT score, and an interaction term of private and the
SAT/ACT scores. For the wage/earnings results, the standard errors are too large
to draw any conclusions. However, for bachelor degree completion, it is clear that
private schools with lower observed quality have higher bachelor completion rates
relative to public schools of the same quality, while this is does not appear to be
the case for schools with higher observed quality. If one takes the estimates at
face value, the completion rate impact of attending a private school is very high for
schools with low SAT scores and falls as the school’s SAT score reaches 900 – 1000.
Coincidentally, the median SAT score for private schools in the Barron’s guide is 920,
so the returns would be positive for about half of the schools. Of course, it is unlikely
that the true relationship is linear. Indeed, it seems implausible that attending a
private school with an average SAT score of 1300 would negatively affect completion
relative to public schools of the same quality. Thus, it is likely that the returns drop
at a diminishing rate as SAT scores increase. Unfortunately, adding higher order
interactions causes the standard errors to become too large to accurately assess this
argument. Nonetheless, in light of the linear interaction results, it is reasonable to
believe that the returns would fall as school quality rises, but are unlikely to fall
below 0. I should note though, that there may be a mechanical reason for this
result. As school quality increases, the completion rate reaches 1, leaving less room
for improvement. However, a cursory look at graduation rates in Barron’s for 1982
suggests that graduation rates for public schools, while they increase with SAT scores,
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never get that close to 1. Ninety percent of public colleges have graduation rates less
than or equal to 0.7 and half of public colleges have rates less than or equal to 0.5.
Considering that the average marginal effect of attending a private school for men is
.135 and for women is .089, very few private schools would get close to the absolute
maximum.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I examine whether attending a private college provides both
monetary and non-pecuniary benefits over attending a public college. In order to ac-
count for positive selection of higher ability and more motivated students into private
schools I control for a large set of observable characteristics, including a number of
unique variables that proxy for motivation and ability such as the number of clubs a
student participates in during high school. However, since some bias may remain, I
interpret these as upper-bound estimates. I find that wage and earnings returns start
out small for men, but then rise to about 11% as they age. I find little to no wage
and earnings returns for women. Some of the male wage increases come from higher
bachelor completion rates. Both men and women who attend private schools are
much more likely to complete their degree even after controlling for a large number of
observable characteristics. Completion rates for males attending private colleges are
13.5 percentage points higher than their public counterparts off of a 55.9% baseline,
while the female rate is 8.9 percentage points higher off of a 53.9% baseline. I find no
statistically significant impact of attending a private school on post-bachelor degree
schooling or graduate school attendance, though there are some statistically signif-
icant effects on highest grade completed. In addition to the results just described,
I show that women may get some benefits in the marriage market from attending a
private school. Private women have a 5.7 percent lower divorce rate than their public
counterparts after controlling for a large set of observable variables.
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I also show that the returns to attending a private college appear to be het-
erogeneous with respect to observable college quality. In particular, the private
premium with respect to completing a bachelor’s degree is larger for schools that
have low SAT/ACT scores. This suggests that a person would be much more likely
to graduate college by attending the local private college rather than the local public
college, but his or her likelihood of graduating will not increase much by attending
private college of similar quality to a high SAT public school. In addition, I show
that the results described above are likely due to unobserved characteristics of private
colleges rather than observed quality measures.
While the results provided here shed light on the average impact of attend-
ing a private college rather than a public college, future work should consider the
mechanism through which institutional control affects student outcomes. Addition-
ally, more work is needed on how the effects vary by student characteristics and by




A.1 Chapter 1: Severe Disciplinary Infractions
One potentially important concern with the discipline results is that, since
they are based on punishments rather than observed behavior, one explanation for
the drop in behavior problems is that charter schools may be more lenient when
determining punishments. One way to address this concern is to find disciplinary
infractions for which any leniency is highly unlikely to result in punishments less
severe than an in-school suspension. Thus, in Appendix Table 7, I consider two
types of these “severe” infractions. The first is a substance abuse infraction. This
includes the use of any drugs or alcohol on school grounds. The second is a criminal
infraction, which includes any behavior that could warrant arrest and prosecution.
In the first two columns of the table I use the model provided in section 4 of chapter 1
and split the charter indicator by conversion and startup status. In levels, there are
statistically significant drops in substance abuse infractions and criminal infractions
in both types of charters. For value-added specifications, the estimates are still
statistically significant for conversion charters, and substance abuse infraction impacts
are statistically significant at the 10% level for startups. In the second two columns
I drop the two periods immediately prior to entering a charter school or having a
non-structural switch to account for endogenous entry. In levels, the impacts for
conversion charters are statistically significant at the 10% level while impacts for
startups are statistically significant at the 1% level. Value-added measures are not
statistically significant except for criminal behavior in startup charters. Thus, overall,
it seems that there are substantial reductions in disciplinary infractions for these
severe misbehaviors in startup charters. In addition, while some of the measures
are not statistically significant, the point estimates are always negative. Thus, this
would suggest that at least part of the estimated decline in discipline problems are
from real behavior modifications.
A.2 Chapter 1: Imputations for Attrition Scenarios
In order to impute data for the attrition scenarios described in section 1.5.2
and Table 1.8 I use a few procedures. First the student’s grade level is imputed as
described for the Kyriazidou (1997) procedure in section 1.5.2. Free lunch, reduce-
price lunch, other economic disadvantage, and parents being migrant workers are
imputed as the student’s last observation for those variables. Recent immigration
status is imputed to be one if the student was less than four years from their first
observation as an immigrant and zero otherwise. Attrited students are imputed to
undergo a non-structural switch only in the first year after leaving ALUSD. If their
predicted grade is six or nine and they do not undergo a non-structural switch, then
attrited students are imputed to have undergone a structural switch.
To determine transition probabilities for attrited students between charter
and non-charter schools in panels C and D I run a multinomial logit regression on
non-attrited observations where the dependent variable is whether the student attends
a conversion, startup, or non-charter and the independent variables are gender, race,
free lunch status, reduced-price lunch status, other economic disadvantage, recent
immigration status, whether a parent is a migrant worker, a set of grade-by-year
indicators, a set of indicators for adjusted zip-codes, and whether the student is in
the highest grade for his or her school. The adjusted zip-code is the student’s zip-
code of residence where any zip-codes with less than 500 students in the base sample
from 1993 - 2004 are grouped into a single catch-all zip code. This is done to limit
147
the size of the variable set and to avoid multicollinearity issues. Attrited students
have adjusted zip-codes imputed to be their last observed adjusted zip-code and have
the highest grade variable imputed to be one if the student is in fifth or eighth grade.
This variable is set to 0 if a student is in twelfth grade since the purpose of the variable
is to capture forced school movement.
After I conduct this regression, I impute the type of school the attrited student
attends. First I use the predicted values for the regression as transition probabilities
for the first year of attrition. Then I generate a random number from a uniform
distribution on [0,1]. This was done in StataTMwith the seed set to 1090195. I
then impute the type of school attended based off the transition probability and the
random number. Then I repeat this process for each additional year the student is
attrited until all attrited students have complete data through twelfth grade
A.3 Chapter 3: List of Variables Used in Main Regression Analyses
NLSY
Age in 1979
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery - First 2 principal components of stan-
dardized scores.
Base salary for high school teacher.
Census region of residence.
Father’s age.
Father’s occupation - Census 1 digit.
Father’s years of education.
Fraction of high school teachers with advanced degrees.
Gender.
High school curriculum - general, college prep, vocational, or commercial.
High school dropout rate.
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High school enrollment.
Lived in urban, suburban, or rural area at age 14.
Mother’s age.
Mother’s occupation - Census 1 digit.
Mother’s years of education.
Number of books in high school library.
Number of high school clubs participated in.
Parental structure - both parents, father only, mother only, one parent & one step-
parent, other.
Per-capita income of county of residence at age 14.
Race.
Religion.
Whether somebody in household had library card when student was 14.
Whether somebody in household had magazine subscription when student was 14.
Whether somebody in household had newspaper subscription when student was 14.
Whether student ever knew father.
Whether student ever knew mother.
Year started college.
HSB
Average grades in high school.
Average HSB test percentile (1980 & 1982).
Census region of high school.
Expected major in 1982.




Fraction of high school teachers with advanced degrees.
Fraction of students in high school who are economically disadvantaged.
Gender.
High school curriculum - general, college prep, or vocational.
High school dropout rate.
High school enrollment.
How often student completes homework for class in high school.
How often student read for pleasure in high school.
Mother’s education.
Mother’s occupation.
Number of high school extracurricular activities participated in.
Number of high school extracurricular activities was leader in.
Parental structure - both parents, father only, mother only, other.
Per capita income of county of high school in 1982.
Race.
Religion.
Type of high school - public, alternative, Catholic, other private.
Year started college.
A.4 Chapter 3: Weighting
The NLSY is set up with weights based on years. However, the wage and
earnings estimates in this chapter are based on the age of the person, not the calendar
year. In order to best approximate the true representativeness of each subject, I use
the following procedure to create wage and earnings weights:
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(1) The sample is cut to include only those people who attended a 4-year college.
(2) Weights for each calendar year are normalized to sum to 1.
(3) Each individual weight is calculated to be the average of the weights in each
year the person is
(a) within the appropriate age range and
(b) reports the wage or earnings measure to be greater than 0.
For educational outcome measures in the NLSY, I use the provided weights for
the 2002 sample. This is to ensure that all individuals included in the analyses had
sufficient time to complete their education. For High School and Beyond, I use the
provided weights for the fourth (1992) follow-up survey.
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At risk At risk classification varies by grade:
K-3: Student fails a state reading exam or is LEP.
4-12: Student fails any section of state exam on most recent attempt, is LEP, or is overrage for grade.
A student is also classified "at-risk" if he/she is pregnant, abused, a parent, homeless, has previously 
dropped out, resides in a residential placement facility, attends an alternative education program, is on 
conditional release from juvenile corrections, or has previously been expelled.
Attendance rate Percent of days the student is enrolled during which the student attends class.
Average grade Annual average of quarterly (grades 1-5) or biannual (grades 6-12) grades in mathematics, reading, 
English, science, and social studies courses.
Bilingual education Student is enrolled in bilingual education classes.  LEP students only.
Criminal infractions Number of disciplinary infractions a student has during a given year warranting a punishment of one 
day suspension or higher in which the violation could be considered criminal.   Includes both violent 
and non-violent infractions such as vandalism.
English as a second language Student is enrolled in ESL classes.  LEP students only.
Free lunch Whether student is eligible for free lunches under the Federal free-lunch program.
Gifted and talented Student is enrolled in a gifted and talented program.
Infractions Number of disciplinary infractions a student has during a given year warranting a punishment of one 
day suspension or higher.
Language NPR National percentile ranking on language standardized examination.
Limited English proficient (LEP) A student is categorized as LEP if (a) he or she speaks a language other than english at home and (b) 
scores below English proficiency level on an oral language proficiency test or scores below the 40th 
percentile in total reading and language on standardized tests
Math grade Annual average of quarterly (grades 1-5) or biannual (grades 6-12) grades in mathematics courses.
Math NPR National percentile ranking on mathematics standardized examination.
Other economic disadvantage Student is designated as having another economic disadvantage if the student does not qualify for free 
or reduced-price lunch and one of the following conditions hold:
(1) family income is below Federal poverty line
(2) is eligible for public assistance (i.e. TANF, Food Stamps, etc.)
(3) family received a Pell Grant or comparable form of state financial aid
(4) eligible for training under Title II of the Job Training Partnership Act
Parents are migrants Student meets the following conditions for eligibility for the Migrant Education Program (MEP):
(1) aged 3-21
(2) has a parent, guardian, or spouse who is a migratory agricultural or fishing worker
(3) has moved between school districts withing 3 years for said parent, guardian, or spouse to seek 
temporary or seasonal work in agriculature or fishing
Reading/English grade Annual average of quarterly (grades 1-5) or biannual (grades 6-12) grades in reading and English 
courses.
Reading NPR National percentile ranking on reading standardized examination.
Recent immigrant (within 3 years) Student is aged 3-21, was born outside the US, and has not been enrolled in a US school for more than 
3 years (based on eligibility requirements of the Emergency Immigrant Education Program (EIEP) of 
1994.
Reduced price lunch Whether student is eligible for reduced price lunches under the Federal free-lunch program.
Retention Whether or not a student was held back one or more grades.
Special education Student is eligible for special education services.
Substance abuse infractions Number of disciplinary infractions a student has during a given year warranting a punishment of one 
day suspension or higher that are due to substance abuse, including alcohol and drugs, but excluding 
tabacco use.
Table A1 - Description of Data Elements Used in Chapters 1 and 2
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obust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses.  B
ehavior and attendence regressions 
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Test score regressions contain over 500,000 observations.    Exact sam
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due to confidentiality restrictions.  R
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Any Charter  Conversion  Startup
Math NPR Level 1.925** 2.000** 1.642
(0.551) (0.593) (1.381)
Reading NPR Level 0.633 0.708 0.348
(0.412) (0.477) (0.897)
Language NPR Level 0.850# 0.893 0.686
(0.470) (0.560) (0.756)
(1)
Any Charter  Conversion  Startup
# of Infractions -0.349** -0.222* -0.770**
(0.082) (0.090) (0.127)
Attendance Rate (%) 0.571 0.111 2.095*
(0.342) (0.148) (0.978)
Likelihood of Being Retained 0.005 -0.002 0.035
(0.010) (0.009) (0.038)
Δ Mathematics NPR 1.481** 1.811** 0.093
(0.440) (0.462) (0.916)
Δ Reading NPR -0.659* -0.582# -0.985
(0.324) (0.345) (0.844)
Δ Language NPR 0.494 0.474 0.573
(0.298) (0.335) (0.573)
Table A5 - Specification Tests
Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses.  Behavior and attendence 
regressions contain over 1,200,000 observations.  Retention regressions contain over 
1,000,000 observations.  Test score regressions contain over 800,000 observations in 
panel A and over 500,000 observations in panel B.    Exact sample sizes cannot be 
revealed due to confidentiality restrictions.  Regressions also include the following 
covariates: free or reduced price lunch status, other economic disadvantages,  whether 
student undergoes a nonstructual switch, whether student undergoes a structural switch, 




B. Regressions Weighted by Number of Days Enrolled
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Table A10 - Sample Reductions
NLSY79
Reason for Reduction Observations 
Left
NLSY Sample 12686
Base Sample (Attended 4-Yr College) 4595
    Missing ASVAB Scores 4392
    No FICE or UNITID Code Provided 4338
    Finished College Before 1979 4313
    Main School Could Not Be Determined   3875
    or Matched
    Not Public or Private-NFP 3823
    Main School is Military Academy 3819
Final Sample 3819
HSB-Sophomore Cohort
Reason for Reduction Observations 
Left
HSBSO Sample 14825
    Did Not Participate in All Follow-ups 11142
    Did not Graduate High School 10642
Base Sample (Attended 4–Yr Public or Private NFP 
College by 1986 & Attempted Bachelor Degree)
4237
    Missing Test Battery Scores 3842
    Listed a 4-Yr School with No FICE 3841
    Control not Public or Private NFP 3823
    Not Able to Match FICE 3788
    Did Not Graduate HS in 1982 3651
    Did Not Start College From 1982-1984 3544
    Race Defined as “Other” 3543
    HS Grades Missing 3542
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Component 1 Component 2
Science 0.345 -0.129
Arithmetic 0.339 0.030
Word Knowledge 0.347 0.064
Paragraph Comprehension 0.327 0.179
Numeric Operations 0.288 0.455
Coding Speed 0.261 0.516
Auto & Shop Information 0.285 -0.475
Mathematics Knowledge 0.324 0.123
Mechanical Comprehension 0.313 -0.350












Table A12 - Eigenvectors of First Two Principal Components of ASVAB 
Scores
Table A13 - Eigenvalues of Principal Components of ASVAB Scores
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